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l)ACCESS REGULATION FOR NATURALLY MONOPOLISTIC PORT TERMINALS
LESSONS FROM REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES
The access problem arises in industries where services are produced using inputs from
both monopolistic and competitive markets. In the port industry, a number of services
need to be jointly provided to complete the logistics chain: pilotage, towage, stevedoring,
storage, etc. In ports where a terminal constitutes a natural monopoly, an integrated
operator has incentives to deter competition from providers of the competitive services. To
avoid such situations from occurring, regulators have two options: forbidding integration
or implementing access policies under which all service providers are allowed to use the
terminal under reasonable conditions. The first option may create non-trivial transaction
costs that result in higher prices for the consumers, for which the second option
constitutes a more desirable policy. 
Unfortunately, formulating access policies is not an easy task. If conditions are too
high, a limited number of firms will enter the market, allowing existing ones to obtain
economic rents. If conditions are too relaxed, an excess of entry may occur, thus reducing
the operator’s incentives to adequately maintain and expand the terminal. This may
produce dear consequences in developing countries, where there is urgency for updating
and expanding port infrastructure. 
The objective of this thesis is to propose a model to deal with the access problem in the
port industry using as inputs the lessons learned in the telecommunications, electricity,
natural gas and railways industries.
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11. Introduction 
1.1. Research objectives 
During the last 50 years, trade in finished goods, components and services has been 
growing faster than the world’s GDP; a trend that is expected to continue in the future 
(Kumar and Hoffman, 2002). To be able to compete in a global scenario, an increased 
number of developing countries have been removing barriers to trade and resorting to 
the private sector to build and improve their port infrastructure. Indeed, according to 
PPIAF (2007), between 1990 and 2006 the private sector participated in almost 300 
port projects in developing countries, worth in excess of US$ 33 billion. More than 
ninety percent of these projects consisted of concessions, greenfield projects and 
divestitures. 
However, due to the economic characteristics of port operations (economies of scale, 
scope and density, and lumpy investments) some port terminals constitute natural 
monopolies for carriers and shippers located in their hinterlands (Flor and Defilippi, 
2003). Transferring monopolistic port terminals to the private sector without an 
adequate regulation of prices and access would allow their operators to obtain rents at 
expense of users (Train, 1991). 
Unlike railways and transmission or distribution networks in telecommunications, 
electricity and natural gas industries, which almost always exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics, in the port industry natural monopolies arise mostly in developing 
countries and small islands where traffic is too limited to justify a second terminal. 
Not surprisingly, literature regarding regulation of natural monopolies in network 
industries is abundant, while in ports, is scarce. Apart from few publications from 
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank (referring to 
transport regulation in general) and a handful of research papers, port regulation 
remains an unexplored matter. Moreover, its practice has been limited to a handful of 
countries. The only countries known to have established port regulators are Australia, 
Colombia and Peru. The further development of the discipline would allow 
governments to involve the private sector in the operation and construction of 
monopolistic terminals characteristics without the fear of harming carriers and 
shippers. 
2Regulation implies implementing two sets of policies: (i) price regulation (setting the 
price of services provided by the monopolist); and (ii), access regulation (setting the 
rules to ensure the monopolist will not deter access to related markets) (Defilippi and 
Flor, 2008). The objective of this thesis is to analyze the characteristics of access 
policies implemented in the telecommunications, electricity supply, natural gas and 
railways industries, and to use the lessons learned from these experiences to propose 
a model suitable for the port industry. Its relevance resides in the importance of the 
subject for the formulation of development strategies in developing countries, and the 
dearth of previous studies in the field.  
The access problem in the port industry 
The problem of access arises in industries where inputs from monopolistic and 
competitive markets are complementarily needed to provide a service. In these 
circumstances, the firm controlling the monopolistic segment has incentives to deter 
competition in the competitive segments (markets) to recover profits foregone by 
regulation (Paredes, 1997). In the port industry, for example, a number of services 
need to be provided to complete the logistics chain: pilotage, towage, stevedoring, 
storage, etc. Without any of these, cargo cannot be delivered. In ports where a 
terminal constitute a natural monopoly, an integrated terminal operator1 has incentives 
to deter competition in the markets of services that are necessary to complete the 
logistics chain, since this would allow him to charge disproportionate prices and 
recover monopolistic rents. This strategy can be implemented by preferential 
treatment to itself or sister companies, or by restricting competitors access to the 
terminal. 
OECD (2006) give several examples of terminal operators having sought to favor 
vertically-related carriers by impeding or complicating the operation of competing 
firms: in the UK, a terminal operator allowed a related ferry line to schedule its service 
to disrupt an entrant’s loading and unloading of passengers. In Denmark, the terminal 
denied access to a ferry line on the grounds that it would prevent existing companies 
from expanding operations. In Bulgaria, a catering firm was unable to enter the 
market because the terminal management refused to dispose the waste brought by the 
company or to allow its trucks entering the terminal. Similar behavior by operators of 
naturally monopolistic terminals has been reported in Peru (Alcazar and Lovaton, 
2005) and Colombia (World Bank, 2007). Likewise, the expansion into developing 
countries of carrier-related terminal operation companies (such as Cosco Group, MSC, 
Evergreen) to operate common-user facilities has also raised concern that similar 
attitudes may arise. One example is the concern expressed after the Cameroon 
Government granted APM Terminals (a company related to Maesrk) the concession to 
operate Douala’s common-user container terminal (Port Strategy, 2003 and 2004).  
                                                
1 A terminal operator that also provides shipping or logistics services (by itself or through related 
companies). 
3To avoid the situations from occurring, regulators have two options. They can either 
(i) forbid integration between terminal operators and carriers or, (ii) establish a 
framework under which all service providers are allowed to access and use the 
terminal under reasonable conditions. As suggested by Vickers (1995), the first option 
(vertical separation) may create non-trivial transaction costs that result in higher 
prices for the consumers, for which the second option (the implementation of access 
policies) constitutes a more desirable policy. However, formulating access policies is 
not an easy task. If access conditions are too high, a limited number of entrants will 
use the terminal, allowing providers to obtain economic rents. If conditions are too 
relaxed, an excess of entry may occur, thus reducing the terminal operator’s 
incentives to adequately maintain and expand the infrastructure (Laffont and Tirole 
1994)2.  
This research analyzes access policies implemented in three countries: UK, US and 
Australia. These countries were chosen because they have approached the access 
problem from different perspectives, and because they are considered best practice 
cases among regulation practitioners (ADB, 2000).  
The UK was the first developed country that carried out a comprehensive privatization 
program, which required formulating access policies without the benefit of previous 
experiences. As we will see in the following chapters, this lack of experience, but also 
of sound economic assessments, led UK regulators to underestimate the monopolists’ 
ability to deter competition despite the implementation of open access policies. On the 
other hand, the US has a long tradition of encouraging competition and allowing the 
private supply of public services. In this country, the reform of network industries 
focused more in restructuring than in changing the nature of their ownership. The 
Australian strategy, on the other hand, consisted on implementing the National Access 
Regime whose provisions cover all relevant infrastructures (regardless of the nature of 
their ownership and the industry they belong). 
1.2 Overview of the study 
The thesis comprises three parts.  
Part I presents the theoretical developments that are necessary to understand the 
nature of the access problem, and the choices to address it. It also analyzes the 
particular nature of the access problem in the port industry and the reasons why 
governments need to address it before concessioning naturally monopolistic terminals. 
                                                
2 An optimal entry is the number of competitors that would enter the market if the terminal was not 
monopolistic (Laffont and Tirole 1994). 
4Chapter 2 presents the basic elements of regulation theory: monopoly pricing, 
regulation rationale and regulatory failures.  It also introduces the five basic dilemmas 
a regulator faces when addressing the problems caused by monopolies. It also 
discusses the main options to introduce competition in network industries: 
competition for the market, competition over existing networks and competition 
among networks. These options are suitable for industries with different economic 
characteristics.   
Chapter 3 discusses the most relevant topics related to the access problem: whether 
vertical separation is convenient or not, the theory behind access pricing and the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD). Chapter 4 analyzes the evidence on the effects of 
privatization processes around the world. It starts by discussing the reasons argued by 
governments to embark on privatization programs and the extension of these in the 
world. It also reviews diverse assessments on efficiency, tariffs and welfare, 
concluding that the majority of them support the idea that privatization had brought 
net positive effects to the implementing countries. Finally, the chapter reviews 
privatization assessments in the port industry. This section concludes that successful 
privatization processes are those complemented by sound regulation, thus supporting 
the idea that better regulatory policies are needed to deal with natural monopolies in 
the port industry. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the basics of port economics; discusses the main 
drivers for port reform around the world and illustrates the processes undertaken in 
three developing countries. Its aim is to demonstrate that privatization of naturally 
monopolistic terminals could be counterproductive in countries unless access policies 
are implemented. The chapter also discusses the relationship between competition and 
access and the dilemmas regulators face when implementing such policies. It shows 
that designing access policies involves making decisions or setting rules regarding 
four main issues: 
a. Vertical structure; 
b. Pricing;  
c. Non-price terms and conditions; and, 
d. The mechanism to expand the infrastructure. 
Part II analyzes the access policies implemented in regulated network industries in 
UK, US and Australia. Its goal is to summarize the lessons learned during their 
implementation and to use them to propose an access model for naturally 
monopolistic terminals. It starts with chapter 6, which describes the economic 
characteristics of network industries and their relationship with diverse market 
structures. This chapter is necessary to understand how the complementarity between 
the components of a network may allow a monopolist controlling an essential input to 
deter competition in related markets.  
5Chapters 7 to 10 analyze the access policies implemented in telecommunications, 
electricity, natural gas and rail industries. To facilitate comparisons, they follow the 
same structure. With the aim of contextualizing the analysis, the economic 
characteristics of the industry and its reform trends are first presented. This is 
followed by a discussion on the industry’s access arrangements and a study of the UK, 
US and Australian cases. Each chapter concludes with a section summarizing the 
lessons that can be drawn for formulating access policies in the port industry.  
The aim of Part III is to propose an access model for the port industry using as inputs 
the lessons drawn from analyzing access policies implemented in network industries.  
Chapter 11 aims at drawing these lessons. It starts by discussing the similarities 
between the economic characteristics of ports and networks industries. The next 
section summarizes the lessons learned from implementing access policies in these 
industries. The last section uses the lessons learned to determine the characteristics 
that an access regime for the port industry should have.  
Chapter 12 proposes an access model to regulate naturally monopolistic port terminals 
using the lessons learned from network industries. The main objective of the proposed 
model is to allow competition to occur in markets that otherwise would need to be 
price-regulated. By limiting regulatory intervention only to situations when it is 
effectively needed, this policy is less costly and less likely to spawn market 
distortions. 
The analysis of the possible interactions between incumbent and service providers 
shows that the implementation of the proposed access regime is likely to reduce entry 
barriers, increase contestability and introduce competition in markets for port 
services. Five out of eight possible outcomes are clearly competitive, and the above-
the-market returns obtained in the remaining three are expected to attract competitors 
until these rents disappear. 
Finally, chapter 13 presents the conclusions of the research.   
1.3 Limitations of the Research 
This thesis has several limitations that need to be pointed out.  
The most important limitation is the one indicated in section 1.1:  there is a limited 
number of academic articles in the subject of port regulation3, an even more reduced 
number of port terminals subject to economic regulation and only few port regulators 
                                                
3 A search for the words “port” and “regulation” in IDEAS (http://ideas.repec.org/; Internet’s largest 
open database of economic papers) yielded only 30 results as of December 2008. 
6in the world. As indicated earlier, only the cases of private terminals located in 
Australia, Colombia and Peru are known to be subject to port regulation, and only the 
latter has been studied in academic journals. 
A second limitation is that even though examples of regulatory policies implemented 
in countries other than the UK, US and Australia are mentioned when possible, it was 
not possible to analyze them in detail.  The author considers, though, that the analyzed 
country cases provide a perspective broad enough to illustrate the options regulators 
have when implementing access policies. 
A further limitation is caused by the inter-industry approach of the research, which 
prevents a more detailed analysis of the motivations policy makers had when favoring 
one regulatory option over another. Although this is not required to analyze the 
consequences of the policies actually implemented, its inclusion would have 
substantially enriched the research. Likewise, the descriptions of the implemented 
regulatory, and the events that occurred in parallel or as a consequence of them, are 
based on secondary sources. Although an adequate effort has been put into describing 
facts rather than interpretations of them, the use of secondary sources may have cause 
inaccuracies the author was not able to correct. 
A final limitation of this thesis is that it is impossible to contrast the proposed access 
regime with reality unless it is implemented and enough time passes to analyze its 
consequences.  Further research will be necessary when this occurs. 
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92. Monopolies and the need for 
regulation  
Regulation is one of the forms of government intervention aimed at assuring the 
correct functioning of economic activities. Through laws, regulators condition agents 
to behave in a different manner than what they would do in the absence of 
institutional restrictions. There exist three main types of regulation: economic, social 
and process regulation.  Economic regulation refers to restrictions in prices, quantity 
and access conditions for specific industries. Social regulation refers to rules that 
apply to several industries, like health, safety and environmental ones. Process 
regulation refers to government management of the operation of the public sector, 
like administrative requirements and costs incurred by producers and consumers 
(Guasch and Spiller, 1999).  
Although certain regulations fall into more than one of these categories (like 
economic regulations caused by environmental concerns) and some others do not fit 
in any of the described ones, this classification serves to clarify what kind of 
regulation this research deals with: the economic regulation of transport 
infrastructure. 
This chapter introduces the theories of monopolies and regulation. The first section 
presents the basic economics of both the general and natural monopoly cases, 
describing their economic characteristics and consequences on welfare. The second 
section introduces economic regulation and explains the theoretical arguments behind 
its existence. It also presents the main theoretical dilemmas a regulator has to face 
when implementing regulatory policies. The last section presents the menu of 
regulatory options to introduce competition in natural monopolies. 
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2.1 Monopoly theory  
 
2.1.1 The general monopoly case 
 
In the absence of regulation, the monopolist would choose a price that maximizes its 
profit function Ȇ(p), which is the difference between the cost of producing goods and 
the revenues obtained by selling them: 
 
 
 
Where D(p) and C(p) are the demand and cost functions, respectively.  Applying the 
first-order condition 0=
Π
dp
d
, the following expression is obtained:
 
 
 
Where MC is the marginal cost. Reordering and dividing into p*: 
 
 
 
This expression is equivalent to:
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, where İ is the price elasticity of 
demand at equilibrium, defined as:
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Consumer surplus is a measure (in currency units) of the utility generated by 
consuming a determined quantity at a determined price p*.   It is defined as the 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay, less what they actually pay:  
 
 
 
Therefore, the variation of the consumer surplus when prices vary is: 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the cost curves of and demand that are typical of a monopoly 
situation. Notice that the demand curve is negatively-sloped, since the monopolist 
supply the entire market, for which the demand it faces matches that of the entire 
market. 
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Figure 2.1 Costs and Demand Curves in a Monopoly Situation 
 
It can be seen that the price that assures the achievement of allocative efficiency is 
where demand (D) and marginal costs (MC) are equaled.  In this point, the value of 
the last produced unit matches the marginal cost of producing it.  In figure 2.1, this 
corresponds to point c, where a quantity yc is produced and a price pc is reached.  At 
this point, the sum of consumer surplus (abc) plus the net benefit of the monopolist 
(bcd) is the maximum. Since this is the point where the welfare of the society is 
maximized, it is called the first-best. 
 
However, when the market structure is a monopoly, the interests of the monopolist do 
not match the interests of the rest of society.  In this case, the point that maximizes 
benefits to the monopolist is not point c but point g, where the revenue produced by 
the last unit sold (its marginal revenue) equals the cost of producing it (its marginal 
cost).  Therefore, a profit-maximizing monopolist will use its market power to limit 
the number of units in the market until marginal revenue (MR) matches marginal cost 
(MC).  In the terms of figure 2.1, the quantity that achieves this equivalency is ym, 
causing the price to rise up to pm.  This behavior, however, will cause negative 
consequences to consumers, who are obliged to pay a price of pm instead of pc due to 
the artificial scarcity caused by the monopolist by restricting production.   
 
Additionally, the monopolist’s behavior also causes economic inefficiency.  It can be 
seen in figure 2.2 that raising the price to pm reduces consumer surplus by the area 
emcb, but the monopolist only appropriates the area emfb.  Therefore, the triangle 
mcg is lost, causing a social cost in terms of inefficiency called triangles of Dupuit, 
Harberger or deadweight loss (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
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Figure 2.2: Social Loss Caused by a Monopolist 
 
There are other inefficiencies caused by monopolies.  One of them is the so called “X-
inefficiency” that arises when monopolies do not minimize their costs. These 
productive inefficiencies have been interpreted as a consequence of the lack of effort 
to reduce costs of firms facing limited competition. Nevertheless, these arguments 
against monopolies are less important when other aspects such as technological 
innovation or economies of scale and scope are considered. Tirole (1990) argues that 
monopolistic firms have more incentives than potential entrants to innovate when 
these innovations are non drastic, while entrants have more incentives to introduce 
innovations when they are more drastic.  In this view, competitive structures do not 
necessarily deliver better results regarding technological innovations than 
monopolistic ones.  On the contrary, Guasch and Spiller (1999) argue that the 
regulation required to prevent abuses from monopolies may cause adverse effects in 
the economy by delaying the introduction of technologically available services.  They 
use the case of cellular telephony and voice messaging in the US to illustrate how 
regulation can slow the introduction of new products and discourage innovation, 
costing the consumers hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
It is worth noting that from a theoretical point of view, it may be beneficial for society 
to maintain a monopoly if economies of scale or scope exist, since, in this case, the 
average production cost of one firm operating in the market would be lower than the 
average cost of two or more firms (regardless the quantity produced).  In these 
circumstances, the introduction of competition may not be desirable. This is the 
natural monopoly argument used to restrict the access of competitors in several 
industries where economies or scale or scope are significant.   
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2.1.2 The natural monopoly case 
 
The concept of natural monopoly has been usually linked to the existence of 
economies of scale and scope.  However, relatively recent research has shown that the 
appropriate definition of natural monopoly lies on the concept of sub-additivity of 
costs (Tirole, 1990).  These concepts are formally defined below. 
 
 
Economies of scale 
 
To assure the presence of economies of scale in the case of a multi-product firm, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the following definitions: 
 
a. Average Multi-Product Cost (AMPC). In the case of a firm producing “n” 
goods,
Ya
YC
AMPC
⋅
=
)(
, where Y is the production vector and a > 0 is a vector 
of relative weights. 
 
b. Decreasing Average Multi-Product Costs. AMPC is decreasing in “Y” if 
AMPC(tY) is a decreasing function of the scalar “t” when t=1:  
 
 
 
There exists evidence of the presence of economies of scale in the case of a Multi-
Product firm if the AMPC is decreasing. It can be said that a firm’s cost function is 
sub-additive, when the presence of economies of scale is supposed, if the following 
conditions are met (Gallardo, 1999): 
 
a. The cost function is convex through cutting rays departing from the origin; 
 
b. The cost function is quasi-convex; and, 
 
c. The cost function has decreasing AMPC 
 
 
Economies of scope 
 
There exist economies of scope in the production of a combination of goods, when the 
cost of producing such a combination by a single firm is lower than the cost of 
producing it by two or more firms that do not produce the same good (Tirole, 1990).  
In the case of a multi-product firm, economies of scope refer to the existence of 
synergies in the production of two or more goods derived, for example, from the 
shared use of a production factor. This would allow a single firm to produce goods 
0
(tY) AMPC
1
<
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cheaper than competitors who do not share production factors, even if economies of 
scale are not present. 
 
To assure the presence of economies of scope in the case of a multi-product firm, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the following definitions: 
 
a. Incremental Cost of Producing “j”. The incremental cost of producing “j” is 
the difference between producing all the goods and producing all the goods 
minus “j”:  
 
)()()( jj YCYCYIC −−=  
 
Where Y-j is the same production vector “Y”, but placing “0” instead of “j”. 
 
b. Average Incremental Cost. The average incremental cost of “j” is:  
 
 
 
It can be said that the firm’s cost function is sub-additive, when the presence of 
economies of scope is assumed, if for any good Yj belonging to the production vector 
Y, the average incremental cost is decreasing (Gallardo, 1999). 
 
 
Sub-additivity of costs 
 
An industry is said to be a natural monopoly when technology imposes a cost function 
that makes it cheaper, for a relevant demand interval, to produce a good or service 
with only one firm in the market (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982).  Formally, a cost 
function “C” associated to a production vector “Y” is strictly sub-additive if the cost 
of producing Y by one firm is lower than the cost of producing the same vector by two 
or more firms using the same technology, for any sub-group “i” of Y.  Therefore, a 
cost function is sub-additive if it satisfies the following condition for the relevant 
demand interval:  
 
¦< i iYCYC )()(  
 
Where: 
¦ =i i YY . 
 
Then, an industry can be defined as a natural monopoly if the cost function is strictly 
sub-additive for the relevant demand interval (Tirole, 1990). As it can be seen, the 
concepts of sub-additivity of costs and natural monopoly are mutually implied. 
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It is worth noting that only in the case of single-product producer, economies of scale 
constitute a sufficient (although not necessary) condition for the existence of a natural 
monopoly. If the firm produces several goods, economies of scale are neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of natural monopolies.  
Graphically, this can be seen in figure 2.3.  Assume all firms that might provide the 
good or service in question have identical cost structures.  In the figure, each firm’s 
average cost curve AC(y) declines up to the production level ya, increasing thereafter.  
The market demand intersects the average cost curve at the output level yb > ya.  
Given the shapes of the curves in figure 2.2, it can be seen that a single supplier could 
serve the entire market at lower unit cost than any industry configuration with two or 
more firms.  In this sense, the industry is a natural monopoly even if economies of 
scale do not exist for all levels of output up to yb (Breautigam, 1989). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Sub-Additivity of Costs without Global Economies of Scale 
 
The natural monopoly constitutes one of the cases where market forces cannot obtain 
efficient allocation of resources, and this has been the principal argument to justify the 
regulation of infrastructure-based industries. In this case, regulation is used to avoid 
excessive prices, thus allowing a socially efficient use of the produced goods.   
 
Natural monopolies are more likely to arise where the total cost has a large fixed-cost 
component, like in most public utilities such as in electricity distribution or in a fixed-
line telephone network. As we will see later, large transport infrastructures such as 
ports, airports, railways and highways may also constitute natural monopolies 
depending on the size of the demand they face. 
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2.2 Regulation theory 
According to Brown et al (2006), regulation refers to government-imposed controls 
on business activity, concerning the setting, monitoring, and enforcing of maximum 
tariffs and of minimum service standards.  
2.2.1 The need for regulation 
According to Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (2000) there are both positive and 
normative views that offer answers to the question of why there is regulation. From 
the positive point of view, regulation is justified when the fundamental theorems of 
welfare economics fail. These theorems constitute the theoretical support of free 
markets as an efficient resource-allocation mechanism (Varian, 1999). 
a. First Theorem of Welfare Economics. Under the following conditions, 
equilibrium in a set of competitive markets is Pareto-efficient: (i) there are no 
consumption externalities; and (ii), there are enough agents to ensure that each 
one behaves competitively.   
b. Second Theorem of Welfare Economics. If all agents have convex preferences, 
every efficient allocation is a competitive equilibrium for some initial 
allocation of goods.   
These theorems state that, under certain conditions, market forces lead to an efficient 
allocation of resources without the need of external intervention. The first theorem 
implies that a private market in which each agent seeks to maximize his or her own 
utility will result in a Pareto-efficient allocation. The second theorem implies that 
whatever allocation of resources is considered socially fair can be supported by the 
market mechanism From a normative point of view, regulation is justified when a 
market is a natural monopoly or it is plagued by externalities. In these circumstances, 
free markets do not lead to an efficient allocation of resources (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1998). 
The existence of a natural monopoly obliges a society to face a conflict between 
productive and allocative efficiencies whose solutions require government 
intervention in the form of regulation. To achieve productive efficiency, it would be 
necessary to allow only one firm in the market, because it is the only case when the 
value of the inputs used to supply the market is minimized. However, this lack of 
competition would encourage the monopolist to set prices above marginal cost, 
therefore impeding the achievement of allocative efficiency that is produced when 
prices are set as close as possible to production costs.  
Externalities exist when the actions of an agent cause positive or negative 
consequences on other agents’ welfare and they are not internalized by the causing 
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party (Fernandez-Baca, 2006).  The most evident example is the use of natural 
resources, like water, in the production of goods. Without government intervention 
water would be inadequately priced, thus leading to an inefficient waste that would 
deplete its sources or prevent other producers from using it. Therefore, in the presence 
of externalities, competition does not result in optimal allocation of resources, for 
which regulation is required. 
Regulation is usually applied to utilities such as electricity, natural gas and 
telecommunications, all of which exhibit characteristics of natural monopolies. As it 
will be shown in the following sections, under certain circumstances key transport 
infrastructures such as ports and airports may also constitute natural monopolies 
requiring regulation. Other reason argued for regulation, besides the standard 
distortionary and distributive effects of monopoly pricing, is the way these industries 
affect the competitiveness of the rest of the economy, since the production of most 
goods uses transport services, energy or telecommunications as inputs. If they are 
priced high, the country is unnecessarily vulnerable to off-shore competition (Tarzijan 
and Paredes, 2001). 
According to Guasch and Spiller (1999), in the specific case of developing countries, 
where the institutional framework is weak and regulatory decisions may be biased due 
to interest groups or political considerations, the demand for regulation comes from 
the need to solve three types of problems: 
a. Government behavior that may distort incentives to invest. These are the 
problems that may distort the investment incentives of companies owning 
large and expensive infrastructures, such as port terminals. To invest in these 
long-lived assets, operators require prices to be set at levels that allow them to 
recover their costs. However, given the weak institutional framework of 
developing countries, political considerations may tempt governments to set 
prices below its optimal level. As shown by Defilippi and Flor (2008), 
regulatory agencies enjoy a large degree of discretion in the selection of 
estimation methodologies when estimating regulated prices, which they could 
use to set artificially-low prices.  
The solution to this problem requires credible regulation. It means the design 
of an institutional arrangement that deters the government from acting 
opportunistically. For example, by granting operational independency to 
regulatory agencies or reducing the causes for which their commissioners or 
directors can be sacked. 
b. Problems between governments and interest groups. These problems refer to 
the problems that may encourage governments to distort regulatory policies to 
favor of special-interest groups.  
According to the positive theory of regulation, this occurs when an interest 
group is able to convince the government to use its coercion power to improve 
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its welfare, even though harming other groups. This situation is more likely to 
occur when the harm produced, although large in aggregate, represent just a 
small loss of welfare for each individual consumer. Examples of this behavior 
can be seen in the transport industry. Appendix 1 illustrates the case of 
pilotage in the Netherlands, although similar arrangements are found in many 
other countries. 
The government may benefit from this behavior if, as a consequence, receives 
political support from a well organized group. Well organized groups are more 
likely to gain from this behavior than less organized ones. Producers are 
typically well organized, while consumers are not (Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington, 2000).   
c. Problems between firms and their customers, as a consequence of the firms’ 
market power. These are the problems that arise as a consequence of the 
asymmetric bargaining power between consumers and a single producer. If 
left unregulated, this asymmetry may allow the producer to raise its prices 
above marginal costs or provide poor quality levels. Regulation could solve 
this contractual problem by setting both price and quality levels. 
In response to these problems, an optimal regulatory framework should set prices 
adequately, provide adequate investment incentives, create a framework for 
productive efficiency and minimize opportunities of interest groups to lobby for 
inefficient policies. However, in the real world the environment for the production of 
regulation differs from optimal, and it is strongly influenced by political 
considerations, interest groups and producers’ bargaining power (Laffont, 1995). In 
order to solve these problems, regulation may take many forms, depending on the 
characteristics of the specific sector and the country’s economic, legal and political 
context. Countries may choose to have industry-specific regulators (UK), one regulator 
covering several industries (US at state level) or grant regulatory powers to its antitrust 
agency (Australia).  
2.2.2 Regulatory failures 
As we have seen, regulation is needed to resolve problems that cannot be solved by 
market mechanisms alone. However, regulation also fails, and according to the theory 
of public choice4, the failures generated by government intervention may result in 
higher economic costs than those caused by market failures (Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington, 2000). The most common regulatory failures are the following: 
                                                
4 This theory is based on the application of the criteria of individual choice (maximization of individual 
preferences subject to determined restrictions) to decisions made by public institutions (Lasheras, 
1999) 
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a. Information asymmetries. This problem arises because regulatory agencies 
have less information about technologies, costs and the characteristics of the 
demand than the regulated firms.  
In the absence of complete information about the firm’s technology and 
opportunity costs, governments face a trade-off between granting adequate 
incentives to the firm and reducing their potential rents. As a matter of fact, 
schemes that provide good incentives to a regulated firm to reduce costs are 
those that reward it with €1 for each €1 of cost reduction, such as fix-price 
contracts or RPI-X price-setting methodology (which will be analyzed in detail 
in section 2.2.4). However, if the government cannot observe if a cost 
reduction is a consequence of exogenous variables (such as technology 
changes), or endogenous ones (such as cost-reduction efforts enabled by the 
firm), this scheme generates substantial rents. Alternatively, if prices were set 
according to incurred costs, regulated firms would not have incentives to 
reduce them. According to Laffont and Tirole (1993), these errors may 
introduce more inefficiencies to the economy that than those the government 
tries to avoid.  
Policies to overcome these informational disadvantages require sophisticated 
administrative capabilities and a substantial amount of regulatory discretion.  
Unfortunately, as mentioned before governments in developing countries tend 
to face institutional and financial restrictions that limit their administrative 
capabilities. Granting significant discretion to public officers in contexts of 
weak institutional development increases regulatory risks and may deter 
private investments. 
b. Regulatory capture. These failures arise when regulatory decisions are biased 
towards the interests of a determined group, causing inefficiencies by 
improving the welfare of this group at the expense of others.  This problem, 
which constitutes one of the reasons that explain the demand for regulation, 
was explained in the previous section. 
To understand why governments can get away with policies that favor certain 
groups, Laffont and Tirole (2000) explain the relation among general public, 
government and regulated firm, in terms of two agency problems. The 
regulatory problem consists of finding the right incentives the government 
(principal) should give to the regulated firm (the agency) so that the latter will 
behave consistently with the policies set by the government. Likewise, the 
policies set by the government, in theory, constitute a response to the interests 
of general public, who in this second problem act as the principal, the 
government being the agency. 
Nevertheless, the individuals that constitute the general public have no 
incentive to make the investment of having a good understanding of the 
technology and economics of utilities. In order to solve this problem, they 
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elect political representatives and support the creation of regulatory agencies 
who act as informational intermediaries. The role of these intermediaries is to 
reduce the information asymmetry between the industry and the rest of the 
society. But this expertise creates the second agency problem: it is precisely 
because the government possesses an expertise the general public lacks, that it 
can get away with policies that favor a determined group to the detriment of 
the rest of the society. This also explains why the influence of a determined 
group is not necessarily offset by interest groups with opposite interests. 
c. Regulatory commitment. Given that governments, as public decision makers, 
have short-term horizons (usually, until the next election), static efficiency 
may collide with dynamic efficiency. Under certain circumstances (political 
reasons, general macroeconomic policies or other constraints), governments 
maybe reluctant to raise tariffs when needed, which might discourage 
appropriate maintenance and new investments. Governments may be tempted 
to implement this sort of policies because their effects might only be 
noticeable in the long-term.  
An example of this occurred in Argentina after the large devaluation of the 
currency that occurred in the period 2000-2001. The government broke its 
commitment to set tariffs for utilities maintaining its value in us dollars by 
setting new ones in (devaluated) Argentinean Pesos, causing great losses to 
investors. As a consequence, exploration activities were drastically reduced: in 
2002, no wells were drilled, and in 2003, only one. The country's natural-gas 
reserves dropped 21% between 2000 and 2003 (Honoré, 2004). However, the 
government’s approval ratings soared at the time the decision was made (The 
Economist, 2005b). 
Moreover, the lack of regulatory commitment may exacerbate the negative 
consequences of a problem known as the ratchet-effect (Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington, 2000).  As said before, schemes that provide good incentives to a 
regulated firm to reduce costs are those that reward it with €1 for each €1 of 
cost reduction. This problem will arise because, under these schemes, the firm 
will only receive this reward at the next tariff revision, when cost reductions 
will be passed on to consumers in the form of reduced tariffs. This reduction, 
however, will impose higher performance requirements from that period on. 
The ratchet-effect consists on the reluctance of regulated firms to pursue full-
extend cost-reductions to avoid higher performance requirements in the future. 
Given the economics of long-lived infrastructures, the lack of regulatory 
commitment may translate into governments trying to renegotiate concessions 
conditions during the period the regulated firm is making profits (after long 
periods of cost-recovery). This likelihood may increase a regulated firm’s 
reluctance to cost-cutting. 
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On the other hand, the regulated firm may also force the government to 
renegotiate and offer more favorable terms if it can make credible threats of 
bankruptcy, or when it can show that the initial terms of the regulatory 
contract are not profitable enough to allow it to carry on the investments the 
government regards as necessary. As we can see, the likelihood of ex post 
contract renegotiation (which is inversely proportional to the government’s 
degree of regulatory commitment) punishes the firm’s cost-reduction efforts, 
thus rewarding its inefficiency. 
 
Regulation may also fail due to a mismatch between regulatory framework and a 
country’s institutional characteristics. For example, it is hard to find in developing 
countries the sophisticated professional and administrative capabilities that regulation 
requires. Therefore, an institutional arrangement that does not take into account these 
limitations may fail because regulated firms can manipulate the process or because 
regulators do not follow the right procedure (Estache and Ginés de Rus, 2000). To 
avoid this problem, it may be necessary to reduce the regulator’s discretionary powers 
by introducing rigidities in decision making. However, this solution may also cause 
inefficiencies by imposing higher administrative requirements and unnecessarily 
dilate regulatory decisions. 
 
 
2.2.3 Regulator’s objective function 
 
It has been stated before that regulation can take many forms, depending on the 
country’s economic, political and social characteristics. However, considering the 
special knowledge and skills that regulation requires, is common for governments to 
create regulatory agencies to oversee one or several industries (Banco Mundial, 
1997). 
 
In formal terms, the regulator’s objective function is usually defined as the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, although not necessarily with similar weights 
(Braeutigam, 1989).  Therefore, the problem for the regulator is to set a price that 
maximizes its objective function W(p):   
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Where E(p) and Ȇ(p) represent the consumer and producer surpluses, respectively; 
and the factor Į reflects the social valuation of the interests of producers and 
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, which means that consumer surplus reduces 
as prices rises and the contrary occurs to producer surplus. Therefore, there is an 
inverse relation between E(p) and ∏(p). 
 
Transforming W(p), we obtain:  
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Where D(p) denotes the demand function and C denotes the total cost of production. 
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pD ⋅=ε  the price that fulfills the first-order condition and 
maximizes the regulator’s objective function is: 
 
 
 
According to this expression, when Į =1, the optimal price is the one that matches the 
marginal cost.  For 0<Į<1, the optimal price is located below the marginal cost, whilst 
for Į>1, the optimal price approaches the monopoly price. 
 
According to Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), there are two main reasons why 
Į may take values lower than 1.  First, it may be socially preferable to transfer income 
from shareholders to consumers, since the average income of the shareholders tend to 
be higher than those of the consumers. And second, the regulator may try to balance 
the shareholder’s capacity of influencing regulatory decisions by adopting Į lower 
than 1. 
 
In countries such as US and UK, where governments tend to refrain from intervening in 
market, regulators are expected to adopt Į closer to one. In more socially-oriented 
economies like the ones in continental Europe, a smaller Į would be expected 
(Lasheras, 1999). 
 
 
2.2.4 Regulation methodologies 
 
There are two pricing methodologies that are most used by regulators: rate-of return 
and price-caps (Kahn, 2004). 
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Rate-of-return  
This methodology has been widely used in monopoly pricing, and is common in 
Japan, Canada and the United States (Intven, Oliver and Sepúlveda, 2000). It consists 
of the regulator setting prices so that the regulated firm earns only a fair return on its 
capital investments. Prices must satisfy the following condition: 
gIYCyp
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Where pi and yi are the price and quantities sold of the good “i”, “C” represents the 
costs and expenses incurred to provide “N” goods, “g” is the return on investment and 
“I” represents the investments which will earn such return.  
This regulation has three components:  
a. The rate base, constituted by the investments that will be allowed to earn a rate 
of return (usually plant minus depreciation and working capital). 
b. The rate level, which refers to the relation of overall revenues to costs. 
c. The rate structure, which refers to the individual prices charged for different 
services to different consumers.   
The most important activities of this form of regulation is deciding what kind of 
investments will be included in the rate base, and selecting the appropriate rate of 
return. Since both variables are estimated using methodologies that are selected 
through subjective criteria, rate-of-return regulation makes regulatory decisions more 
easily challengeable before the courts, and may convert the judiciary into the ultimate 
regulator. This characteristic may introduce more inefficiency to the regulatory 
process. 
The main strength of this price-setting policy is that it insulates the firm against 
unforeseen events by allowing it to recover unexpected costs.  However, it suffers 
from three essential problems (Guasch and Spiller, 1999): 
a. It provides little incentive for productive efficiency, since it allows firms to 
pass all production costs onto consumers in the form of higher prices. 
b. Since the firm earns a return over its capital investments, this method 
encourages the firm to invest excessively. 
c. The regulator needs a high degree of discretion to implement it. This 
facilitates regulatory capture by regulated firms, thus inducing rent-seeking 
behavior from monopolists. 
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Price-caps  
Price-cap regulation is increasingly replacing rate-of-return as preferred pricing 
methodology. It is the most common form of regulation in Europe for privatized gas, 
telephone, electricity and water companies. It is also the price-setting policy used by 
regulators in the US, Singapore, and several countries in Latin America (Intven, Oliver 
and Sepúlveda, 2000). It has been the methodology to regulate prices for monopolistic 
port terminals in Colombia, Australia and Peru. 
Under price-cap regulation, the firm is allowed to raise its prices between review 
periods, at the rate of the Retail Price Index (RPI or inflation rate), minus some amount 
(the X factor) chosen to reflect expected increases in productivity (this is the reason 
why this scheme is also called RPI-X). The main benefit of this methodology is that 
allows producers and consumers to share the risks and rewards. It also provides 
incentives for cost-cutting, since the firm may keep any cost savings until the end of 
the review period. In this way, a profit-maximizing concessionaire will maintain its 
incentive to operate efficiently, and this effort will be passed on to the consumers in 
the form of price reductions at the next review period (Bernstein and Sappington, 
1998). 
As we can see, this system avoids the drawbacks of rate-of-return regulation by 
setting incentives to reduce costs and achieving productive efficiency.  However, the 
use of this price-setting policy has some shortcoming as well (Guasch and Spiller, 
1999): 
a. Regulatory capture. The profitability of a regulated firm depends on the price 
set by the regulator. If governments want to concession more infrastructures or 
attract further capital to the industry, the regulator may be tempted to keep 
prices high.   
b. Regulatory risk. The use of the RPI-X methodology may distort investment 
incentives if the public policy towards private provision of public services 
changes with the government’s political agenda. 
c. Cost calculations. The use of this methodology does not reduce the 
information asymmetries between regulator and regulated firms described 
before, and may even exacerbate them because of the use of forward-looking 
costs to set the X factor. 
d. Cross-subsidization among regions. The regulator may receive public pressure 
to set the same prices across different regions even when costs differ in 
different geographical markets, thus forcing the monopolists to cross-subsidize 
certain services based on the location of the infrastructure. 
e. Entry deterrence. The use of price-caps that allow rate rebalancing among 
services may be used by monopolists to cross-subsidize services sold in 
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competitive markets with those sold in monopolistic ones, thus deterring entry 
in potentially competitive complementary markets. 
f. Access pricing. As we will see in the next chapter, access prices should be set 
to allow the monopolist to recover all costs incurred, but, at the same time, 
they should not deter competition in complementary markets (pilotage, 
towage, warehousing). Regulators receive pressures to use access-pricing 
methodologies that favor either the monopolist or its competitors. 
g. Regulatory lags. Cost reductions that can be gained from privatization of 
utilities tend to diminish over time. This increases the possibility of the 
government overestimating cost reductions. If the review period is longer that 
the lag between expectations and reality, it can lock the regulator and the 
regulated firms into an inappropriate framework that is difficult to adjust. On 
the other hand, too frequent reviews may increase regulatory risks and deter 
investments. 
Comparing rate-of-return and price-caps5
This section compares both regulation methodologies under several criteria. It can be 
seen that despite the increasing popularity of price-caps, they are not better for all 
scenarios. 
Productive efficiency 
As we have seen, rate-or-return regulation biases investments decisions towards a 
more-intensive-than-optimal capital use. Price-cap regulation corrects this bias 
because it allows the regulated firm to appropriate the surplus generated by cost cuts 
until the end of the review period. By doing that, price-caps incentivize incumbents 
incentives for cost reduction. Considering these reasons, we can conclude that, in 
principle, price-caps offer better incentives to allow productive efficiency than rate-
or-return regulation. 
Allocative efficiency 
Rate-or-return regulation constitutes a better scheme to correct allocative 
inefficiencies, since it relates the firm’s revenues with the costs actually incurred.  On 
the contrary, since price are fixed while costs decrease between review periods, price-
cap regulation dissociates revenues and costs, thus allowing allocative inefficiencies. 
Speed and likelihood of convergence towards the optimum 
With price-cap regulation, an inadequate estimation of the X factor may prevent prices 
from converging towards the optimum.  Indeed, if this factor is set below the 
optimum, regulation will generate monopolistic rents and consequent inefficiencies 
                                                
5 This section is based in Gallardo (1999) 
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that will slow down convergence towards the optimum.  On the contrary, setting this 
factor above optimum will discourage future investments, therefore deterring 
innovation.  For these reasons, it is preferable to use rate-of-return regulation when 
non-economic factors play a substantial role in price-setting. 
Monopolistic rents 
Price-cap regulation explicitly allows the firm to obtain monopolistic rents, and the 
appropriation of such rents is the incentive used to promote productive efficiency.  
However, rate-of-return may also generate rents due to information asymmetries 
discussed earlier.  However, since information problems affect both schemes but are 
only explicitly allowed in the former case, it seems logical to conclude, a priori, that 
rate-of-return regulation delivers better results in avoiding monopolistic rents. 
Information requirements 
Both schemes require large quantities of information, but under rate-of-return 
regulation this requirement is higher for the regulator, who needs to know not only the 
cost of the capital investments incurred by the regulated firm, but also its current 
value. This requirement also exacerbates the problem of information asymmetries 
discussed before. For these reasons, rate-of-return regulation requires more 
information than the price-cap scheme. 
Learning costs 
As we have seen, the effectiveness of regulations depends on the information 
available to the regulator.  However, information is usually valid only for a certain 
period of time, after which becomes obsolete.   
Gallardo (1999) argues that price-cap regulation seems to be more appropriate in 
industries characterized by rapid innovation, since the accumulation of information by 
the regulator becomes less relevant. On the contrary, if an industry is characterized by 
slow technological change, the cost of learning is lower, which reduces the usual 
information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm.  In this context, rate-of-
return regulation seems to be more appropriate. 
2.2.5 Regulatory dilemmas 
A regulator has to face five theoretical dilemmas when trying to maximize its 
objective function (Gallardo, 1999). 
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Dilemma 1: Productive or allocative efficiency 
When the costs of an industry are sub-additive, it is desirable to have only one firm 
supplying the entire market.  The entry of more firms to the market would increase the 
industry’s average costs, which would lead to productive inefficiencies.  This is the 
argument in favor of restricting the entry of firms to a market, which is especially 
relevant in industries with substantial fixed-costs such as telecommunications, energy 
or transport infrastructure. This restriction would allow a coordinated investment 
program, avoiding duplication of investments and destructive competition. 
However, the existence of only one firm in the market would concede it substantial 
market power, increasing the probability of occurrence of the undesired behavior 
described in section 2.2.1.  As we have seen, a monopolist has incentives to charge a 
mark-up above its costs, increasing prices and causing allocative inefficiencies.  
Therefore, the solution to the problem of productive inefficiency creates a problem of 
allocative inefficiency.   
There are four methods a government can organize economic activities within an 
industry to solve this problem, all of them with advantages and disadvantages.  
a. State-owned companies. A commonly used solution has been the creation of 
public enterprises or state-owned companies, which are believed not to have 
incentives to use their market power. 
b. Concession to a regulated firm. Another way to organize the production of 
goods in the context of natural monopolies has been through the concession of 
the industry to a private firm whose activities are supervised and regulated by 
a regulatory agency. This case usually combines access restrictions to solve 
the problem of productive inefficiencies, with price regulation to solve the 
problem of allocative inefficiencies. 
c. Ex ante competition. A third alternative to solve this dilemma is the 
introduction of ex ante competition through auctions, with the winner being 
the bidder who offers the lowest prices (Demsetz, 1968).  In this case, the 
problem of allocative efficiency is minimized, whilst the granting of 
monopoly rights solves the problem of productive inefficiencies. 
d. Liberalization of the industry. The fourth option to solve this problem is the 
liberalization of the industry (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). Under 
certain circumstances (price sustainability, for example) this can reduce the 
degree of inefficiency. As a result, potential competition would impede 
extraction of economic rent, considering that overcharging may allure 
competitors, thus solving the problem of allocative inefficiencies. If the threat 
of competition disciplines monopolists, the likelihood of firms entering the 
market (thus causing productive inefficiencies) would also be minimized, and 
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incumbent’s prices would not diverge much from marginal social opportunity 
costs. 
However, all of these options have important disadvantages to consider. In first place, 
the creation of public enterprises was supposed to solve the problem because of their 
lack of incentives to abuse their market power. However, this view overlooks the 
agency problem between society and the management of such enterprises, something 
that, in countries with weak institutional arrangements such as developing ones, may 
lead to gruesome inefficiencies. Indeed, the view that state-owned companies will 
serve the public interest better than private ones implicitly supposes that the interests 
of their management are aligned with those of the consumers, which is not necessarily 
true. According to Tirole (2006), there are various ways in which management may 
not act in the owner’s best interests (in this context, the public’s best interests): 
insufficient effort, unnecessary investments and self-dealing, among others. These 
agency problems (Laffont and Martimort, 2001) seem to be exacerbated in developing 
countries, where the lack of an adequate system of checks and balances facilitates 
public officers making decisions that favor their political parties or themselves.  
According to Kessides (2004), a main cause of deteriorating infrastructure 
performance in developing countries has been underinvestment, which was largely 
due to the failure of governments to prescribe cost-reflective tariffs. Under state 
ownership, prices fell to levels that could not cover the investment needed to meet the 
demand, which led to a significant infrastructure deficit and substantial welfare losses. 
These inefficiencies constrained domestic growth, reduced international 
competitiveness, and discouraged foreign investment. The World Bank (2003) 
estimates that technical inefficiencies related to public management in developing 
countries’ roads, railways, power, and water, caused losses estimated at US$55 billion 
a year in the early 1990s. This figure is equivalent to 1% of their GDP, a quarter of 
their annual investment in infrastructure, and twice the annual development finance 
for infrastructure in the developing world. In the port sector, many of the large public 
monopolies have been quite effective in preventing competition even where there are 
allowances for private facilities, such as in Philippines or India (ADB, 2000). 
Secondly, downside of using regulation to deal with monopolies is the occurrence of 
the regulatory failures described in the previous section; and the use of auctions may 
cause substantial problems when unforeseen events occur due to the rigidity of the 
approach (this will be discussed in detail when analyzing the third dilemma). Finally, 
the liberalization of an industry may not deliver the results expected by Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig, (1982) if the presence of sunk costs (typical in the case of 
infrastructure-based industries) or asymmetric information is taken into account. In 
these cases, liberalization may lead to “cream-skimming”, i.e., competitors entering 
only to the profitable segments of the market and leaving the incumbent with no 
option to finance the deficit in the unprofitable ones. This view also supposes that 
firms can enter of leave a market easily, which is not likely when sunk investments 
need to me made. 
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Since there is not an a priori better solution to this dilemma, this will depend on the 
advantages and disadvantages of these options relative to the characteristics of each 
country or industry. In ports, for example, it is common to find port authorities of 
state-owned companies providing services, whilst in telecommunications; the most 
common way to deal with this problem is to concession monopolies to regulated 
firms. 
Dilemma 2: Optimal, subsidy-free, sustainable or equitable pricing 
If the government chooses to organize economic activities by concessioning the 
natural monopoly to a private firm, the problem of selecting the most appropriate 
pricing philosophy arises. As we will see, the prices that maximize the regulator’s 
objective function are not necessarily subsidy-free, sustainable or fair, and the criteria 
of optimal pricing may collide with other efficiency or distributional concerns, such 
as the minimization of inefficient entry or the elimination of cross-subsidies. 
Optimal prices 
As we have seen, the regulator’s objective is to set prices that maximize the function 
W(p).  We have also seen that the price that maximizes this function is the one that 
equates to marginal cost (the first-best). However, with large infrastructures such as 
ports, where fixed-costs represent a large share of total costs, setting prices at 
marginal cost would not allow firms to recover their fixed-costs.  For these 
infrastructures, the regulator has to set prices that cover the long-run average or 
marginal cost of the monopolist. 
There are two main options for doing this. The first consists on setting prices at 
marginal cost and cover the consequent revenue deficit with government transfers.  
This option, that would allow the achievement of the first-best, is called the 
“Hotelling approach” and will lead to Pareto-efficient results if the transference is 
financed through a lump-sum tax paid by all the population, regardless of their level 
of consumption of the service (Hotelling, 1929). However, this characteristic makes 
this tax-and-subsidy scheme practically impossible to be implemented by industry 
regulators.  
The second alternative is to set prices equal to marginal costs plus a surcharge that 
allows the covering of fixed costs. Since this option would introduce economic 
inefficiencies, it would only allow achieving a “second-best” solution; i.e., welfare 
maximization subject to the restriction that the firm covers all its costs. The main 
approach for second-best pricing is known as the “Ramsey rule” or “invert-elasticity”, 
and consists of adding a surcharge to marginal cost that would be higher for 
consumers with low demand elasticity and lower for those with high elasticity 
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(Ramsey, 1927)6.  The prices obtained through the Ramsey rule are considered 
optimal ones. The conditions that allow obtaining the invert-elasticity rule according 
to Ramsey criteria are the following: 
 
a. There are no cross-elasticities among different market segments. 
 
b. The rent-effect caused on the individual behavior of consumers does not 
substantially alter the analysis of elasticities on demands that do not 
contemplate such effects. 
 
When these conditions are met, the Ramsey criterion lead to a relatively simple rule 
of price setting for different types of consumers that can be defined by the following 
statement: when there exist different products or market segments with different 
demand elasticities, the optimal way to distribute fixed-costs is by a margin over the 
marginal costs, which is inversely proportional to the demand elasticity in each 
segment. This is an optimal criterion, since the loss of welfare produced by increasing 
the price above marginal cost is minimal when such mark up is charged to consumers 
with more rigid demands. 
 
To obtain the expression that sets optimal prices as a mark up over marginal costs, it 
is necessary to define p = (p1, p2, p3,…pn) (where pi represents the price of a service in 
segment “i”) and incorporate the concept of fixed costs (FC).  The function Ȇ(p)  
then becomes:  
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Where C is the firm’s cost function. 
 
The problem for the regulator is to set prices that maximize the welfare function W(p) 
subject to the restriction Ȇ(p)=0 (in this way the monopolist is allowed to recover all 
its costs) (Lasheras, 1999).  To maximize W(p) subject to the restriction Ȇ(p)=0, we 
need the following Lagrange function: 
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Where Ȝ represents the multiplier of the restriction. Differentiating this function with 
respect to the price pi, we obtain the following first-order condition: 
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6 This solution was initially proposed by Ramsey (1927) for tax purposes and was applied by Boiteaux 
(1956) and Baumol and Bradford (1970) to the problem of optimal tariffs for natural monopolies facing 
marginal costs below average costs. 
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If for the sake of simplicity, the same weight is given to producer and consumer 
surpluses in the W(p) function, this expression equals to: 
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Regrouping terms and substituting the demand elasticity of the good “i” with respect 
to its price, we get: 
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The expression “į” is called the “Ramsey number” and represents the global price 
level of the regulated firm, whilst each market segment’s elasticities configure the 
relative structure of the price vector.   
 
The use of the Ramsey rule has been criticized, among other reasons, because it 
requires the regulator to have large amounts of information that is very difficult to 
estimate, such cross-elasticities among different market segments (Miller, 2007).   
 
 
Equitable prices 
As seen in the previous section, the use of optimal (Ramsey) prices would imply that 
consumers with inelastic demand pay prices above marginal cost, while consumers 
with elastic demands pay prices below marginal costs. In the case of utilities, low-
income consumers are usually those whose demand for public services is more rigid, 
and who, under the Ramsey rule, would be charged with higher prices. In this context, 
the implementation of the rule for public services may not be socially viable, 
especially in societies with unequal income distribution, such as the developing 
countries (Prieger, 1996). In ports, where terminals are increasingly privatized, the 
use of Ramsey prices would lead to carriers paying a disproportionately large share of 
the port’s costs, since they face a rigid demand.  
 
It can be seen that whereas the Ramsey rule leads to economic efficiency, it does not 
guarantee equitable prices.   
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Subsidy-free prices 
A natural monopoly may have incentives to set prices that imply the use of cross 
subsidization. For example, if a monopolist produces two goods, but one of them is 
sold in competitive markets, the firm has incentives to eliminate competition by cross-
subsidizing this good with the revenues obtained in the regulated market. If joint costs 
exist, this could be difficult to prove, since determining the fraction of the cost that 
must be imputed to each good is a complex process and often impossible. This 
situation is more likely to happen when the Ramsey rule is used, since goods sold in 
competitive markets are more elastic than those sold in monopolistic ones.  In the port 
sector, this situation may arise when port authorities that provide infrastructure to 
third parties are also involved in cargo-handling activities. They are able to cross-
subsidize total handling costs by not taking into account port dues.  
Naturally, the fact that optimal prices are not necessarily subsidy-free creates a 
problem for the regulator, who might have to opt between prices that maximize 
consumer surplus and subsidy-free ones, especially in contexts where an industry is 
being liberalized or competition is being used to increase economic efficiency. The 
solution to this dilemma becomes even more complex when the monopoly provides 
the same service in different regions, for example, telephony or electricity in rural 
areas.  In this case, the regulator will have to opt between setting prices that reflect the 
different costs of providing the service in diverse areas or setting the same price in all 
areas, thus allowing cross-subsidization. 
As we can see, optimal (Ramsey) prices are not necessarily subsidy-free. 
Sustainable Prices 
When several products are provided by the monopolist, the incursion of competitors is 
possible when some goods, segments or lines are profitable. For example, the 
operation of a port terminal may not be profitable, but the provision of pilotage, 
stevedoring or towage services may be lucrative and attract other firms who want to 
provide these services without having to operate the port. In this case, the operation of 
the unprofitable service is only sustainable if the monopolist can obtain surpluses in 
related services. 
According to Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), for the prices of a monopoly to 
satisfy the condition of sustainability, there should not be a competitor that covers a 
segment of the demand, charges lower prices, and, at the same time, generates profits.  
However, Ramsey prices do not necessarily satisfy these conditions. In the described 
case, the competitors in the provision of pilotage, stevedoring or towage services may 
very well charge lower prices and make profits (Train, 1991). 
As we can see, optimal (Ramsey) prices are not necessarily sustainable. 
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Dilemma 3: Ex ante competition or flexible regulation  
As stated before, an alternative to price regulation consists on implementing auctions 
to grant the concession of the natural monopoly to the firm offering the lowest prices.  
The central idea was initially proposed by Demsetz (1968), who claims that it is 
possible to achieve optimal results without regulation by generating ex ante
competition (the “Demsetz Approach”). This process is called competition “for the 
market” because it differs from the usual one that occurs between rivals within a 
market (competition “in the market”). 
In the absence of collusion, equal access to essential inputs and symmetric 
information among the bidders, the auction would make prices approach the average 
cost of the most efficient firm, thus minimizing simultaneously productive and 
allocative inefficiencies.  
Besides this argument, the use of auctions might be desirable for two other reasons: 
a. Auctions would solve the problem of the government’s lack of information 
about costs and demand. 
b. Auctions may reduce the cost of regulation by not requiring the existence of a 
regulatory agency.  
However, Demsetz’s proposal works well only when it is possible to specify, in the 
concession contract, how prices will be adjusted to reflect changes in market 
conditions. This implicitly supposes that it is possible to anticipate the occurrence of 
future events, or that it is possible to modify existing contracts without generating 
important costs for society. Following this argument, Williamson (1976) criticizes 
Demsetz’s approach because it supposes the existence of perfectly designed contracts 
that specify the actions to follow before any contingency.  He argues that contracts are 
in essence incomplete for the following reasons: 
a. It is difficult to anticipate future contingencies;
b. Even when contingencies may be anticipated, it may still be difficult to 
negotiate measures to take in each case; 
c. It is difficult to write contracts in a language that allows third parties to 
interpret them and settle all kinds of disputes. 
Two mechanisms have been suggested to incorporate modifications to concession 
contracts: long-term contracts that allow planned investments, and repeated auctions 
of short-term contracts that allow the incorporation of new information.   
Williamson also criticizes both types of contracts. The use of long-term contracts may 
lead to efficient results only if the gains or losses generated by unanticipated events 
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are shared by the parties, i.e., if it is possible to introduce modifications that reduce 
allocative inefficiencies. However, inefficiencies may arise because the monopolist 
has incentives to manage the information strategically, or because the government 
may prefer to allow the contract to expire before acknowledging any error in its 
design. On the other hand, the success of the use of consecutive short-term contracts 
depends on the equality of conditions among the concessionaire and the potential 
entrants. The main problem is that incumbents always have advantages over potential 
entrants, such as a deep knowledge of the demand, better information about operation 
and technology costs and human resources with specific experience. 
The introduction of government supervision on the firm’s accounting or operations 
would reduce the problems or both types of contracts, but this would not differ from 
standard regulation.  For this reason, Williamson does not consider the use of auctions 
as a substitute to regulation, but as an alternative method of organization. 
As we can see, the concession of an unregulated industry through the use of auctions 
may generate problems that reduce its apparent advantages over the use of standard 
regulation, making it impossible to decide a priori which mechanism is superior.  
Dilemma 4: Economic efficiency or informational rents 
The theory of optimal prices assumes the regulator has the same information as the 
regulated firm. However, this is not true. As a matter of fact, firms possess better 
information than the government about important endogenous and exogenous 
variables, such as technology, costs and demand.  In a context like this, where the 
regulator faces informational restrictions, it will have to opt between achieving 
productive and allocative efficiencies, and avoiding the monopolist obtaining 
extraordinary rents at the expense of the consumers. To illustrate this, Baron and 
Myerson (1982) developed a model in which there is hidden information about costs. 
In this model, the regulator’s aim is to maximize productive efficiency by setting 
prices at marginal cost, for which he is willing to grant a transfer to encourage the 
monopolist to disclosure its marginal cost.  However, for the incentive to work, the 
monopolist’s profit from the transfer must be larger than the profit produced by 
declaring any other cost; for which this transfer has to be as large as the consumer 
surplus. In terms of productive efficiency, this strategy would lead to a first-best 
solution, but in terms of distribution, the firm would enjoy excessive profits paid by 
the consumers with their surplus.   
If this option is not viable, the regulator can improve allocative efficiency by granting 
a smaller transference, although it would have to be at the expense of reducing 
productive efficiency. The price, then, will be set above marginal costs.  Nevertheless, 
if the regulator has an objective function (as the one described earlier in this section) 
with 0 < Į < 1, where €1 of consumer surplus is worth more than €1 of profits, it will 
be satisfied with the monopolist obtaining economic rents if by doing so it increases 
consumer welfare. 
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As we can see, in a context of information asymmetries, a regulator will have to 
decide whether to achieve productive efficiency by granting an economic rent or to 
improve surplus distribution by setting prices above marginal costs. 
Dilemma 5: Rate-of-return or price-cap regulation 
When implementing a price-setting policy, the regulator will have to opt between the 
two main schemes: rate-of-return and price-cap regulation.  As we have seen in the 
previous section, the rate-of-return methodology translates cost increases directly to 
prices, thus reducing the risk for the monopolist but eliminating its incentives to 
operate more efficiently. Price-cap regulation provides better incentives for achieving 
efficiency by making the firm the residual claimant of costs reductions.  
Both are opposed in terms of the relation costs-revenues and none can be considered 
superior a priori. 
2.3 Options to introduce competition in natural 
monopolies 
According to Klein (1996), there are three main options to introduce competition in 
natural monopolies: competition for the market, competition over existing networks 
and competition among networks. 
2.3.1 Competition for the market 
It consists on granting the right to operate a monopoly to the operator who offers to 
charge the lowest price. This approach was explained while discussing the dilemma 
between ex ante competition or flexible regulation, in section 2.2.4. 
This option works well with monopolistic activities that do not involve a large amount 
of sunk costs, such as towage services in Australian ports (Ergas, Fels and Soon, 
2004). In these cases, the concession can be auctioned periodically and new 
information can be easily incorporated in the contracts. But since most infrastructures 
have the characteristic of being long-lived, and it is impossible to write complete 
contracts that foresee every contingency, problems are found in cases when long 
terms are required. In these situations, concessions are granted using auctions but 
incorporating a schedule for price-revisions and even the methodologies to be used for 
that activity.  
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2.3.2 Competition over existing infrastructures 
Typically, large infrastructures are used to produce services for several markets, not 
all of them naturally monopolistic. Therefore, it is possible to minimize the risks of 
regulatory failure by introducing competition in non-monopolistic markets 
(potentially competitive ones). Klein and Gray (1997) argue that there are three 
options to introduce competition using existing infrastructures: open access, time-
tabling and pooling arrangements. The suitability of each for a particular industry 
depends on the nature of the services and the infrastructure over which these services 
are to be provided. 
Open access 
The main characteristic of network industries is that they require complementary 
inputs, produced in both monopolistic and competitive markets, to produce a single 
service (see chapter 6). In the telecommunications industry, long-distance and mobile 
services are usually considered competitive, while fixed telephony is not. In 
electricity and natural gas, generation is considered a competitive segment whilst 
transmission and distribution naturally monopolistic ones. In these circumstances, 
competition in non-monopolistic markets is not possible unless competitors have 
access to the monopolistic segments of the network. For example, long-distance 
carriers cannot compete unless they have access to the fixed-telephony network, since 
a call cannot be completed unless both networks are interconnected (Intver, Oliver 
and Sepulveda, 2000). 
In transport, air, sea, rail and road freight are usually considered competitive 
activities, while some port terminals, airports, highways and railways may be natural 
monopolies. It requires services from both kind of markets to complete the transport 
chain. For example, neither airlines nor those who provide services to them (ground 
handlers, caterers) will be able to compete unless they have access to the airport 
(Betancor and Rendeiro, 1999). Although a port terminal is not a network, the same 
rationale applies. Providers of pilotage, towage or storage cannot enter the market 
unless they have access to terminals. The problem is that in small ports, usually 
located in remote or poor areas, building a second terminal may be uneconomical. 
This fact converts the terminal operator7 into a monopolist. If the terminal operator 
also provides other services that are needed to complete the transport chain (shipping, 
pilotage, towage, storage, etc.), regulation of the monopolistic activity gives the 
monopolist incentives to try to foreclose competition in the related activities it 
participates (Paredes, 1997).  
                                                
7 The terminal operator can be a private company (such as the operators of Matarani port terminal, in 
Peru; or Cartagena’s container terminal in Colombia), a state-owned company (such as Göteborgs 
Hamn AB, the operator of several terminals at Gothenburg’s port) or a port authority (such as Cyprus 
Port Authority, operator of several terminals at five Cypriot ports). 
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Under open access, the government, usually through a regulator, fixes the terms and 
conditions under which firms participating in competitive markets acquire access to 
naturally monopolistic facilities (Valletti and Estache, 1998). The aim of this 
intervention is to enhance the contestability of these markets (see appendix 2 for the 
characteristics of contestable markets). When implementation is possible, open access 
does not require vertical separation of activities. This means that the owners of 
naturally monopolistic facilities are not restricted to participate in related competitive 
market, therefore it is possible to preserve economies of scope and coordination. 
According to OECD (2001), the implementation of an open access regime is most 
effective when the capacity and the quality of the non-competitive segment are easy 
to observe. In this case, the regulator has only to ensure that all requested capacity is 
made available under non-discriminatory terms.  
The open access option will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Timetabling 
A theoretical option to introduce competition is timetabling, which allows several 
firms to use the same infrastructure according to a predefine schedule. In theory, this 
option would allow rail tracks or time slots at airports to be used by several 
competitors, thus generating competition and fostering the efficient use of expensive 
infrastructures. However, as indicated by Klein (1996), the implementation of this 
option faces practical complexities that deter its use. Indeed, in industries such as 
electricity or gas the homogeneity of the product makes the identity of the producer 
irrelevant. But in shipping, airlines of railways, where passengers or freight need to 
reach a particular destination; the requirements for route optimization are more 
complex than matching electricity or gas inflows with outflows. For example, in order 
to define rights to use rail tracks and allocate them to multiple parties, secondary 
trading would yield the optimal set of paths that maximizes welfare given valuations 
by producers and consumers. However, since the value of each right to use a segment 
of track depends on what happens with all the other segments, it is not clear if an 
optimal timetable can be generated through decentralized bargaining. Apart from the 
allocation of pairs of slots in some airports, there are no experiences with this system. 
Pooling 
This option applies only to electricity networks, where the physical characteristics of 
electric power and some distinctive features of electricity markets make it difficult to 
implement open access policies. Demand for electricity is highly seasonal (it even 
changes during the same day), but since power cannot be stored efficiently; supply 
must match demand at every time. In such a situation, competition can be introduced 
in the generation segment by establishing a central system that selects the generators 
who will dispatch electricity to the network according to their production costs, 
matching supply and demand at every time (Hunt, 2002). In Peru or Chile, for 
example, a central system dispatches orders on the basis of the audited costs of power 
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plants. Those that use cheaper technologies (such as hydropower) are dispatched first. 
Those which use more expensive technologies only dispatch at peak time. Under this 
system, transmission and distribution activities remain natural monopolies that require 
regulation.  
2.3.3 Competition among infrastructures 
The third option for introducing competition in network industries consists of 
promoting competition among different types of infrastructure, for example, by 
fostering competition among short-sea shipping, railways and highways, or between 
fixed and mobile telephony networks. Klein (1996) argued that two problems may 
arise with this approach. The first one is that in the presence of a natural monopoly, 
the establishment of an alternative network supposes welfare losses associated with 
the duplication of investments (Vickers, 1995). The author, however, claims that the 
pressures generated by competition to work hard, to learn and to innovate outweighs 
many costs of duplication. This view implicitly argues that the dynamic benefits of 
competition are larger than the static allocational benefits of preventing duplication. 
One example of this is the competition that occurs among global supply chains, of 
which ports are crucial nodes. The competition among these networks forces ports to 
be more competitive, thus limiting their potential to abuse of their market power. The 
second problem is the imperfect substitutability between products. In fact, 
competition between transport modes is only possible for a limited number of 
products and origin-destination pairs just as wireless telephony is an effective 
substitute for fixed telephony for some types of clients and geographical areas only. 
However, it can be argued that this substitutability, although imperfect, limits the 
market power of monopolists by making the demand curve more elastic.  
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Appendix 1: The Creation of a Pilotage Monopoly in 
the Netherlands8
“In 1988, The Netherlands Pilotage Service became an independent organization, with 
pilots acting as private entrepreneurs. The objectives of the government in the 
privatization of pilot services were to reduce the governing executive burden and to 
improve efficiency and adequacy of pilot services. 
A public entity, the Nederlandse Loodsen Corporatie (The Netherlands Pilot 
Corporation, NLC) was created to manage the register of licensed pilots and be 
responsible for education and training of licensed pilots. All licensed pilots constitute 
the NLC.  (…) The licensed pilots are all shareholders of the Loodswezen Nederland 
BV (Pilotage Service of the Netherlands Ltd.) which is responsible for the exploitation 
of the independent private enterprise. All supporting staff is employed by this 
company.  The company collects the pilotage fees and makes payments to the pilots in 
accordance with the financial statute.  (…)  
Privatization in The Netherlands did not bring an end to the debate about pilot 
services. The Government Audit Office directed harsh criticism at the privatization 
process and asserted that the efficiency improvements did not benefit the shipping 
lines or the government, but solely the pilots. Notwithstanding counter arguments, the 
Government Audit Office’s criticism, The Netherlands’ privatization of pilot services 
is not considered a successful one.  
To a certain extent, the government’s objectives have been attained. The increase in 
the amount of pilot activity and the reduced number of licensed pilots have led to 
higher efficiency. However, pilotage became a virtual monopoly and efficiency 
improvements have led primarily to a very substantial rise in pilots’ incomes.  
The cost structure of the pilotage organization is not transparent. The fees are non-
negotiable, contrary to the fees for other marine services and pilot fees in other ports.  
The magnitude and rigidity of pilot fees create strong pressures to reduce other cost 
elements in the highly competitive maritime transport sector.  
Overall, the present situation has proven unsatisfactory to port users”. 
                                                
8 World Bank (2001) Module 3, P. 72 
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Appendix 2: Theory of Contestable Markets 
A2.1 Contestable Markets 
The “Theory of Contestable Markets” was initially proposed by William Baumol, 
John Panzar and Robert Willig (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982).  In their book, the 
authors proposed the concept of “contestable markets”.  A contestable market is one 
in which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless.    
As explained by Train (1991), the terms “free” and “costless” have a particular 
meaning.  “Free entry” does not mean that a new firm need not incur any cost to enter 
an industry, but that a new firm does not have to incur any cost that is not also 
incurred by a firm that is already producing in the industry.  This concept therefore 
requires the entrant having access to the same technology and inputs as the 
incumbent.  On the other hand, “costless exit” means that any firm that decides to 
leave an industry is able to recover all the costs it incurred when entering –minus the 
respective depreciation. This implies that no sunk costs are incurred by entrants.  
According to this theory, when markets are contestable, the threat of potential 
competition can be more important than actual competition in generating competitive 
discipline to producers.  Under perfect contestability, this threat would even force 
monopolists to behave as if they were in perfectively competitive markets. Indeed, if a 
monopolist is charging a price above competitive levels, a new firm can enter the 
market, charge a slightly lower price and capture the whole market.  If the incumbent 
retaliates by lowering its own price, the entrant could simply leave the industry, 
recovering all costs incurred.  Analogously, if the incumbent is producing 
inefficiently, a new firm could enter the market producing without waste, charge a 
slightly lower price and capture the whole market, earning a positive profit.   
As it can be seen, a crucial feature of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit-
and-run entry.  Nevertheless, this hit-and-run mechanism is only possible if there is an 
asymmetric time lag between the incumbent and the entrant. Indeed, the entrant must 
be able to enter the market, enjoy profits at prices above competitive levels, and leave 
before the incumbent can retaliate.  As it will be explained later, this critical 
assumption has been a source of criticisms to the theory.  
The authors recognize that perfectively contestable markets are as scarce as perfectly 
competitive ones in the real world.  On the basis of this Baumol claims that “perfect 
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contestability is not useful to describe reality, but it should be seen as a benchmark in 
industrial organization that is more flexible and more widely applicable than perfect 
competition”9.  In fact, one of the advantages of this theory is that the concept of the 
perfectly contestable market is a generalization of the concept of the perfectly 
competitive market, and it is possible to apply its analysis to any industry structure, 
including monopoly and oligopoly.   
In the case of oligopoly, under perfect contestability, oligopolistic structure do not 
need to depend on the assumptions made about the incumbents’ behavior, but both, 
structure and behavior, are determined uniquely by the pressures of potential 
competition.  In the case of a monopoly, however, the behavior of a monopolist under 
perfect contestability does not guarantee that the second best optimum is achieved, 
despite the restriction of financial viability and the presence of economies of scale.  
It is worth noting that in contestable markets, firms need not be small or numerous or 
independent, not even produce homogeneous products.  Therefore, the existence of a 
perfectly contestable market is a necessary condition for the existence of a 
competitive market, but not a sufficient one. 
Baumol also argues that while the theory extends in some directions the domain in 
which market forces operate, it restricts it in others.  For example, where the market 
structure is such as to yield a satisfactory allocation of resources within the period, it 
will also perform well between periods.  But where there are economies of scale in the 
production of durable capital, a contestable monopoly that performs relatively well in 
a single period will not do so as time passes.  In such a case, the least costly producer 
is in the long run vulnerable to replacement by rivals, creating a potential waste of 
social resources. 
Until this theory was presented, industry structure was thought to be determined 
exogenously.  Previous economic theory hardly explained the reasons why one 
industry was organized as monopoly or another as an oligopoly.  In contrast, under 
perfect contestability, the structure of an industry is determined explicitly, 
endogenously, and simultaneously with the pricing, output and other decisions of the 
firms operating in it. 
A2.2 Properties of Contestable Markets 
According to the author, the two most important properties of contestable markets are 
their welfare attributes and the way in which they determine industry structure. 
  
                                                
9 Baumol (1982), p.3 
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A2.2.1 Welfare Attributes 
The welfare properties of contestable markets are drawn from their characteristics of 
free entry, costless exit and vulnerability to hit-and-run incursions from rival firms.  
The first welfare property is that, given that under perfect contestability even 
monopolists have to behave as if they were in competitive markets, contestable 
markets never offer more than a normal rate of profit.  Any positive profit would 
encourage any firm to enter the market, undercut the price of the incumbent and earn 
a profit.  
The second welfare property of contestable markets is the absence of any sort of 
inefficiency in production.  The argument is similar as above.  Any waste, like any 
abnormal profit, constitutes an incentive to entry.  This is valid for inefficiencies 
derived from misallocation of inputs, inefficient management, X-inefficiencies, or 
inefficient organization of the industry. 
The third welfare characteristic of contestable markets is that in the long-run, no 
product can be sold at a price lower than its marginal cost.  If a firm lowers its price 
below marginal cost to drive competitors out of the market, it will not be able to 
recover its losses once they are left, since any price above marginal cost will entice 
hit-and-run entry.  This characteristic has an important implication for regulatory and 
antitrust policy, since no predatory pricing can be used for unfair competition.   
Baumol (1982) uses a different rationale to explain why in the long-run, no product 
can be sold at a price lower than its marginal cost.  He explains that if some firm 
charges a price lower than its marginal cost and still makes a profit, then it is possible 
for an entrant to offer a smaller quantity at a slightly lower price and still make a 
profit.  If the price p is lower than marginal cost MC, then the sale of y – ȟ units at 
price p must yield a profit (ʌ + ǻȆ) which is greater than the profit Ȇ, that can be 
earned by selling only y units of the output at that price.   
A2.2.2 Determination of an Industry’s Structure 
To understand the way industry structure is determined under perfect contestability, it 
is important to recall the fact that contestable markets are incompatible with any sort 
of inefficiency, in particular, with inefficiencies in the organization of an industry.  To 
illustrate this point, we can suppose that that a certain output of an industry can be 
supplied by two or 1,000 firms, as done by Baumol (1982).  But, if under the first 
arrangement the output can be produced at a lower cost, the industry cannot be in 
equilibrium if there are 1,000 producers.  Therefore, we can expect a wave of 
mergers, acquisitions and/or bankruptcies in this industry until equilibrium is reached.  
The way market forces will lead this industry towards equilibrium will be described in 
the following paragraphs. 
As explained when natural monopoly was defined, if economies of scale and/or scope 
hold throughout the relevant range, production by a single firm will be most 
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economical.  Similarly, in the single product case and under constant returns to scale, 
if the minimum cost is obtained by producing 10,000 units and there is demand for 
50,000 units, the most economical way to produce this output is by five firms.  
Therefore, the industry will be organized as an oligopoly.  In the multi-product case, 
the analysis is slightly more complicated, but the logic is the same.  When the 
industry’s output vector is small compared to the output vector a single firm can 
produce at relatively low costs, an efficient industry will be characterized by few 
firms.   
From this analysis, we can see that the most efficient number of firms will vary with 
the location of the industry’s output vector.  An industry may be a natural monopoly 
with one output vector, and a competitive market with another. 
Note that the optimal structure of an industry depends on its output vector, but this 
output vector in turn depends on the prices charged by its firms.  However, since 
pricing depends on industry structure, pricing behavior and industry structure must be 
determined simultaneously and endogenously.  
The theory says nothing about how the structure of an industry is determined when 
the market is not perfectly contestable.  But the author argues that while the industry 
structures that emerge in reality are not always those which minimize costs, they 
constitute reasonable approximations to efficient structures.   
A2.3 Criticisms 
As pointed by Waldman and Jensen (2001), the theory of contestable markets 
represented a dramatic departure from conventional economic views, for which its 
introduction drew much interest and scrutiny.  However, as time passed, it became 
clear that the new theory constituted more an evolution than the revolution in 
economic thinking that its followers initially expected.  
As Tye (1990) argued, critics have focused more on the theory itself than on its 
application.  In particular, criticisms have concentrated on the assumptions required to 
allow hit-and-run entry.    
The first main criticism to the theory was presented by Schwartz and Reynolds 
(1983).  The authors argued that perfect contestability requires two conditions that are 
“implausible”:  (i) in response to high prices, an entrant have to be able to enter the 
market instantaneously, with no time lag; and (ii), the entrant can exit the market with 
no loss of fixed costs before the incumbent can adjust his price, i.e., there must exist a 
time lag between the entrant entering the market and the incumbent’s response.  
Moreover, the authors claim that the theory is not robust, since any relaxation of these 
assumptions will make results differ from those obtained under perfect contestability.  
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Shepherd (1984) argues that while the theory focuses on several aspects of entry, their 
results hold only for the limiting and extreme case of perfect contestability.  He agrees 
with Schwartz and Reynolds about the lack of robustness of the theory, by stating that 
under any departure from perfect contestability, the analysis becomes speculative.  
But the author mainly criticizes the consistency of the assumptions and the 
generalization of its recommendations. Indeed, he claims that the assumption of both 
total and trivial entry –the cases when the entrant takes all or some part of the 
incumbent’s market, respectively—are inconsistent.  And even in the eventuality that 
it holds, it would lack of generality because of its extreme character.  
Shepherd also claims that the assumption that external market conditions dominate 
internal ones is “eccentric”.  He clearly states his belief that industrial organization is 
primarily about internal conditions, and criticizes the fact that the theory ignores 
actual competitors.  Moreover, he claims that research and experience confirm the 
expected dominance of internal over external conditions. 
Baumol and Willig (1986) argue that Shepherd incorrectly associates their position 
with an all-pervasive laissez-faire position on the role of regulation and antitrust.  
They argue that contestability theory provides guidance in determining when 
intervention is socially warranted, and that it has the value of providing a more 
applicable benchmark for policy makers when intervention is required.  And about the 
criticism of the inapplicability of the theory in real-life situations, the authors state the 
following: 
“The economy of reality is composed of sectors which vary widely in the degree 
to which they approximate the attributes of contestability.  Thus, the conclusion 
that perfectly contestable markets require no intervention claims little more than 
the possibility (which remains to be proven, case by case) that some markets in 
reality may automatically perform in a very acceptable manner despite the small 
number of firms that inhabit them.”10
  
  
                                                
10 Baumol and Willig (1986), p. 10 
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3. Topics in access regulation 
This chapter introduces the main topics in access regulation. The first section 
describes the debate on vertical integration in these industries and whether this should 
be permitted of prohibited.  As we will see, this decision would have substantial 
consequences on the incumbent’s incentives to allow access and thus, alter the focus 
of regulation. The second section discusses one of the main issues of access 
regulation, namely access pricing. It describes the main methodologies used for this 
task, as well as their implementation problems. The last section introduces the concept 
of “essential facilities” and describes the doctrine that is commonly used in antitrust 
to prevent the abuse of market power by the owners of this kind of infrastructure. 
3.1 Vertical integration versus vertical separation  
As said before, naturally monopolistic and competitive segments co-exist in 
infrastructure-based industries. Typically, access to the former is necessary to render 
services in the latter. In these circumstances, when a firm that controls a naturally 
monopolistic segment is allowed to participate in the competitive ones, it has 
incentives to try to monopolize the competitive markets with the aim to regain the 
profits forgone by regulation. Therefore, some form of regulatory intervention is 
warranted. There are two main regulatory approaches to address this problem :  
a. To forbid owners of the non-competitive segments to participate in potentially 
competitive ones, i.e., to enforce the vertical separation of the industry. 
Vertical separation implies, for example, that neither terminal operators nor 
their related firms can supply other services that are necessary to complete the 
logistics chain. 
b. To regulate the terms and conditions under which participants in competitive 
markets acquire access to non-competitive segments of the industry. 
OECD (2001) advocates vertical separation as a preferable approach. This document 
argues that vertical integration increases incentives on the incumbent to restrict 
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competition in competitive activities. Vertical separation, in contrast, would lessen the 
regulatory burden, thus enhancing the quality of regulation and the level of 
competition. They claim, for example, that as long as prices are set above costs, the 
incumbent has incentives to sell as much of its product at those prices. Therefore, 
rather than refuse access, the incumbent “has an incentive to welcome access, as each 
new entrant in the competitive market will enhance competition, innovation and 
product differentiation (…) enhancing demand for the non-competitive service”11.  
Furthermore, the authors argue that allowing integration makes regulatory tasks more 
complex, since regulation must overcome the incumbent’s incentive to deny access.  
Given the information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm, the risks of 
regulatory failure are increased. In contrast, by removing this incentive, vertical 
separation would allow lighter regulation which, in turn, may permit the incumbent to 
use its information in a more efficient way.  For example, the regulated firm could 
have more discretion to use complex access pricing schemes, such as multi-part or 
peak-load pricing.   
The incentive system that vertical separation introduces may also facilitate 
investments in new capacity that integrated firms would not have incentives to 
undertake, like new capacity that would be mainly used by rival firms. These 
incentives become crucial when, as in most cases, regulators lack legal powers to 
force incumbents to invest. Another reason the authors cite to advocate for vertical 
separation of related activities are the longer time that negotiations between 
incumbents and entrants may take, given the incentives the former have to delay 
entry, raise prices and lower quality.  In addition, they claim that separation improves 
information by eliminating the use of transfer prices and, at the same time, reduces the 
possibility of cross-subsidization between regulated and non-regulated activities. 
Paredes (1997) analyzed the issue in the context of the debate on the convenience of 
vertical integration initiated in Chile in the mid-nineties. The author firstly presents 
Coase’s theory about the origin and nature of the firm (Coase, 1939). According to 
this theory, a firm is an institution that avoids the costs of using the market. For 
Coase, the activities carried out by a firm in an integrated manner can also be 
subcontracted to the market. However, the use of the market is not free. It generates 
transaction costs that under some circumstances can prevent using it. Therefore, the 
integration of those processes that substitute the costly use of markets constitutes the 
essence of the firm. 
According to the author, economic literature identifies three factors that cause non-
trivial transaction costs that avoid using the market:  
a. Uncertainty about the future that causes the incompleteness of written 
contracts; 
b. Uncertainty about the compliance word or implicit contracts; and, 
                                                
11
OECD (2001), pp. 21. 
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c. Specificity of investments to third parties. 
For example, a producer may contract transport services to carry his products to the 
market or integrate this activity within the firm. According to this theory, the producer 
will be more inclined to integrate transport within the firm if he or she is uncertain 
whether the supplier of transport services will comply with the contract or that will be 
able to find another one in the market.  In this case, the likelihood of finding another 
supplier is reduced when a substantial part of his investments are specific to the 
original supplier, because of packing specifications, IT systems, etc. Therefore, 
according to the circumstances, the most efficient solution may be vertical integration.  
Forcing the separation of activities in these cases raises costs and damages consumers. 
However, if uncertainty can be somehow reduced or the cost of the service being 
provided by a specialized party is so low that compensates for any risk involved, the 
producer will naturally contract out transport services. The cost of using the market 
would be trivial and it would not be necessary to force separation. In fact, the 
advancements made in logistics and the rapid surge of third-party logistics providers 
confirms that this is what has occurred in the manufacturing industry. 
Paredes also analyzes the argument that vertical integration facilitates the extension of 
monopoly power. If a monopoly is left unregulated, it is possible for the monopolist to 
maximize profits in the monopolized market. Thus, integration does not produce extra 
benefits to the monopolist. But when the monopoly is regulated (and the monopolist’s  
profits capped), he has incentives to recover foregone profits by integrating 
downstream and excluding rivals. It is worth noting that an integrated monopolist 
could only extract monopolistic rents if he is able to exclude rivals in the competitive 
segment. The author argues however that this is not the general case. 
Vickers (1995) presents a theoretical model that is consistent with Paredes’ assertion.  
In this model, both imperfect information in the monopolistic segment and imperfect 
competition (there are more firms than needed) in the downstream market are 
supposed. The information asymmetry makes the regulation of the upstream 
(monopolistic) segment to be imperfect, hence allowing the incumbent to charge a 
price mark-up. Imperfect competition in the downstream market causes duplication of 
fixed costs. According to this model, when the incumbent is allowed into the 
downstream market, prices are higher and output is lower than in the case of vertical 
separation; but the number of firms in the imperfectly competitive downstream 
market, and hence, the number of times that fixed costs are incurred, is lower. 
Therefore, concludes the author, the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous. It 
depends on whether the reduction in the duplications of fixed costs offsets the greater 
price mark-up. 
It can be seen that, as in many other topics in regulation theory, there is not an 
approach that can be considered, a priori, the best. As we will see in Part II, vertical 
separation is the norm in liberalized electricity markets. In telecommunications, the 
owners of fixed-line networks are commonly allowed to render mobile services. In 
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ports, the experience is mixed. In Australia, for example, regulated terminal operators 
can provide complementary services or be related to companies providing them 
(pilotage, towage, shipping, etc.). In Chile, there are limits to vertical integration. Up 
to 40% of a port concessionaire’s shares may be owned by “relevant players”, i.e.,  
shipping companies or cargo owners accounting for more than 25% of the traffic at 
the concessioned terminal or more than 15% of the traffic at ports in the same region 
(Foxley and Mordones, 2000). 
3.2 Access pricing 
As seen before, fair access rules to naturally monopolistic facilities are necessary to 
promote competition within network industries, regardless of vertical structure.   
Laffont and Tirole (2000) claim that access charges reflect multiple objectives.  They 
must “induce an efficient use of networks, encourage incumbents to invest while 
minimizing costs, generate an efficient amount of entry into infrastructure and 
services, and do all of this at a reasonable regulatory cost”12. Furthermore, according 
to Valletti and Estache (1998), the failure to design these policies is one of the main 
reasons why potential gains from restructuring utilities are not realized or shared 
between the users and the owners of these facilities. 
3.2.1 Access pricing methodologies 
In principle, pricing access poses the same difficulties for regulators as pricing final 
goods produced in monopolistic situations. If access is priced according to marginal 
costs, the fixed costs incurred in its provision have to be recovered through 
government transfers. If a surcharge is added to recover fixed costs, the regulator 
faces the dilemma between optimal (Ramsey) prices, and fair, subsidy-free and 
sustainable ones (see section 2.2.5).  In this case, access to monopolistic facilities is 
seen just as any of the products sold by the incumbent. However, in the context of 
access pricing, Ramsey pricing will require price discrimination when the same 
product is sold to firms facing different price elasticities. 
Even in a context of vertical separation, the problem of access pricing is complex due 
to the large consequences of not doing it adequately.  For example, if access is priced 
in a way such as to allow the upstream monopolist to obtain a mark-up, the final 
effect in retail prices would be further magnified, leading to the double 
marginalization problem. This problem occurs because access charges constitute a 
cost for downstream operators, upon which they will charge their own mark-ups.  In 
this way, part of the downstream mark-up will thus be charged upon the upstream 
mark-up, increasing retail prices even further (Motta, 2004).   
                                                
12 Laffont and Tirole (2000), p. 99. 
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On the contrary, if access is priced too low, excessive and inefficient entry may occur 
(arguably, subject to physical limitations). In this case, the waste of resources due to 
the duplication of fixed costs discussed by Vickers (1995) and described in the 
previous section would be produced. Even more, low access charges may discourage 
incumbents from maintaining and upgrading the infrastructure. The problem becomes 
even more intricate under vertical integration. As discussed in the previous section, 
the monopolist has in this case incentives to recover the foregone benefits by 
foreclosing entry in related markets (where it has to compete with other operators).  
High access charges erect barriers to entry and maintain the incumbents’ market 
power in the potentially competitive markets. Moreover, given the information 
asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated firm, this may lead to a practice 
called “price-squeeze”: the incumbent charges higher-than-optimum access charges 
and uses the extra revenues to undercut competitors’ final prices. In this way, 
competitors are “squeezed” between expensive costs and reduced retailing prices. 
A first approach to price access is by using the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule” or 
ECPR, proposed by Baumol and Sidak (1994).  This approach reflects the following 
rationale: if final prices are already fixed, the price of access has no effect on 
allocative efficiency.  Therefore, if final products are homogeneous and the market is 
contestable, the access charge should equal the difference between the final price and 
the marginal cost of producing the good. Alternatively, the rule says that the access 
charge should be equal to the direct cost of providing access plus the opportunity cost 
of providing access.  
It is important to explain the rationale of the ECPR in more detail. According to 
Laffont and Tirole (2000), the premise is that in absence of government transfers, the 
monopolist must recover its fixed costs by offering some goods or services above 
marginal cost. Therefore, setting access charges any differently than what would be 
done under Ramsey pricing will introduce distortions by requiring the incumbent to 
recover fixed costs in some other way. ECPR pricing reflects this view. This rule is 
neutral for the incumbent’s revenue, i.e., every good or service sold contributes with 
the recovery of fixed costs, even if it is not provided by the incumbent. Furthermore, 
the use of this rule secures a level playing field: entry is profitable only for those firms 
that are more efficient than the incumbent in the downstream activity.  In this respect, 
the rule sends the right signal to new entrants. 
This methodology has been repeatedly criticized (Tye, 1994; Economides and White, 
1998). First, since the ECPR assumes that final prices are fixed, its critics claim it 
provides no mechanism for forcing retail prices to competitive levels. Secondly, if the 
incumbent is earning supra-normal profits, the use of the rule guarantees these rents. 
Valletti and Estache (1998), however, argue that this observation is inappropriate 
because ECPR assumes that final prices are optimally set. A third criticism is that if an 
entrant is effectively more efficient than the incumbent, the latter will disappear from 
the downstream segment, for which the regulation of the final price is irrelevant.  
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Other criticisms are that under the ECPR approach the entrants’ full costs on the 
competitive market are likely to exceed the incumbent’s incremental price; that the 
use of the rule will facilitate “price-squeezing” and that it would force the entrants to 
contribute to the incumbent’s cost inefficiency.   
3.2.2 Implementation problems 
The first problem of implementing any access pricing rule is to calculate and allocate 
costs adequately. The costs implicitly supposed in economic theories differ from the 
costs kept in accounting books, mainly because economic and accounting costs serve 
different purposes. A further complication is that accounting costs are usually kept 
according to historic costs, while economic costs usually suppose replacement costs. 
The costs incurred in providing access are of two kinds: incremental costs, defined as 
those directly related to the increase in production caused by the demand for access; 
and common costs, those incurred in the supply of a group of services that cannot be 
directly attributed to any one service, typically as a consequence of economies of 
scope (Fernandez-Baca, 2006). The problem is that allocation rules are arbitrary and, 
under monopolistic situations, common costs are so important that, to avoid anti-
competitive situations, have to be allocated in the right proportions to the various 
services provided with the infrastructure. 
The most straightforward way to allocate costs is under the Fully Distributed Costs
(FDC) methodology. Under FDC, the costs are allocated mechanically among the 
different products following several criteria: output shares, revenue shares, direct 
costs involved, contribution margins, etc. This allocation method has the advantage to 
be well understood and easy to implement.  However, even though it allows recovery 
of investments, it does not account the demand nor encourages cost minimization. In 
the presence of competition, FDC may induce an inefficient amount of entry.  
Valletti and Estache (1998) sustain that the current dominant paradigm is the use of 
cost-based methodologies such as  the Long-Run Incremental Cost (LRIC). Their 
rationale is to set access prices on the basis of an efficient cost benchmark rather than 
on the incumbent’s actual costs. The LRIC is calculated based on the cost of the 
currently most efficient technology derived from an engineering model, and on a 
forecast of the most likely use of the infrastructure. The main drawback of this 
methodology is that it requires too much information and projections that in practice 
give the regulator a large amount of discretion. Indeed, this methodology requires 
knowing the lowest current cost of the incumbents’ equipment, how intensively it will 
be used and also the rate of technological progress of the industry. The method is 
popular, however, because it promotes competition although, according to the cited 
authors, prevents incumbents from making money in the bottleneck, which may bar 
perverse consequences in the long-run. 
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A more usage-based approach to calculate access charges is through a Global Price-
Cap (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). This regulation methodology consists of setting a 
price-cap in the form of a weighted average of the goods or services produced by the 
monopoly.  Given that the monopolist possesses better information about the 
characteristics of the demand than the regulator, it is allowed to choose any 
combination of prices that better matches the needs of his customers, as long as the 
weighted average does not exceed the global price-cap. This approach has the 
advantage that when a cap is set properly, the regulated firm is induced to choose the 
optimal Ramsey prices, without the need for the regulator to know demand functions. 
Since, for the incumbent, providing access is not much different than providing any 
other good or service, the rationale is to treat access not differently and include access 
charges in the computation of the global price-cap.   
The main criticism to this approach is that it allows the monopolist to engage in anti-
competitive practices. In fact, this methodology allows the incumbent to set high 
prices in the monopolistic segments, where no entry is encouraged, and set artificially 
low prices in competitive segments, thus discouraging entry. For this reason, this 
approach might need to be used with price floors and caps (Boyer, 1997).  
3.3 The Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The third important topic necessary to understand how access policies are 
implemented is the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD). This is a principle used to 
promote competition in markets where an (tangible or intangible) asset necessary to 
compete is controlled by a firm with the ability and incentive to foreclose competitors.  
According to this doctrine, under certain circumstances the incumbent should be 
mandated to grant access to competitors to this asset (the “essential facility”) under 
“reasonable” conditions. 
3.3.1 The EFD under Antitrust Law 
The EFD was first articulated by the US Supreme Court in 1912, in the case United 
States v. Terminal Railroad Association13. In this case (see Appendix 3 for details), 
the company Terminal Railroad Association had monopolized all ways to cross the 
Mississippi river, thus controlling all the freight that crossed the city of St. Louis. 
Instead of mandating the divestiture of this bottleneck, the US Supreme Court restored 
competition by granting access to competitors to the monopolized facilities. 
Since then, the US Supreme Court had reached similar decisions in a series of cases.  
According to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks (2002), the most cited are: Associated 
                                                
13 224 U.S. 383 (1912) 
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Press v. United States14, Lorain Journal v. United States15, and Otter Tail Power Co. 
v. United States16.  In these and other decisions the Court made clear that the EFD
portrays a unilateral refusal to deal, potentially liable as a monopolization attempt.  
According to these and other authors (Bergman, 2001; Werden, 1987), the leading US
essential facilities case is MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T17.  In that case, the 
Seventh Circuit Court established that there were four elements necessary to establish 
liability under the EFD: 
a. Control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
b. A competitor's practical or reasonable inability to duplicate the essential 
facility; 
c. The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and, 
d. The feasibility of providing the facility. 
Since the establishment of this precedent, Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks (2002) claim 
that virtually every court in the US has used these criteria to analyze cases related to 
essential facilities claims. However, as a result of the practical difficulty to 
demonstrate that the facility controlled by the incumbent is essential to competition; 
American courts rarely impose liability under the EFD. 
The situation is somewhat different under European competition law. Van den Bergh 
and Camesasca (2001) argue that essential facilities cases constitute a special kind of 
“refusals to deal” practices under European law. According to Bergman (2001), any 
exclusivity agreement that limits trade to a pair or group of firms is considered to 
have the “object or effect” to restrict competition, and constitutes a violation of the 
article 81 of the EC treaty; unless it is explicitly allowed. Furthermore, any unilateral 
selective refusal to deal may also infringe the same article if the purpose or effect is to 
establish a vertical agreement, i.e., the setting of prices and conditions under which 
retailers are allowed to sell their products. But if there is no exclusivity element 
present, European law does not interfere with a firm’s right to decide with whom to 
deal, unless it is involved in abusive practices forbidden in the article 82 of the EC 
treaty.   
Bergman (2001) argues that the EFD is also related to the prohibition against excessive 
pricing stated in the mentioned article 82 of the EC treaty.  However, in this case, the 
doctrine is not seen as a criterion to define when excessive pricing constitutes an 
abusive practice, but a tool to be used against a certain type of predatory action. 
                                                
14 326 U.S. 1 (1945) 
15 342 U.S. 143, 146-149,156 (1951) 
16 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973) 
17 708 F.2d at 1132-33 
55
Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2001) argue that, in contrast with US practice, the EFD
in Europe has been overused.  They argue that frequently the underlying analysis, 
starting with market definition, has been conducted in a “rather patchy manner, and 
this then resulted in an overtly summary appraisal of the essential character of the 
facility at hand.”18. They use as an example the Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink
case19, in which the later evolution of the market proved the European Commission 
wrong in defining a harbor facility as essential. 
The use of the EFD in Europe substantially proliferated until the European Court of 
Justice ruled the case Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG et al20.  In that case, the Court held that refusing 
access does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position under the article 82 of the 
EC treaty.  To arrive at such decision, the Court set a series of conditions for a facility 
to be deemed as essential (lately called the “Bronner test”), that since then have 
substantially limited the scope of the EFD under European law. These conditions are 
the following: 
a. The facility is controlled by a monopolist; 
b. The facility is considered essential because it is indispensable in order to 
compete in the market with the controller of the facility;  
c. Access is denied or granted on unreasonable terms; 
d. No legitimate business reason is given for objectively justifying the denied 
access (as to the feasibility of providing the facility); and, 
e. A competitor is unable (practically or reasonably) to duplicate the essential 
facility. 
Consequently with this restrictive interpretation, the exceptional circumstances 
required to apply the EFD only exist if a monopolist’s refusal to deal eliminates all 
competition in a downstream market; and if this input is indispensable for competitors 
to carry out their business. 
It is worth noting that although the standard formulation of the doctrine supposes two 
vertically-related markets, this is not necessarily a requisite to apply it under 
American antitrust law.  In fact, in the case Aspen Highlands Corp. v. Aspen Skiing 
Co.21 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the EFD when a ski resort decided to 
stop its participation in a “multi-area ski ticket” that allowed customers to use several 
resorts at a discounted price.  The Court established that this multi-area ticket was an 
                                                
18 Van der Bergh and Camesasca (2001), p. 275 
19 OJ L 15/8 (1993) 
20 C-7/97 
21 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1984) 
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essential facility to which the firm was denying access with the intent of driving 
competitors out of business and monopolize the market. The Court also stated 
explicitly that vertical integration is not essential to finding a violation of antitrust 
laws (Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, 2002).  
This practice contrasts with European competition laws. Indeed, as argued by 
Bergman (2001), “the doctrine is only applicable in situations where a firm that is 
refused access to the facility is incapable of being active in another market, due to this 
refusal”22.   
3.3.2 The EFD under regulation: the Australian National Access 
Regime 
In the early nineties, the Australian Federal Government commissioned a study aimed 
to define a national competition policy. The report of this inquiry, known as the 
“Hilmer Report” recommended the establishment of a new legal regime under which 
firms could access specific essential facilities on reasonable terms. The new regime 
was implemented in 1995 and applies only to infrastructures considered “of national 
significance” (Maddock and Marshall, 1997). 
The Australian access regime applies only to assets that had been declared “essential 
facilities” by the National Competition Council (NCC). The criteria used by the NCC to 
evaluate applications by potential entrants are the following (Productivity 
Commission, 2001):  
a. That access to the service would promote competition in at least one market 
(whether or not in Australia) other than the market for the services; 
b. That it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to 
provide the service; 
c. That the facility is of “national significance”, regarding its size, importance to 
trade and commerce or the importance of the facility to the national economy; 
d. That access can be provided without risks to human health and safety; 
e. That access to the service is not already subject to an access regime; and, 
f. That access to the service would not be contrary to the public interest. 
If the facility satisfies these criteria, the NCC makes its recommendation to the 
respective Federal, State or Territory Minister, who decides whether or not to 
                                                
22 Bergman (2001), p. 418 
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“declare” the facility based on NCC’s arguments.  When an asset is declared to be an 
essential facility, access can be granted in two ways:  
a. A contract, where the applicant and the incumbent agree on access price and 
conditions following a negotiation. Once an agreement is reached, the contract 
has to be registered by the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission 
(ACCC), who can deny registration if its terms harm the public interest. If the 
parties are unable or unwilling to agree, either party may apply to ACCC for 
dispute arbitration.   
b. Mandate by the ACCC when a deal is not reached. 
When registered, such contract has effect as if it were a decision of the ACCC. If a 
facility has been declared and an agreement has already been negotiated or arbitrated, 
further access seekers may apply to be granted access under the same conditions. 
Likewise, existing regimes can be certified by the ACCC if they are effective in 
granting access to third parties at reasonable terms. The telecommunications, 
electricity and natural gas regimes have been certified by the ACCC. Furthermore, the 
owner of any non-declared facility may submit to the ACCC a voluntary undertaking 
which outlines the conditions under which access would be granted to any third party. 
In these cases, the ACCC may accept or reject the undertaking based on criteria 
described before (Maddock and Marshall, 1997).  
The criteria upon which the ACCC must base its determinations (both for registering a 
contract or enacting a mandate) are the following (Productivity Commission, 2001): 
a. The legitimate business interests of the provider's investment in the facility; 
b. The public interest, including the public interest in having competition in 
markets; 
c. The interests of all persons having rights to use the service; 
d. The direct costs of providing access to the service; 
e. The value to the provider of extensions whose cost is borne by someone else; 
f. The operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and reliable 
operation of the facility; and, 
g. The economically efficient operation of the facility. 
Two problems have been identified (Pengilley, 1998).  The first is the length of the 
process. Indeed, the legislation itself does not specify how long would it take to an 
applicant to go through the whole access system, with the possibility to appeal in 
many instances to the Australian Competition Tribunal. The second and most 
58
important problem is that the legislation does not state what access pricing scheme 
will be used to compensate a facility owner. The encouragement or discouragement of 
private investments will then depend on the consistency upon which the ACCC
exercises its discretionary powers to decide what pricing scheme will be used. 
Some features of the Australian access regime are worth to be highlighted. First, the 
regime is general (as opposed to industry-specific) and only applies to facilities 
considered as of national importance, regardless if they are owned by federal, state or 
private parties. The second important aspect is that the regime is an administrative 
one.  Court recourses are only allowed when the administrative process is exhausted.  
The third and most important characteristic is that rather than directly regulating the 
price of access, Australia has chosen to allow parties to negotiate privately. The 
government only intervenes when an agreement cannot be reached.   
3.3.3 The EFD as criterion for access granting 
  
The application of the EFD can be seen from an economic point of view as a trade-off 
between static and dynamic economic efficiency. On one hand, it is desirable to limit 
the incumbent’s property rights to avoid the loss of welfare caused by the reduction of 
competition in at least one market. On the other hand, this limitation on property 
rights also reduces the incumbent’s incentives to invest, innovate and improve the 
coverage of infrastructure. This effect should not be underestimated, especially in the 
case of scarce, expensive-to-build infrastructure, such the one needed in transport, 
energy or telecommunications industries. Given the seriousness of the undesired 
effects caused by the limitation of property rights, the misuse of the EFD carries large 
risks. For this reason, it is important to establish clear criteria to select the cases where 
it is correct to apply the doctrine (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).   
The desirability of the application of the EFD seems to be clear in cases when the 
facility is a natural monopoly and its use constitutes an essential input to produce 
goods in a related market. As discussed in previous sections, the duplication of natural 
monopolies would waste valuable social resources and increase the production costs 
of the goods produced with these facilities. Furthermore, its essentiality would 
increase the loss of welfare by facilitating the extension of monopoly power to 
potentially competitive markets–especially in the case when the monopoly is 
regulated.  
The case is much less clear however when the input is not produced within a natural 
monopoly or its use is not essential to produce further goods (Maddock and Marshall, 
1997). Indeed, the feasibility of duplication makes the market more contestable, thus 
reducing the potential of monopoly pricing. The application of the EFD in this context 
may also be counter-productive, given that the elimination of duplication incentives is 
likely to perpetuate the monopoly. In other words, the potential short-term gains of 
sharing may not compensate the long-term effects of reducing the owner’s incentives 
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to invest and innovate.  Analogously, the arguments for limiting property rights are 
weaker when the output produced by a natural monopoly can be substituted, for 
example, in cases when transport is possible both by railways and highways.  In this 
case, even in the presence of sub-additivity of costs, the possibility of a monopolist 
excising market power is limited by competition. 
As important as knowing in which cases the application of the EFD is desirable, is to 
correctly assess price and conditions under which access should be granted. If the 
price is too high or conditions are too restrictive, less-than-optimum access will occur, 
producing economic rents and thus loss of welfare.  On the other hand, if the access is 
priced below costs or its conditions make the incumbent bear some of the costs that 
should be paid by the entrants, excessive entry will occur, thus reducing or 
eliminating the incumbent’s incentives to invest in new infrastructure. 
In this respect, an issue raised by several authors is the inability of courts to correctly 
assess in which cases the EFD should be applied and to supervise its correct 
application in cases that access requires continuous supervision (Maddock and 
Marshal, 1997; Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2001). According to Pengilley (1998), 
courts in general do not have staff with the required business expertise to evaluate 
commercial decisions, not even in the US, where courts have probably the greatest 
experience in EFD. In effect, US courts have not usually mandated access unless it is 
under “nondiscriminatory” conditions (in cases where access has been previously 
granted) or when the issue has been delegated to a specialized regulatory agency. 
As we can see, the EFD serves as criterion to evaluate when access should be 
mandated, but not to set prices and conditions of such access. Considering the poor 
performance of courts in this matter, and that the specialized knowledge required for 
this task is similar to that necessary to price goods produced in monopolistic 
situations; it seems logical to entrust this task to an economic regulator. Indeed, in an 
increasing number of countries, access to natural monopolies is regulated by 
specialized agencies. 
The system devised in Australia has two main innovations. The first one, considering 
the magnitude of the potential negative effects of misusing the EFD, the legislation 
aims to reduce regulatory failures by limiting the application of the access regime 
only to infrastructure regarded as of national importance. Moreover, in its 2001 
review of the National Access Regime, the Productivity Commission recommends to 
mandate access only if this measure will increase competition in a substantial fashion 
(Productivity Commission, 2001).  This choice implicitly supposes that undesired 
anti-competitive behavior can be dealt using antitrust law. 
The second innovation of the Australian regime is the preeminence given to direct 
negotiation between the incumbent and the entrant. This limits the participation of the 
regulator to cases in which the parties do not reach an agreement. According to the 
Productivity Commission (2001), the regime is not intended to replace commercial 
negotiations between facility owners and access seekers, but to enhance the incentives 
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for negotiation and provide a means of access on reasonable terms and conditions if 
negotiations fail. This feature, aimed to reduce the typical information asymmetries 
between regulators and regulated firms, is consistent with a theoretical development 
known as the “Coase Theorem”. This theorem indicates that if property rights are well 
defined and there are no transaction costs (or these are extremely low), negotiation 
between the parties will lead to a better resource allocation than if there was 
governmental intervention (Coase, 1960). In this context, the intervention of the 
regulator is justifiable only if its own costs are lower than the transaction costs of a 
negotiated agreement between the parties (Flor and Defilippi, 2003). 
However, some authors are skeptical about the social efficiency of negotiated 
agreements. Maddock and Marshall (1997), for example, argue that only two 
outcomes are possible: access pricing according to the ECPR rule (under which the 
incumbent maintains its monopoly rents) and collusion between both parties to share 
the rents. These authors, however, do not analyze cases where other access pricing 
methods are used and ignore that the existence of economic profits will attract further 
entrants until this rent disappears. Furthermore, the authors implicitly suppose that the 
information asymmetry between the parties and the ACCC is such that this agency will 
fail to recognize potential threats to public interest.   
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Appendix 3: United States v. Terminal Railroad 
Association23
“In 1889, the notorious financier Jay Gould organized a coalition to acquire railroad 
facilities in and around St. Louis, Missouri. The antitrust suit that resulted from 
Gould’s escapade (…) involved three different means of crossing the Mississippi 
when the government finally sued the combination. After Gould had obtained control 
of each crossing, his acquisitive urge was still well short of its goal. At this dominant 
regional and transcontinental railroad junction, twenty-four independent lines 
terminated—half on the bluffs forming the St. Louis side of the Mississippi, and half 
on the plains stretching away from East St. Louis, Illinois, on the opposite bank. 
Gould’s group, which included only fourteen of the twenty-four lines, acquired all of 
the railroad facilities of both cities: terminals and yards, and tunnels and tracks 
leading from the high bluffs on the Missouri side of the Mississippi down to the river 
crossing below. 
In short, the acquisition gave Gould complete control of the facilities necessary to 
load or unload freight traffic or passengers anywhere within the area of St. Louis or 
East St. Louis, let alone carry anything or anyone across the Mississippi. Given that 
the assets under Gould’s control were absolutely indispensable to the railroads of the 
region, and considering the importance of the railroad to both passenger and freight 
transportation in that era, it is difficult to imagine an amalgamation today that could 
achieve a similar chokehold. Perhaps one might imagine the unification under 
common control of the highways, bridges, railroad facilities, airports, and city streets 
of St. Louis and East St. Louis. 
The specific results of the combination’s power were predictable: The combination 
was able to impose premium rates on traffic moving within and through the St. Louis 
area, constrained with respect to the latter by the presence of a railroad bridge at 
Memphis, Tennessee, roughly 285 miles to the south. These rates were imposed in the 
form of supplemental charges called “arbitraries.” The term suggests the likely 
attitude of the parties most obviously aggrieved by the situation—namely, the 
railroads relying on those facilities that were not included within Gould’s ownership 
group.  
                                                
23 Lipsky and Sidak (1999), pp. 1189-1190. 
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The federal government brought suit in 1905, seeking, under sections 1and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, [footnote deleted] to dissolve the Association and restore independent 
competition among the various entities united by Gould. But the Supreme Court, in 
1912, found merit in the defendant’s argument that the consolidation of terminal 
facilities within this enormous transportation complex would permit more efficient 
coordination of railroad operations. Accordingly, the Court held that dissolution 
would not be required unless the parties could not agree on a remedy short of 
divestiture [footnote deleted].  This remedy was to require the Association to admit 
any railroad to ownership on the same terms and conditions as the railroads already 
allied with Gould. Moreover, railroads that wished to use the Association’s facilities 
without becoming owners would have to be charged usage fees that would “place 
every such [railroad] company upon as nearly an equal plane . . . as that occupied by 
the [member] companies.” [footnote deleted].   The Court gave no further guidance on 
the principles by which such rates could be calculated.  
Thus, the competition that had existed before Gould’s consolidation of the numerous 
independent terminal companies and other facilities operators could have been 
restored by a decree of divestiture. Rather than rekindle the competition extinguished 
by Gould, however, the Court permitted the entry of a decree that required regulation 
of (1) the terms and conditions of ownership in the monopoly established by the 
consolidation and (2) the relationship between the rates and terms of usage applied to 
owners and those applied to non-owner users of the monopoly facility” 
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4. Privatization and regulation 
The following section describes the main characteristics of the reforms carried out by 
a large number of governments during the last three decades, and the new role of the 
private sector in providing public services. The second section presents various 
assessments of the consequences privatization brought to the countries that 
implemented it. We will see that despite the obvious failures of some processes, 
privatization generated important gains to most countries that implemented it. We will 
also see evidence that sound regulation is required to promote investment and avoid 
private agents obtaining economic rents from operating infrastructures. The last 
section presents the findings of several studies that have analyzed the effects of 
privatization in the port industry. These studies do not present conclusive evidence 
that private management deliver higher levels of efficiency, although much of the 
research leans towards this direction. 
4.1 Private sector involvement in infrastructure 
industries 
Transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure play a vital role in economic 
growth, since they provide the basis on which economic activities take place. It has 
been argued that the inadequacy of physical infrastructure constitutes the key 
characteristic defining developing and transition economies (Dutz, Ordover and 
Willig, 2000). 
Some characteristics of infrastructure-based industries (the presence of naturally 
monopolistic segments and externalities) make the provision of their services difficult 
for societies to organize. In effect, the fear that the owners of facilities may abuse 
their market power by providing a sub-optimal quantity of services was such that in 
many cases the ownership and operation of infrastructure within these industries was 
exclusively limited to governments.   
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Unfortunately, the provision of infrastructure-based services by the government was 
not exempt of problems. The public nature of the utilities’ management often made 
pricing and investment decisions to be guided by political and not economic reasons, 
causing gruesome inefficiencies and hindering economic development, especially for 
poor countries. The seriousness of the problem became evident in the last decades of 
the 20th century, when the globalization of world markets made inefficiency a burden 
too expensive to bear.  
In the early eighties, the UK government embarked on a series of reforms aimed at 
changing the role of the public sector in the economy. Although these reforms were 
not exempt of criticisms (the most acute ones were those stating that the reforms were 
guided by pure ideological reasons), a number of developing countries started to 
imitate them very soon. These reforms share three common elements (Kessides, 
2004): 
a. Liberalization of the economy. The reforms typically liberalized the country’s 
economy, cutting tariffs to imports, removing barriers and eliminating 
exclusive rights to enter markets. 
b. Changing the roles of the public and private sectors. The reform’s rationale 
assigned the private sector the role of creating wealth and generating 
employment whilst the public sector regulates and promotes competition. As a 
consequence, many public enterprises were privatized and governments 
embarked in the promotion of public-private partnerships. Private investment 
was promoted in areas once reserved for the government, from infrastructure 
to social services. 
c. Implementation of pro-competitive policies. New antitrust agencies were 
created and old ones were empowered to guarantee competition. Considering 
the special characteristics of transport, telecom and energy, however, the 
promotion of competition in these industries required that some previously-
integrated activities were unbundled, setting new rules aimed at creating 
markets were previously was none, and the creation of regulating agencies in 
charge of overseeing the remaining naturally monopolistic segments in the 
industries. 
The reasons behind the reforms, however, were different for developed and 
developing countries. In the former ones, besides ideology, the shift toward a bigger 
role for private sector was motivated by failures of previous reforms aimed at 
introducing business-like practices (i.e. commercialization) in public companies but 
fell short of ownership change; plus the short-term fiscal attraction of selling state-
owned assets (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). In developing ones, the main reasons argued 
were the following (Alexander and Estache, 1999): 
a. Governments were increasingly convinced that their own resources are 
insufficient to meet investment demands. 
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b. Even when a government may have sufficient funds for investing in 
infrastructure, other demands—mainly for social programs—were leading 
governments to seek new sources of funding.  
c. A belief that private operators will produce greater efficiency than can be 
achieved by the public sector. 
Kikeri and Kolo (2005) show that between 1990 and 2003, 120 developing countries 
carried out 7,860 transactions involving the divestiture of state assets or some form of 
public-private partnership; generating US$ 410 billion in proceeds. Nearly US$ 200 
billion correspond to infrastructure projects. During the same period, additional US$ 
350 billion worth of greenfield projects were developed through public-private 
partnerships. Around half of these transactions occurred in Latin America. Europe and 
Central Asia accounted for 26%. 
Transactions in infrastructure sectors have been, however, concentrated in 
telecommunications and power, amounting to 50% and 36% of the total occurred 
between 1990 and 2003. During the same period, 65 developing countries embarked 
in projects involving some form of private participation in telecommunications, and 
72 in electricity or natural gas.  
Compared to the large number of privatizations, there have been few nationalizations 
of privatized companies. These occurred when heavily indebted companies failed or 
in times of crisis or due to political change. The most prominent examples of re-
nationalization of privatized companies are Rail Track in the UK (due to bankruptcy), 
Air New Zealand, water and sanitation concessions in Bolivia as well as postal and 
water concessions in Argentina.  
4.2 Privatization assessments and the need for better 
regulation 
In the early eighties, when privatizations started in the UK, there was neither great 
theoretical justification nor hard evidence that the performance problems of state-
owned companies could be altered by changes in ownership. But later, as 
privatizations processes started in other countries, the number of assessments of these 
policies grew.  
Kikeri and Nellis (2004) surveyed more than 100 papers assessing privatizations. 
They focus on performance and compare productivity, profitability, output changes, 
investments and capacity utilization before and after the sale. Most of these studies 
conclude that privatization improves performance and profitability for new owners, as 
well as efficiency, output and investment. They also indicate that in terms of welfare, 
privatizations increased the resources available in the economy and produced net 
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gains for stakeholders (consumers, workers, investors, competitors and the 
government). However, only in rare occasions all of them benefited at the same time. 
In most cases, the status of winner or loser was a consequence of the transaction’s 
structure and the degree of institutional development of the economy. As we will see 
later, regulation plays an important role in the distribution of these gains. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) reviewed cross-cutting studies that evaluate the impact 
of privatization over firm performance. These studies (Megginson, Nash and van 
Randerborgh, 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza, Nash and Megginson, 
2000) show that profitability increased from 8.6% in average before privatization to 
12.6. They also show that efficiency rose from 96.9% in the year of privatization to 
123.3% afterwards and that output per worker increased in between 79% and 86% of 
firms. The main factors driving these improvements were better incentives, more 
adequate management structure and improved corporate governance. 
Moreover, a study of more that 200 enterprises privatized in Mexico by La Porta and 
Lopez de Silanes (1997) concludes that these companies went from highly 
unprofitable to profitable, closing the performance gap with the control group of 
similar private sector firms. Output rose 53.4%, sales per employee doubled and 
profitability increased 24%. The authors infer that improvements were due to 
productivity gains resulting from better incentives and management associated with 
private ownership. 
Several studies also conclude that privatization improved efficiency and profitability 
of enterprises in Brazil. Pinheiro (1996) analyzed the performance of 50 Brazilian 
companies before and after privatization and concluded that the process significantly 
improved performance, especially when it involved a change of control rather than a 
sale of a minority stake. A paper by Macedo (2000) showed that a large steel mill, 
which had been unprofitable before privatization, started to obtain profits afterwards, 
boosting investments dramatically.  
Privatization has also improved performance in infrastructure sectors. According to a 
survey by Harris (2003), well designed schemes for private participation (those that 
align economic incentives with public policy goals) produce substantial increases in 
overall welfare. For example, private participation led to overall domestic welfare 
benefits in Guinea and Argentina, amounting to US$1.4 billion in the case of Buenos 
Aires.  
Moreover, the evidence produced by Harris suggests that in many developing 
countries the private sector does as well (or even better), than the public sector at 
expanding the service. In Gabon, for example, where the same private operator runs 
water and electricity services, targets for increasing coverage for both services have 
been met or exceeded. The privatization of electricity led to near universal coverage 
in Lima, Peru; and in Chile, the largest coverage increase has occurred in low income 
areas. 
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Results have been particularly impressive in telecommunications, especially where 
competitive regimes have been established. In fact, evidence suggests that expansion 
has been far slower where competition has not occurred; but even in that case, private 
monopolies have expanded more quickly than public ones. In Uganda, for example, 
the entry of private mobile companies led to a major increase in the number of 
connections, which largely surpassed those of the fixed-line incumbent. According to 
the author, the private sector’s technical and managerial competence, combined with 
more sustainable pricing policies and better financial discipline provide more 
resources for investing in the infrastructure’s expansion. 
A study by Galal et al. (1994) estimates the consequences of privatizing 12 companies 
in Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and the UK. The study compares the performance of these 
companies before and after privatization, analyzing consumer welfare, efficiency and 
investment. The authors conclude that divestiture substantially improved economic 
welfare in 11 cases, which equal, on average, 26% of the firm’s pre-divestiture sales. 
According to the authors, this result was due to increased competition, adequate 
regulation, more rational pricing and investment policies and productivity 
improvements. 
Mckenzie and Mookherjee (2002) evaluated the distributive impact of privatization in 
four Latin America countries (Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia and Nicaragua). They 
analyze the effects of this policy on customers and workers, based on household and 
employment surveys. They find that there is no clear pattern concerning price 
increases, with prices actually going down in about half of the cases. And even when 
prices went up, their effects were outweighed by increases in access to basic services 
that occurred in the lower half of the income distribution. They also found that the 
quality of service improved significantly, in some cases because it was mandated by 
the government as part of the conditions for sale of the public company. For example, 
the privatization of electricity in Bolivia was accompanied by rules that established a 
system for measuring quality, setting out dates by which privatized companies had to 
comply with the indicators and determined penalties in the event of failure.  
Clarke and Wallsten (2002) analyzed the performance of infrastructure firms in 
delivering services to poor and rural households. Using data from around the world, 
their results show the failure of state-owned monopolies to provide universal service 
everywhere, with the only exception of Eastern Europe. The evidence also suggests 
that privatizations have not harmed poor and rural consumers, and in many cases have 
improved their access to infrastructure services.  
Andres, Foster and Guasch (2006) analyzed the impact of privatization on the 
performance of 116 electricity utilities in ten Latin American countries. They 
constructed a panel data of a wide range of indicators such as output, employment, 
productivity, efficiency, quality, coverage and prices. They evaluate three stages: 
before privatization, transition period (two years following divestiture) and after the 
process. Their results suggest that changes in ownership generate important 
improvements in key indicators, especially during the transition period. The most 
significant ones are in labor productivity (around 19% in the transition period and 
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5.5% afterwards), efficiency (5.5% during transition), and service quality (reductions 
on the duration and frequency of interruptions of 9.8% and 10.6%, respectively, 
during transition). 
There are also cases of privatizations not achieving their policy goals, generating 
undesired effects or having been carried out in environments unlikely to improve 
performance. Boubakri and Cossett (1998), for example, studied 16 privatized African 
firms and found a significant increase in capital spending but insignificant changes in 
output, profitability or efficiency. Analyzing the privatization of the Central 
Electricity Generating Board in England and Wales, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) 
conclude that the process effectually produced substantial cost reductions, but the 
bulk of the financial gains were captured by the new shareholders, not consumers or 
government (the privatization of UK ports was severely criticized for similar reasons). 
Likewise, Brown (2002) discussed the failures of privatizing Dabhol and Hub river 
power plants in India and Pakistan, respectively, and that of Rio Light electricity 
distribution company in Brazil. The author points out that the lack of a proper 
regulatory and competitive framework is much to blame for these failures, concluding 
that this is a prerequisite for transferring infrastructure companies to the private 
sector. 
Kikeri and Nellis (2004) claim that results tend to be the best when privatization is 
combined with proper competition policies and regulatory frameworks. Other 
assessments also conclude that good regulation is required to generate adequate levels 
of competition, increase investment levels and improve the distribution of the 
efficiency and welfare gains.  
A study made by Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) separates the effects of 
privatizations in Argentinean utilities with those of regulation itself. They find that 
privatization led to operational gains equivalent to 0.9% of GDP or 41% of the 
average expenditure on utility services. More importantly, effective regulation added 
gains worth 0.35% of GDP or 16% of the average expenditure on utility services. 
According to the authors, this improvement occurs because regulation acts as a 
mechanism to transfer rents from shareholders to consumers. 
In a recent study by Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2007), the authors analyzed a panel 
of 302 utilities with private sector participation and 928 utilities run by different 
government levels in 71 developing countries. Their aim was to evaluate the impact of 
private management on firm performance in electricity and water distribution. They 
find evidence that private sector participation is associated with output increases in 
electricity, connection increases in water, and improvements in service quality and 
bill collection ratios in both sectors. However, they do not find conclusive evidence 
for a change in prices nor an increase in investment levels, which point to a lack of 
maintenance and expansion investment even when private management has generated 
gains in operational efficiency. These results call for better regulation policies. 
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To determine if and how regulation matters for policies promoting private investment 
in infrastructure, Andres, Guasch and Straub (2007) tested the impact of regulation on 
1,000 concessions granted in Latin America from late 1980s to early 2000s. They 
tested the effect of regulation on aligning costs and tariffs, deterring opportunistic 
contract renegotiation and on productivity, quality of service, coverage and prices.  
Assessing the impact of regulation on aligning costs with tariffs, they find that the 
better the quality of regulation the closer the alignment between financial results and 
costs of capital (which implies that monopolists’ profitability is similar to that of 
firms in competetive markets). Assessing the impact of regulation on deterring 
opportunistic contract renegotiation, they find that the setting of a regulatory 
framework prior to privatizations reduces the likelihood of contract renegotiation. 
And, assessing the impact of regulation on productivity, quality of service, coverage 
and prices; they find that, effectively, regulatory structure, framework and quality are 
important determinants of how regulated companies perform. 
It is worth noting the dearth of literature analyzing privatization or regulation of 
transport infrastructure. The paper by Estache and Serebrisky (2004) is one of the few 
exceptions. The authors analyze the effects of liberalization and regulation of 
transport infrastructure claiming that for governments in developing countries, two of 
their most important objectives when privatizing ports, airports, railways and toll 
roads have been the reduction of their fiscal burden and the promotion of new 
investments in the sector. In developed countries, however, the decision to deregulate 
and restructure may have been more of an ideological choice and less of an urge to 
resolve pressing problems.  
The authors claim that in terms of efficiency, the liberalization and regulation of 
transport infrastructure has brought significant gains, although their specific source 
has not been adequately documented. From a fiscal viewpoint, the short-term effects 
have generally been positive, but it is still too early to draw long-term conclusions. 
From the viewpoint of freight transport, the effects of the reforms are not clear. Since 
competition with the trucking industry has been quite strong, it is unlikely that the 
average users may have been penalized. Nevertheless, the situation of captive 
shippers (those who have no other choice but to use the privatized infrastructure) 
might have been worsened. As for quality, the evidence is mixed. Visible quality 
dimensions, such as punctuality or safety, seem to have improved significantly (at 
least in developing countries); but less visible ones, such as regard for the 
environment, may have improved but not as much as expected. Lastly, the authors
argue that there is enough evidence to point out the need for an improvement in 
regulation in many countries, especially developing ones. One of the most important 
dimensions that require improvement is the access to key transport facilities. 
Kessides (2004) supports this view. After analyzing reforms in infrastructure 
industries carried out in developing and developed countries, the author points out 
two important issues: 
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a. Designing and implementing stable and effective regulation remains one of the 
most critical tasks for policymakers in developing and transition economies. In 
these countries the most pressing issue is designing regulatory mechanisms for 
privatized companies in infrastructure industries. 
b. To obtain the benefits of having reformed infrastructure industries, policies 
need to harmonize regulatory oversight of monopolistic activities with 
fostering competition. For the latter, it is critical to design policies that 
effectively allow firms to access key facilities (access policies). Otherwise, the 
relation between bottleneck components and competitive segments can create 
such severe distortions that results in terms of productivity and efficiency can 
be even worse than before the reforms. 
In the specific case of the reforms carried out in the port industry, the author indicates 
the following regarding the need for better regulation: 
“The primary objective of port policy is to support national development. 
Although some emphasis has recently been placed on port services that add value 
to products, the development objective is usually best served by securing cheap 
and fast movement of traffic through ports. To that end, the landlord port model 
introduces competition either in the market for the provision of port services 
(between or within terminals) or for the exclusive right to provide services where 
the market is too small to support multiple providers. This approach may require 
structural controls to secure or maintain an appropriately competitive framework 
or, where structural measures are insufficient, controls to prevent monopolistic 
exploitation or distortion”24
4.3 Privatization assessments in the port industry 
In the port sector, evidence about the private sector achieving higher levels of 
efficiency than the government is not conclusive, although much of the research 
seems to point in that direction.  
Cullinane and Song (2002) studied the theoretical support and practical validity of the 
claim that the transfer of ownership from public to private hands will lead to an 
improvement in economic efficiency, and financial and operational performance. The 
authors claim that in the case of UK ports, it is extremely difficult to conclude that 
ownership constitutes a significant factor in port performance and efficiency. Instead, 
factors such as geographical location and deregulation seem to have a greater 
influence. They conclude that privatization is only a partial cure for port’s economic 
problems and that, if implemented in isolation, it cannot deliver the desired results. 
  
Cullinane, Song and Gray (2002) employed two different models to assess the 
efficiency of a sample of Asian container terminals. The authors find evidence that 
                                                
24 Kessides (2004), p. 214. 
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privatization is related to the efficiency improvements observed in the studied 
terminals. Cullinane and Song (2003) also find evidence that efficiency levels in 
Korean container terminals increase with the degree of private property. 
Two studies suggest that privatization brought overall efficiency gains to the Mexican 
port system. Estache, Gonzales and Trujillo (2002) used panel data from 11 
independent Port Administrations. Their findings concluded that the decentralization 
and privatization of Mexican ports produced positive effects to practically every Port 
Administration; and that the efficiency gains reached between 6% and 8% per annum 
between 1996 and 1999 for the whole industry. Moreover, the findings of Estache, 
Tovar de la Fe and Trujillo (2004) conclude that the Mexican reform introduced 
incentives to port operators to increase capacity and adopt new technologies, which 
constituted the main contributors of efficiency gains. 
Trujillo and Serebrisky (2004) assessed the privatization and deregulation of 
Argentinean ports. According to the authors, the process transformed Puerto Nuevo 
de Buenos Aires from the most expensive port in Latin America into the cheapest one 
(stevedoring costs dropped by 8% per container, 11% for grain and 22% for general 
cargo). Cargo volumes grew significantly (containerized traffic grew by 78% between 
1996 and 1999), and tonnage handled per worker increased from 900 per year in 1991 
to 5,417 in 2001; allowing a reduction in the average duration of ship’s stay by about 
around 79% between 1995 and 2002. The privatization process had the additional 
advantage of eliminating all cross subsidies and reducing fiscal burden.  
Tongzon and Heng (2005) analyzed a sample of selected container terminals around 
the world. They find that increasing private sector participation in the port industry 
contributes to increase efficiency, but full privatization does not. Based of their 
findings, the authors claim that the best policy is to limit private participation within 
the “landowner and operator” functions, with the public sector performing regulatory 
functions. 
Other studies, however, do not find higher levels of efficiency in private port 
operations. Liu (1995) compared the efficiency of publicly and privately operated 
ports using data from 28 ports in the UK. His findings failed to show that ownership 
has a significant effect on efficiency. Analyzing 36 European container terminals and 
four Asian ones, Noteboom, Coeck and Van Der Broeck (2000) also failed to find a 
clear relationship between ownership and terminal efficiency. 
Baird (2003) claims that port privatization offers port users and the economy as a 
whole many advantages, but only when carried out properly and for the right reasons. 
Moreover, Baird (2000) argues that the sale of port land and the transfer of 
operational and regulatory functions may be counter-productive. In fact, even though 
private sector participation may increase efficiency levels, an almost total dependence 
on private operators to provide infrastructure may result in delayed investments. 
Therefore, public sector support, particularly in regard to provision of certain 
elements of port infrastructure, is still likely to be necessary.  
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5. Port economics and the need for 
an access regime 
The aim of this chapter is to argue why, in countries which possess naturally 
monopolistic terminals, privatization (in the form of concessions, leases, divestitures 
or greenfield projects), could be counterproductive unless access policies are 
implemented. It starts by describing port characteristics, services and markets and the 
complexities behind their organization and forms of competition. It continues 
discussing the drivers of the reforms carried out during the last quarter century and 
presents the experiences of three developing countries during their implementation. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relationship between competition and 
access in naturally monopolistic terminals and the dilemmas regulators face when 
formulating such policies. 
5.1 Port economics 
5.1.1 Economic characteristics of ports and terminals 
Ports possess a series of economic characteristics that make them difficult to regulate. 
Their first distinctive characteristic is that they are multi-service entities; i.e., different 
services for different markets are produced within a single port: infrastructure 
services, cargo handling services, pilotage, towage, mooring, etc. (Kessides, 2004). In 
the case of cargo handling, each type of cargo constitutes a different market: 
containers, grains, oil, coal, mineral ore, etc.  
Moreover, ports not only produce private goods, such as the services mentioned 
before, but also public goods. Public goods are those which possess the characteristics 
of non-rivalry (their consumption by one agent does not preclude their consumption 
by a second one) and non-exclusion (it is impossible to exclude a consumer from their 
consumption), and produce positive externalities when they are used (Baird, 2004). 
However, since private companies cannot profit from them, they have no incentives to 
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produce them. Port assets considered public goods are breakwaters and navigational 
aids, among others (Haralambides, 1997). Other public goods produced by ports are 
trade enhancement, second order increases in production volumes and collateral 
increases in trade-related services (World Bank, 2007). However, ports may also 
produce negative externalities, such as water pollution and the loss of natural marine 
habitats caused by vessel traffic, congestion caused by the vehicles transporting cargo 
to and from the port, and others such as landscape degradation and the loss of shores.  
An important characteristic of the port industry is that services from more than one 
market are required to complete the transport chain (to allow cargo and passengers to 
be embarked or disembarked). For example, for cargo to be transferred between ship 
and land, ships carrying it need pilotage, towage and mooring, and cargo itself needs 
handling services. If one of these services is not provided, the others become useless. 
As we will see, this is an important feature for ports with monopolistic markets, since 
the monopolization of one market would allow the monopolist the control of the 
whole logistics chain (Flor and Defilippi, 2003).  
A fourth distinctive characteristic of the industry is that the degree of competition 
largely depends on factors that are generally beyond the control of the port authority 
or the terminal’s management, such as the port’s location relative to maritime routes, 
the size and development patterns of the regional economy (which determines 
demand) and the quality and coverage of the overall transport network (which 
determines the degree of inter-port competition). The capacity to develop new ports or 
terminals is also limited because suitable shores are usually hard to find. 
A fifth important characteristic of ports is the presence of economies of scale and 
scope. In fact, a study by Heaver (1975) suggests that economies of scale in port 
operations amount to 0.8; i.e., that a 10% increase in traffic would only raise total 
costs by about 8% (average costs would diminish). Economies of scope emerge from 
the fact that ports are multi-product entities, which implies that the same inputs can be 
used to provide different services. For example, once a channel has been dredged, it 
can be used by both tankers and container ships at lower costs than in situations where 
two separate channels are needed. 
Tovar, Jara-Diaz and Trujillo (2004) reviewed several studies measuring these 
economies in ports and reported that not only infrastructure but also cargo handling 
services present increasing returns to scale. Other studies also suggest the presence of 
economies of scope between cargo types for infrastructure and cargo handling 
services. In a previous study, the same authors found both economies of scale and 
scope in Las Palmas port, in Spain (Tovar, Jara-Diaz and Trujillo, 2003)  
A sixth economic characteristic of ports is asset indivisibility. Indeed, port terminals 
cannot be expanded in a continuous way but in discrete amounts of relative large 
minimum sizes (De Rus, Campos and Nombela, 2003). In fact, in the case of 
container terminals, the investment needed to develop a new berth can be as high as 
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€70 - €100 million (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2004). Moreover, a large part of 
the capital is invested in sunk, long-lived assets, such as yards, berths, dredging, etc.  
These characteristics are not trivial, since they have a large impact on the design of 
port policies. The fact that ports produce public goods and externalities, for example, 
has been one of the main justifications for government intervention in the sector 
(Baird, 2004). This intervention has been typically oriented at the creation of 
industrial clusters around port areas, where large numbers of companies supplying or 
demanding specialized goods or services concentrate. It is believed that clustering of 
related activities improves the competitiveness of the industrial sector by fostering 
innovation and facilitating the dissemination of technological change. Governments 
have usually intervened in the planning and development of port areas and the 
regulation of entry, prices or profits of port service providers. 
The fact that the minimal size of terminal investments is relatively large, constitutes 
an entry barrier, since it is harder for newcomers to raise large amounts of capital. 
Moreover, the difficulty to find suitable shores to develop new ports (and the slow 
pace at which new terminals are developed) constitute barriers for existing companies 
to enter specific markets. Likewise, the combination of economies of scale and scope 
also constitutes an entry barrier, since smaller and less diversified entrants would face 
higher costs than the incumbent.  
5.1.2 Port markets and services 
Ports are conformed by water and land areas upon which infrastructure and 
superstructure is developed. The infrastructure of a port is conformed by the facilities 
that allow ships to enter and leave the port (channels, locks, navigation aids), 
load/unload cargo (berths, wharfs, yards), and for cargo to be transferred to and from 
the port (connections to roads, rails and waterways). The superstructure of a port 
consists of equipment (cranes, conveyor belts, elevators and other quay and yard-
handling equipment) and fixed assets built on the infrastructure (fuel tanks, 
warehouses, buildings) (Estache and De Rus, 2000)25. Both infrastructure and 
superstructure are used to provide port services.  
Table 5.1 presents a list of assets that constitute the infrastructure and superstructure 
of a port. 
                                                
25 There are several definitions of what is regarded as port superstructure. The one used here is used by 
Estache and De Rus (2000)  
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Table 5.1: Port infrastructure and superstructure 
Infrastructure Superstructure 
Channels 
Cranes and other container 
handling equipment 
Locks Conveyor belts 
Navigation aids Elevators 
Berths Pipelines 
Wharfs Fuel tanks 
Yards Warehouses 
Road, rail and water connections Office buildings 
Source: Trujillo and Nombela (2000) 
 
It is worth mentioning that the basic port infrastructure (channels, navigational aids, 
breakwaters) is typically provided by a public body such as a port authority or 
maritime administration. But under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP), the terminal’s 
infrastructure can be provided by either the port authority or the terminal operator, 
depending on the PPP agreement. Under a Lease, the port authority provides the 
infrastructure and the terminal operator the superstructure. Under a Concession or a 
Greenfield Project, the operator also builds most of the terminal’s infrastructure 
(World Bank, 2007). This topic will be discussed in detail in section 5.2.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows port’s logistics chain and the services required to complete it. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Port’s Logistics Chain 
 
There are many markets within a port. The most important service carried out within a 
port is stevedoring/cargo handling, which consists on the transfer of goods between 
the berth and the ship26. Each type of cargo is considered a different market, since 
many of the assets required to handle them are different. The main cargo handling 
markets are: containers, coal, mineral ore, grain (wheat, maize and soy, among 
                                                 
26 Since in previous time cargo handling and stevedoring were performed by different crews, they were 
differentiated. The movement of goods from the berth to the side of the ship (and vice-versa) was 
considered cargo handling, whilst the movement from the side of the ship to storage inside the vessel 
was considered stevedoring. Nowadays, both activities are provided by single firms and are considered 
synonyms (Trujillo and Nombela, 1999). 
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others), oil, liquefied gases, break-bulk and semi-commoditized products such as 
rolling cargo (ro/ro), forestry, steel products, fruit and fruit juices, etc. (Fearnleys’, 
2004). 
It is important to note that the amount of cargo handled in large ports, such as 
Rotterdam, Long Beach or Buenos Aires, justify investing in specialized terminals 
(Stopford, 1997). But in small local ports such as those which usually constitute 
natural monopolies (for example, Ilo, Paita or Matarani in Peru and Buenaventura in 
Colombia), different types of cargo are handled within single multi-product terminals.  
A second group of port services is related to the processing of these cargoes through 
the port: storage, cargo handling and related services (stuffing and striping, bagging 
and packaging, etc). A third group of port services is related to serve ship’s needs 
during their port call. Table 5.2 shows the main port markets. 
Table 5.2: Main port markets 
Services to the Cargo Services to the Ship 
Shipping Pilotage 
Stevedoring/cargo handling Towage 
Storage Mooring 
Transshipment Bunkering 
Stuffing and striping Ship repair 
Bagging and packaging Purveyance 
Consignation and delivery Refuge collection 
Port services are provided under various organizational models in which the public 
and the private sector play different roles. According to Baird (1999), there are three 
dimensions of port management that can be used to characterize the extension of 
privatization within a single port: regulation, land ownership and management and 
operations. In a pure public port, all of these tasks are carried out by the public sector. 
Under an organizational model that the author calls PRIVATE/I, port operations are 
carried out by private companies but the public sector still owns and manages port 
land and performs regulatory functions. Under PRIVATE/II, the private sector not 
only undertakes port operations but also own and manages port land. Under 
PRIVATE/III, the private sector performs the same functions as in the previous case 
but also performs regulatory functions. These options can be seen in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Port management models 
Model Port Regulation 
Land ownership 
and management 
Port operations 
PUBLIC Public Public Public 
PRIVATE/I Public Public Private 
PRIVATE/II Public Private Private 
PRIVATE/III Private Private Private 
Source: Baird (1999) 
According to the author, in 1999 88% of the top 100 container ports of the world 
operated according to the PRIVATE/I option. 
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It is worth noting that these models are stylized and port services are rarely organized 
in such straightforward way. In some PUBLIC or PRIVATE/I ports, such as those in 
Cyprus, for example, some port services have been liberalized but the port authority 
still supplies some services directly. Likewise, the fact that some port services are 
provided by the public sector does not imply that they are provided by a single entity. 
For example, in the case of Gothenburg port, in Sweden, VTS services are provided by 
the maritime authority, while locks are provided by the municipality and hinterland 
connections are provided by the public road or rail administrations. 
It is also worth noting that even though there is a clear trend towards reducing the 
degree of government intervention in the industry, the results of the European 
Commission’s Port Policy Consultation 2006-2007 indicate that the debate on the role 
of the public sector still continues (European Commission, 2007). Most stakeholders, 
with the exception of some in the UK, support the idea of public financing for sea 
access to ports, but opinions are divided on financial support for the construction of 
quay walls. In the case of services related to port safety (pilotage and towage), the 
debate continues on whether these should be provided as public services or viewed as 
regular commercial activities whose characteristics are regulated by the government 
but whose tariffs are determined by market forces. 
5.1.3 Port competition 
As said before, ports are motionless, expensive-to-build infrastructures, where many 
services are provided and different markets develop and interrelate in complex ways. 
Three concepts need to be grasped when analyzing port competition: that ports may 
be very different from each other, that port competition occurs in overlapping 
hinterlands and that port competition occurs in different ways. 
Ports are very different from each other 
Since many of the characteristics of a port depend on geographical and economic 
features, there are not two ports alike. Differences are not only physical but, most 
importantly, on the markets they participate.  
Common-user ports tend to compete in most cargo markets, while private ones tend to 
specialize in few commodities (ADB, 2000). Large ports tend to have enough traffic to 
justify the construction of terminals specialized in a single cargo, while small ones 
may consist of just one terminal with few berths handling different types of cargo. 
According to Stopford (1997), ports can be classified according to their size and 
importance for the local economy. There are four main types of ports: 
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a. Small local ports. These are ports consisting of single terminals handling a 
mixture of containers, dry-bulk and break-bulk cargo. These terminals usually 
possess only basic facilities such as general-purpose berths and storage areas. 
Their typical users are small vessels (feeders and short sea shipping) and local 
shippers. In small islands or developing countries where long distances are 
combined with relatively small regional economies, ports like these may 
become natural monopolies. 
An example of this type of port is Matarani, in southern Peru. The port is 
conformed by just one multi-purpose terminal with three berths (see figure 
5.2). In 2006, it handled less than 2 million tonnes, mostly break bulk (soy, 
fishmeal), dry bulk (coal, maize, fertilizers) and sulfuric acid. Containerized 
cargo accounted for less than 15,000 TEU. The port is owned by the Peruvian 
Government but it was concessioned to an important business conglomerate in 
1999 (Alcazar and Lovaton, 2005). 
Figure 5.2: Matarani Port Terminal (Peru) 
It is important to notice that, although small, this port is of crucial importance 
for the Peruvian economy. It is the second largest common user port and 
practically constitutes the only door for the foreign trade generated in southern 
part of the country (an area that generates one third of the Peru’s GDP and 
comprises 30% of its population). Moreover, long distances and poor transport 
infrastructure impede shippers located in this area to use alternative facilities, 
for which they constitute a captive demand. The closest common user port 
(Ilo), handles one tenth of Matarani’s cargo and is even less connected to 
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c. Large regional ports. These are ports that handle significant level of long-haul 
traffic and require large investments in specialized terminals and facilities for 
specific goods. Some of these ports are Zeebrugge (Belgium), Santos (Brazil) 
and Durban (South Africa.) 
Figure 5.4 shows the layout of the port of Zeebrugge. The port has several 
specialized terminals and the facilities to serve the kind of large ships used in 
long-haul bulk transport. It has an outer port and an inner port. The outer port 
has two specialized terminals for containers and one for liquid bulk, dry bulk 
and rolling cargo, respectively. The inner port is an area of logistics and 
distribution activities, with several terminals and warehouses that handle 
specialized cargo: fruit and fruit juices, tires, cars and spare parts, among 
others. The port has rail and road connections and is also served by barge. In 
2006, the port handled almost 40 million TM, including 1.6 million TEU 
(www.zeebruggeport.be). 
Figure 5.4: Port of Zeebrugge (Belgium)28
d. Regional distribution centers: These are the world’s largest ports, such as 
Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hong Kong and Singapore. These ports also act as hubs 
for long-haul ships. They have several specialized terminals and facilities to 
distribute cargo using several other transport modes (railways, road, and 
inland navigation).   
The case of the port of Rotterdam is illustrative. It is Europe’s main port. It 
has 2,000 ha of infrastructure extended in an area of more than 10,000 ha, 
including 74 km of quay length (see figure 5.5). Cargo can be transported 
to/from the port by truck, train, inland shipping, short sea shipping, air or 
pipelines. The port contains more than 60 terminals: 11 for containers, in 
excess of 20 for bulk cargo, three for juice, two for fruit, and 17 multi-purpose 
ones. Its annual throughput amounts to more than 400 million tonnes, 
including 10 million TEU. The port is also the heart of a large petrochemical 
complex, comprising five oil refineries, 44 chemical and petrochemical 
                                                
28 Source: www.zeebruggeport.be 
82
companies, 19 storage and distribution terminals for oil and chemical 
products, four refineries for edible oils and fats and more than 1,500 km of 
pipelines (www.portofrotterdam.com). 
Figure 5.5: Port of Rotterdam (The Netherlands)29
Port competition occurs in overlapping hinterlands 
As explained before, each kind of cargo represents a different market, since many of 
the assets required to handle them are different. Therefore, competition occurs in each 
market. Ports can face intense competition for certain types of cargo and a much more 
limited one for another. According to Haralambides, et. al, (2001) price elasticities are 
in general much lower for liquid and dry bulk cargoes than for containers, general 
cargo and Ro/Ro30. 
The port of Rotterdam illustrates this situation. It faces intense competition for the 
containerized cargo generated in the industrial areas of northern and central Europe. 
For northern European traffic, competition comes from the ports located in the 
“Hamburg-Le Havre range”, a group of ports located in the coast line between 
northern France and Germany. In the container market, competition among these 
ports is intense, as one can see from their elasticity figures shown in table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: Price elasticities for HLH range container ports 
Port Elasticity 
Hamburg 3.1 
Bremen Ports 4.4 
Rotterdam 1.5 
Antwerp 4.1 
Le Havre 1.1 
Source: Haralambides, Verbeke and Musso (2001) 
                                                
29 Source: www.portofrotterdam.com 
30 Ro/Ro is a shortening of the term "Roll on/Roll off." A method of ocean cargo service using a vessel 
with ramps that allow wheeled vehicles to be loaded and discharged without cranes (World Bank, 
2001).  
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For the traffic generated in central Europe, additional competition comes from ports 
located in the Mediterranean. Principally those in Spain, France and Italy (see figure 
5.6). In the case of dry bulk, its low value-added per unit of weight does not allow its 
transport over long distances, for which competition mainly comes from ports located 
in the immediate surroundings (Amsterdam and Antwerp). Liquid bulk is mostly 
imported to be consumed at Rotterdam’s petrochemical complex, for which it faces 
very limited competition.  
Figure 5.6: Main European ports31
Port competition occurs when the influence areas or hinterlands of two or more ports 
overlap. The extension of a port’s hinterland depends on many factors, although the 
most important is the cost of transporting cargo between the port and its point of 
consumption or production. In turn, transport costs are largely influenced by 
geographical features, political factors and the quality and extent of the transport 
infrastructure (De Rus, Campos and Nombela, 2003). 
Two factors allow the container market to be very competitive: that containers are 
standardized, i.e., operators can handle them without further specialization; and that 
they do not necessarily contain cargo that will be used or consumed in the port’s 
vicinity. The hinterland of Pusan port, for example, includes not only South Korea but 
also parts of northern China and even Japan, areas typically served by feeder services 
connecting to Pusan (Yap and Lam, 2006).  
                                                
31 Source: www.portofrotterdam.com 
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Factors such as the relation between value-added and weight and time-sensitivity also 
play an important role in determining the extension of a port’s hinterland. 
Manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, for example, have higher value-added 
levels per weight unit than raw materials, which can be transported over longer 
distances. Thus, the location of new manufacturing areas may extend a port’s 
influence area and allow inter-port competition where previously was none. However, 
this competition is limited by another common feature of manufactured goods, which 
is time-sensitivity. Indeed, intense competition in high-end industries such as apparels 
and electronics is reducing the life-cycle of these products, therefore increasing the 
need to reduce the time between manufacturing and delivery. This is the reason why 
many goods manufactured in northern Asia and destined to the US east coast are 
unloaded in west coast ports. Shippers prefer to pay extra handling costs and have 
them delivered earlier by train than waiting three to eight days and have them 
delivered (more cheaply) directly to east coast ports using the Panama Canal. 
According to ACP (2006), 61% of the traffic between northern Asia and the US east 
coast route uses west coast ports.  
The fact that competition is limited to overlapping hinterlands may lead to situations 
where ports face both a captive and a competitive demand for the same cargo at the 
same time. The abovementioned port of Matarani illustrates this situation. As 
mentioned before, shippers located in southern Peru constitute a captive demand for 
the port’s only terminal. However, its influence also reaches the production areas of 
neighboring Bolivia, as shown in figure 5.7. But unlike southern Peruvian shippers, 
Bolivian ones also have the choice of using the Chilean ports of Arica and Iquique. 
Therefore, even though Matarani’s terminal operator has a monopoly over southern 
Peruvian cargo, it has to compete for the Bolivian one (Gamarra, 2006). Similar 
situations may arise in ports around the world that handle both local (captive) and 
transshipment (competitive) cargo. 
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Figure 5.7: The Hinterland of Matarani port 
It is important to note that the boundaries of what constitutes a captive hinterland are 
being reduced due to the increased efficiency of transport operations. Both train and 
truck operations have become more efficient and greatly reduced inland transport 
costs (Estache and Serebrisky, 2004). Improved custom procedures have also 
increased rivalry among ports located in neighboring countries.  
The existence of extensive hinterlands and monopolies over captive customers is 
more likely to occur in sparsely-populated areas with relatively limited economic 
activity and long coastlines. Although this situation is more likely to arise in the 
developing countries, it also occurs in developed ones such as Australia. Indeed, a 
number of Australian ports face limited competition and are thus under monitoring or 
regulation of government authorities. The ACCC, under its Container Stevedoring 
Monitoring Program, monitors prices, costs and profits of container terminal operators 
at the ports of Adelaide, Brisbane, Burnie, Fremantle, Melbourne and Sydney (ACCC, 
2008). The natural monopoly problem is especially severe in the case of small islands 
such as  Rèunion Island (a French possession in the Indian Ocean), which generates 
cargo to support only one container terminal (World Bank, 2007). 
On the contrary, rich countries as the US and the European ones enjoy intense port 
competition. In the US, there is intense competition within ports located in the Gulf 
and in the east and west coasts and among them (Fleming, 1989). The relatively small 
extension of continental Europe, the existence of many navigable waterways and first-
class transport infrastructure allow competition to occur between ports located in the 
North Sea and the Mediterranean (Foschi, 2003). Competition for transshipment cargo 
86
is also very intense in ports located un southeast Asia, such as Honng Kong, 
Singapore, and Pusan, among others (Slack and Wang, 2002). 
Port competition occurs in different ways 
Given the large number of markets related to port activities, it is not surprising that 
competition takes place at different levels. Ports compete among them, terminals 
compete with other terminals within the same port, and service providers compete to 
supply port services to vessels and cargo owners within terminals. Moreover, when 
alternatives exist, competition can also occur with other transport modes. Port 
competition can be defined as: inter-port, intra-port, intra-terminal and inter-modal 
(World Bank, 2007).  
a. Inter-port competition.  Occurs when two or more ports compete for the same 
trades, like Canadian and US ports in both coasts; between Singapore and 
Hong Kong and between other ports in the region; and between ports that 
compete inter-regionally, such as Japan and Australia (Van Niekerk, 2005). 
The containerization of general cargo has produced an important form of port 
competition that is worth commenting. Unlike most other cargoes, containers 
are transported by ships that make several calls under a fixed itinerary. This 
allows shippers to reach not directly-connected ports through successive 
transshipments. This practice has created a new market, since ports compete to 
attract transshipment traffic (Foschi and Cazzaniga, 2002). The most 
successful ones are those located where east-west routes intersect with north-
south ones, such as Hong Kong and Singapore in Southeast Asia, Algeciras, 
Gioia Tauro and Marsaxlokk in the Mediterranean, and Balboa in Panama. 
Ports with large shares of transshipment traffic are called “hubs”. Figure 5.8 
shows the location of the main hubs along the east-west route. 
Figure 5.8: Hub Ports in the East-West Route (World Bank, 2007) 
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b. Intra-port competition. It occurs when two or more different terminal 
operators within the same port compete for the same markets. As one can see, 
users of large ports enjoy the benefits of this type of competition in addition to 
the one generated by inter-port competition. However, for users located in 
areas where the latter is weak, intra-port competition produces the additional 
benefit of avoiding rent extraction by the closest terminal.  
According to De Langen and Pallis (2006), intra-port competition also 
promotes innovation and specialization and is more relevant when users do not 
have a strong bargaining power. Examples of medium-sized ports where 
terminal operators compete head-to-head are Buenos Aires (Argentina), Laem 
Chabang (Thailand) and Bremerhaven (Germany).  
c. Intra-terminal competition. It occurs when companies compete to provide the 
same services within the same terminal. Both cargo and vessel services can be 
competitively provided within a terminal. In many ports, pilotage, towage and 
cargo storage are provided by several competing companies. In Puerto Limon 
(Costa Rica), for example, stevedoring is provided by several competing 
companies (Kent and Fox, 2004). Moreover, one of the aims of the proposed 
EU’s Directive for market access to port services was that mooring could be 
provided by ship owner’s own land-based staff (Comisión Europea, 2001). 
d. Inter-modal competition. This is a form of competition that arises when cargo 
can be transported using alternative transport modes, such as railroads and 
trucks; or a combination of them with maritime transport. This situation allows 
competition to occur between ports situated at long distances. 
The US provides a good example of inter-modal competition. As mentioned 
before, goods manufactured in northern Asia and destined to areas close to the 
US east coast can be unloaded in nearby ports (New York, Charleston or 
Savannah) or unloaded in west coast ports (Los Angeles, Long Beach, 
Oakland, Seattle/Tacoma and Portland) and distributed via rail to their final 
destination. Another choice is to use gulf ports (Houston or Mobile) and 
transported from there by train or truck (ACP, 2006). This produces inter-
modal competition among several logistics chains, of which ports and 
terminals are just a node. 
5.2 Port reform and trends 
Most countries’ port sectors have been reformed since the 1990s. Although reform 
has taken different forms depending on each country’s particular conditions, a general 
trend toward limiting the public sector’s role and allowing ports to be managed under 
a business orientation has emerged.  
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Much has been written since the mid-1990s on the forces that are driving this reform: 
Haralambides (1995), Haralambides, Ma and Veenstra (1997), Juhel (2001), Oster 
and Strong (2000), Slack (2001) Van der Veer (2001), World Bank (2007), among 
others. It seems to be a consensus that globalization and the increasing 
containerization of general cargo are the main forces behind port reform. Other 
observed trends that are shaping today’s port industry, such as privatization or the 
increasing concentration of the container handling market, seem to be their most 
evident consequences. 
5.2.1 Forces driving port reform 
Historically, governments have had a large role in the provision and regulation of port 
infrastructure and services. Haralambides, Ma and Veenstra (1997) point out the 
following reasons for this policy: 
a. Economic policy. As explained in section 5.1.1, the fact that ports produce 
public goods and externalities became one of the main justifications for 
government intervention, which was oriented at converting ports in “growth 
poles”. Moreover, since before containerization ports were large demanders of 
low-skilled labor, this argument was especially important in developing 
countries implementing inward-looking industrialization policies, where high 
port dues tariffs, long turnaround times and inefficient services constituted 
effective non-tariff barriers to foreign competition. 
b. Natural monopolies. As seen in chapter 2, natural monopolies arise when 
technology imposes a cost function that makes it cheaper to produce a good or 
service with only one firm in the market. This situation is likely to occur when 
the total cost has a large fixed-cost component, as in ports, depending on the 
size of the demand they face.  
In previous times, when port demand was constrained by high transport costs 
and the low value added by the commodities traded, ports were referred to as 
the classic example of natural monopoly. Direct provision of port services by 
the government was thought to be the best policy to deal with this type of 
market failure.  
c. Financing. Ports require investing large quantities of capital which will have 
long recovery periods. In times where financial markets were not as deep and 
well developed as today, governments where the only ones capable of 
financing port investments, since public policies usually extend beyond 
considerations of short-term profitability and toward the maximization of 
long-term social profitability. Moreover, the port sector was thought to be 
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reluctant to invest in ports because institutional and regulatory frameworks 
could not guarantee positive financial returns.
d. Military reasons. Ports are strategically important in times of war and are 
especially vulnerable to attacks from the sea. Moreover, many commercial 
ports are located close to a country’s borders or nearby naval facilities –like 
Puerto Cabello (Venezuela), Murmansk (Russia) or La Spezia (Italy), for 
example. Reasons like this were often argued to justify a large role for 
government in ports. 
Times have however changed and also technology and markets. Moreover, poor 
public sector performance and new ideas about its role in development have set the 
stage for reform in many infrastructure-based industries. 
Globalization 
In ports, one of the main forces driving reform is globalization. According to 
Haralambides (1995), globalization has brought greater mobility of goods, services 
and production factors due to three main factors: 
a. Cultural changes that occurred as a result of telecommunications, mass media, 
advertising, the abolition of national barriers and other factors; have led to a 
convergence of consumption patterns and the creation of larger international 
markets. 
b. The idea shared by many governments that economic integration will lead to a 
more efficient allocation of resources and thus stimulate growth and economic 
development. 
c. The technological changes that have increased the speed and efficiency of 
transport and lowered the costs of communications. 
The main consequences of globalization, along with the trend toward trade 
liberalization and the reduction of tariffs, have been to weaken the link between 
manufacturing and the location of production factors, the expansion of internal 
markets for goods and services and the relocation of manufacturing facilities to 
developing countries. Sources of raw materials and the markets where final goods are 
sold have become global.   
For Kumar and Hoffman (2002), globalization means that trade is growing faster than 
the world’s GDP; and that this trade is not only in finished goods and services, but 
increasingly in components and services that are used within production processes of 
global scale (particularly, intra-firm trade).  
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According to the World Bank (2007), globalization has allowed four manufacturing 
processes to occur: vertical specialization, focused manufacturing, expansion of 
logistics’ geographical scale and increased sourcing alternatives. The implementation 
of these processes, in turn, reinforces the increasing interrelation of national 
economies that characterizes globalization. 
a. Vertical specialization. Firms have been increasingly concentrating on their 
core competences and subcontracting out non-core activities to contractors. 
Companies within the Italian apparel industry, for example, have been 
performing key activities such as design, cutting, finishing and quality control, 
while contracting out the assembly of their products. The customization of 
many Asian-manufactured products to be distributed in Europe is also 
performed in distribution centers located in Spain, Belgium or the 
Netherlands. 
b. Focused manufacturing. Many firms have been changing the way they 
organize the manufacturing of their products. Instead of having local plants 
manufacturing a broad range of products for domestic markets, they have been 
concentrating production capacity in few plants that manufacture few products 
for global markets. European car producers like Volkswagen have been 
implementing this strategy, which allows the company to maximize economies 
of scale through specialization. However, it implies that products have to be 
transported, on average, over longer distances; thus making manufactured 
goods more transport-intensive. 
c. Expansion of logistics’ geographical scale. As a consequence of globalization, 
companies have expanded the geographical scale of their sourcing and 
distribution operations. It means that companies such as Toyota, Airbus or 
Starbucks acquire inputs and sell their products all over the world. 
d. Increasing sourcing alternatives. Globalization allows producers in distant 
parts of the world to compete with each other for the same raw materials, 
intermediate or final product markets. Chinese companies, for example, can 
buy mineral ore from Africa, Australia or South America and European 
consumers can buy wine from France, Chile, Argentina or New Zealand from 
their convenient store. 
The economies of developing countries have the distinctive characteristic that a large 
share of their exports consist of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods with low 
value-added. In a scenario of global and very competitive markets, inefficiencies such 
as those produced by inadequate infrastructure and poorly managed port services may 
hinder economic growth. This new reality requires cheap and reliable logistics chains 
of which ports are important components. Thus the need of transforming ports into 
efficient providers of logistics services. 
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Containerization 
The second relevant trend behind port reform is the increasing containerization of 
general cargo32. According to Vigariè (1999), before the advent of the container all 
general cargo was transported as break bulk, i.e., in sacks, boxes or crates of different 
size and volume. Most vessels were multi-purpose, carrying general cargo above and 
bulk cargo below. Turnaround times were slow. The author claims that in an efficient 
port as Antwerp, gangs could handle as much as 300 tons in two seven-and-a-half 
hour shifts. As a result, ships spent up to 30% of their time or more in ports, a fact that 
destroyed any economies of scale that could be reached by larger vessels. 
The most important characteristic of pre-container ports was that much labor was 
needed. The irregularity of ships’ departure and arrival required maintaining a casual 
workforce to complement the number of longshoremen employed in a regular basis. 
(Haralambides, 1995). This required an organization of the workforce that facilitated 
unions achieving a position of importance in many ports of the world. Through strikes 
and confrontations, unionized port workers secured better work conditions for 
themselves (including much higher salaries than in other industries) but significantly 
raised the costs of port operations.  
The container was introduced in the US in the early 1950s, for transporting freight 
between New York and Gulf ports. In 1956, the first container ship (a converted 
tanker) started operations, and ten years later the first regular container service 
between New York and Rotterdam took place. The improvements in cargo handling 
that were brought about by containerization dramatically reduced ship’s time in port 
and allowed achieving economies of scale by building larger ships. Other technical 
advancements in propulsion and ship design contributed to this trend by allowing 
these vessels to sail faster.  
Although shippers and ship-owners gained much from containerization, port workers 
were the main losers. Instead of several gangs of low-skilled workers, containers 
require mechanized equipment and smaller numbers of trained laborers, thus changing 
the nature of port operations from labor-intensive to capital-intensive. Despite the best 
efforts of union leaders, the number of port workers has dramatically decreased 
around the world; and with them, the hours lost to strikes and other forms of service 
disruptions. This factor has also contributed to organize container shipping as a 
regular service with scheduled port calls, allowing better income predictability and the 
financing of ever larger ships. As Haralambides (2007) points out: “Operational 
practices have been streamlined; the element of uncertainty in cargo flows largely 
removed; forward planning has been facilitated; port labor regularized; and customs 
procedures simplified. These developments took place under the firm understanding 
of governments and local authorities that ports, now, constitute the most important 
link (node) in the overall door-to-door supply chain and thus inefficiencies 
                                                
32 General cargo is a general term that refers to all cargo that is not transported as liquid or dry bulk. 
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(bottlenecks) in the port sector can easily whither away all benefits derived from 
economies of scale and scope in transportation and logistics”. 
 
According to Kumar and Hoffman (2002), around two-thirds of the world trade 
(measured by weight) is transported by sea. Of this quantity, 10% corresponds to 
general cargo. Containerization reaches approximately 60% of world’s general cargo 
trade. The remaining 40% is still transported as break bulk. Figure 5.9 illustrates these 
proportions.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: World trade by type of transport service33 
 
According to UNCTAD (2007), by the beginning of 2007 there were 3,904 fully cellular 
containerships with a total capacity of 9.4 million TEUs, which represents 12.3% of 
the world’s total fleet (measured by dwt). Ship sizes continue to increase, with 
average carrying capacity per ship growing from 2,324 TEUs in January 2006 to 
2,417 TEUs in January 2007. 
 
It is worth noting that containerization requires ports to invest sizeable amounts of 
capital in mechanized equipment and modern port facilities that allow the reduced 
turnaround times that make investing in large ships profitable. Haralambides (1995) 
argues that developing countries initially responded to this necessity with skepticism. 
Their worries concerned the suitability of capital-intensive techniques in countries 
with abundant and inexpensive labor, their lack of financial resources and the fact that 
the vast majority of their exports were not containerizable. However, the success of 
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Chile in implementing export-led 
                                                 
33 Percentage of metric tons. Source: Kumar and Hoffman (2002). Data from unctad. 
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strategies seems to have convinced many governments that job losses in the port 
sector could be more than compensated in other export-oriented labor-intensive 
industries such as agriculture, aquaculture or textiles.  
Moreover, a number of principally Asian countries located near trading routes saw the 
opportunities that containerization brought by enabling them to export transshipment 
services, as explained in section 5.1.3. Transshipment increases cargo traffic beyond 
the limitations imposed by their own local economy and allows ports to achieve 
significant economies of scale that benefit the country’s external trade. Indeed, as a 
result of transshipment, shippers in Hong Kong, Singapore or Panama face lower 
logistics costs than their peers in other countries. 
Haralambides (1995) also argues that transshipment traffic allows the development of 
feeder service networks for the regional distribution of containers. This would enable 
the port’s home country to be profitably involved in shipping and other value-added 
activities that otherwise would be lost to competing ports. 
Privatization 
The third main trend behind port reform is the private provision of port services. As 
said before, port services have been typically provided by the public sector. But the 
substantial changes occurring in the industry and the investments needed to meet them 
require efficient port operations and market-oriented organizations. In recent years, 
many governments have acknowledged that the private sector can provide the capital 
required to invest in equipment and infrastructure and the efficient management that 
their ports require.  
The term “privatization” loosely refers to different types of processes involving the 
transfer of state-owned assets to the private sector. Although privatization can take 
several forms, two are the main ones (World Bank, 2007):  
a. Under divestitures, the government transfers ownership of the business to 
private companies.  
b. Under concessions, the responsibility for operating and maintaining the 
privatized facilities is passed to a private company, but not its ownership. 
Their key characteristic is that the concessionaire has the right or the 
obligation to modify the infrastructure. This is the reason why they are granted 
for long terms (20-30 years).   
Divestures are common in non-infrastructure industries, such as mining, 
manufacturing, oil, shipping, air transport, etc. They were also the most common way 
to privatize telecommunication and energy networks. In transport, however, the large 
majority of privatized facilities (airports, toll roads and ports) have been concessioned 
(Guislain and Kerf, 1995). A less used option is the granting of management 
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contracts, under which a private firm operates a public company, but the public sector 
is still responsible for investments in infrastructure expansion and other important 
matters such as labor downsizing. 
In the particular case of the port sector, some terminals have been transferred to 
private operation through lease contracts, under which the private operators are not 
required or allowed to modify the infrastructure. These agreements usually have 
shorter terms than concession contracts. In addition to the privatization of existing 
facilities, some governments have promoted the development of new ones through 
private investment, called greenfield projects. These projects typically include explicit 
subsidies or some form of government guarantee. The associated commercial risks 
tend to be the responsibility of the private party, while other risks (exchange or 
political ones) are shared with the government.  
Table 5.5 provides an overview of the extension of privatization in the port industry. 
It can be seen that almost 300 port projects with private participation have been 
implemented between 1990 and 2006, half of them through concessions and one third 
through greenfield projects. More than 100 of them were developed in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It can also be seen that divestitures are not common in this 
industry.  
Table 5.5: Port projects with private participation by type (1990-2006) 
Region Concession Divestiture 
Greenfield 
project 
Management 
and lease 
contract 
Total 
East Asia and Pacific 30 5 41 3 79 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
6 9 9 3 27 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
70 4 24 10 108 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
6 0 9 2 17 
South Asia 6 0 18 1 25 
Sub-Saharan Africa 33 0 6 4 43 
Grand Total 151 18 107 23 299 
Source: PPIAF (2007) 
Table 5.6 shows that the private sector invested more than US$ 33 billion in port 
projects between 1990 and 2006. Greenfield projects amounted to US$ 16 billion 
while concessions to US$ 15.5 billion. 
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Table 5.6: Private investment in port projects by type (1990-2006) 
Region 
Concession 
US$ MM 
Divestiture 
US$ MM 
Greenfield 
project 
US$ MM 
Management 
and lease 
contract 
US$ MM 
Total 
US$ 
MM 
East Asia and Pacific 4,879 978 8,640 0 14,498 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
1,075 238 758 92 2,163 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
5,419 147 2,021 88 7,674 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
552 0 1,571 3 2,125 
South Asia 741 0 2,837 0 3,578 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,814 0 248 0 3,062 
Grand Total 15,480 1,363 16,075 183 33,100 
Source: PPIAF (2007) 
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2000), the following are the main 
trends among PPPs in ports: 
a. A large number of countries have adopted the landlord model; 
b. Private common-user ports are mainly found in the UK and New Zealand; 
c. Private investment within public-owned ports has been directed mainly to 
container terminals and break bulk facilities dedicated to specialized cargo: 
steel, coal, wood products, etc.; and, 
d. The majority of privately-owned facilities are individual terminals operated by 
the owners of the cargo. 
The shift toward the private provision of port services has not been smooth, neither in 
developed nor developing countries. Although there are indications that private 
supply has increased the efficiency of port services (Micco and Perez, 2001; Tongzon 
and Heng, 2005), several problems remain.  
In an economically integrated area like the EU, where decisions of one Member State 
may have consequences on the others, interesting public policy issues emerged as a 
consequence of privatization, regarding subsidies, investments and pricing of port 
infrastructure and services (Haralambides, 1997a and 1997b). The first is the rationale 
for continuing subsidizing basic infrastructure (dredging, breakwaters, road/rail/canal 
connections) in an environment where ports are no longer viewed as growth poles. 
Indeed, if port terminals are viewed as commercial undertakings, why should they not 
pay for their infrastructure with the dues they collect? On the other hand, it is difficult 
for one country to stop subsidizing their ports unless countries home to competing 
ports also stop doing it.  
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An additional problem is that subsidies can be subtle. Haralambides (1997) argues 
that port land is rarely liable to market forces and thus its pricing does not reflect the 
opportunity cost of using it for other ends. Therefore, port charges will not reflect 
their opportunity cost either, which amounts to a subsidy. The fact that ports belong to 
a transport network add another level of complexity to the problem, since port 
investments cannot reflect commercial decisions when the rest of the transport 
infrastructure in which ports belong is publicly funded or subsidized. 
In less developed countries, privatization has brought dramatic increases in efficiency 
due to better management and investments (see section 5.2.2), but private operators 
will not invest in socially (economically) profitable projects unless they are profitable 
from a private point of view as well. Because of this issue and the externalities caused 
by port operations (congestion and other environmentally-related problems), 
governments will continue having an important role in the port industry, regardless of 
the extension of the privatization programs. 
After two decades of port privatization, three main problems have been observed. The 
first is the way the process itself took place. In many countries privatization was 
implemented in a haphazard way, raising questions about its real necessity, costs and 
the fairness of their results. The UK port privatization, for example, was heavily 
criticized it because allowed employees to buy shares at prices well below market 
value and sell them later at a large profit and because it also transferred some 
regulatory functions to the private sector (Baird, 1999).  
A second problem related to port privatization processes is the one argued by Estache, 
Ellis and Trujillo (2007), that a large group of port and transport projects seems to be 
in the hands of no more that twenty operators, sponsors, bankers and investors with a 
large capacity to invest, access to financial markets and strong financial support from 
their parent companies. While local investors may participate in specific niches, these 
major organizations set the standards and practices in transport project finance, thus 
reducing even further the potential for competition in port markets. 
A final major issue that emerges with privatization is the distribution of its benefits 
between operators and users. In markets where effective competition takes place, 
terminals will compete away any monopolistic rent, thus benefiting users in the 
process. But as discussed in section 5.1.1 port markets tend to be oligopolistic and 
natural monopolies may also arise, for which some form of regulation is warranted. 
The aim of this research is precisely to contribute to the development of such a 
regulatory body in the port industry. 
Market concentration  
An important consequence of containerization is the emergence of global players. 
Indeed, the latest years have witnessed a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 
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container terminal sector, which has resulted in fewer competitors handling a larger 
share of the world’s throughput.  
Table 5.7: Global player’s world throughput, 2002 and 2006 
Nr. 
2006 2002 
Operator 
Million 
TEU 
Share Operator 
Million 
TEU 
Share 
1 HPH 60.9 13.80% HPH 36.7 13.30%
2 APM Terminals 52 11.80% PSA 26.2 9.50% 
3 PSA 47.4 10.70% APM Terminals 17.2 6.20% 
4 DP World 41.6 9.40% P&O Ports 12.8 4.60% 
5 Cosco 22 5.00% Eurogate 9.5 3.40% 
6 Eurogate 11.7 2.70% Cosco 4.7 1.70% 
7 Evergreen 9.4 2.10% Evergreen 5.7 2.10% 
8 MSC 8.8 2.00% DPA 5.3 1.90% 
9 SSA Marine 7.6 1.70% SSA Marine 4.4 1.60% 
10 HHLA 6.6 1.50% APL 4.3 1.60% 
11 APL 5.9 1.30% HHLA 4 1.40% 
12 Hanjin 5.4 1.20% Hanjin 3.7 1.30% 
13 OOCL 4.8 1.10% MSC 2.2 0.80% 
14 Dragados 4.7 1.10% NYK Line 3.5 1.30% 
15 CMA CGM 4.5 1.00% OOCL 3 1.10% 
16 NYK Line 4.1 0.90% CSXWT 2.7 1.00% 
17 MOL 3.3 0.80% MOL 2.7 1.00% 
18 K Line 3.1 0.70% Dragados 2.2 0.80% 
19 TCB 2.9 0.60% K Line 2 0.70% 
20 ICTSI 2.2 0.50% TCB 1.8 0.70% 
Total 308.9 69.9%   154.6 56.0% 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants (2004 and 2007)
This trend can be seen in table 5.7, which shows the throughput of the 20 largest 
container terminal operators. In 2002, they handled 56% of the world’s throughput. In 
2006 that figure had increased to 69.9%. 
The consequences of this consolidation phenomenon on port competition are yet to be 
seen. On the one hand, consolidation reduces the number of players in the market, 
which may lead to less competition and higher prices for the shippers. On the other 
hand, the presence of economies of scale indicates larger operations tend to be more 
efficient, for which the consolidation of the industry may lead to a more intensive 
rivalry. So far, the second effect appears to be the largest, since intense competition is 
observed and there are no signs of higher prices for port services.  
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5.2.2 Port reform in developing countries 
As mentioned before, a general trend in port reform is toward limiting the public 
sector’s role and allowing ports to be managed under a business orientation. 
According to Juhel (2001), the key topics addressed under port sector reform 
programs include: 
a. The reformulation of national port system development strategies; 
b. Reforms of legislative, institutional and procedural provisions for the planning 
and regulation of port systems; 
c. The participation of private parties in the provision and management of port 
services; and, 
d. The introduction of innovative financing and cost recovery schemes. 
The following sections describe how port reform was implemented in four developing 
countries. It can be seen that in most cases reform resulted in a dramatic increase of 
operational efficiency, reduced prices and increased investments. 
Argentina 
Argentina has forty active ports, one under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
and the remaining ones under the provincial governments. The most important is 
Buenos Aires, which handles more than 40% of the country’s tonnage. Buenos Aires 
includes two areas: Puerto Nuevo and Dock Sud.  
Argentina began reforming its port sector in 1990. Until this year, the system was 
operated under a complex institutional framework, its infrastructure was inadequate, 
tariffs were high and traffic was declining. Indeed, traffic declined 10% between 1970 
and 1989 and tariffs raised 250% in real terms between 1980 and 1991. In addition, 
labor practices were severely restrictive and the system faced major corruption 
problems. Between 1990 and 1993, the system was reformed. With the exception of 
Buenos Aires’ Puerto Nuevo, all major ports (including the area called Dock Sud) 
were transferred to the provinces to be administered by Sociedades de Administración 
Portuaria (SAP), which operate under certain parameters. The provincial and municipal 
governments as well as users, operators and workers have a chair in the SAP’s board. 
The remaining ports were also transferred to the provinces, which could operate them 
directly, lease them or shut them down. In addition, stevedoring, pilotage and tug 
assist services were deregulated and operators were allowed to set their own prices. 
Restrictions on vessel registration and short-sea shipping were also released and 
restrictive labor practices were abolished (Trujillo and Serebrisky, 2004). 
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Free entry to the industry was established, which means that any agent can build and 
operate a port, subject to basic safety, environmental and custom regulations. It was 
also established that users would be protected against anti-competitive practices by 
general antitrust laws. Regulation remained in the areas of safety, security and 
environmental protection.  
In 1994, Buenos Aires’ Puerto Nuevo was divided into six terminals and 
concessioned to the private sector on the basis of the highest annual payment to the 
government. Bidders were allowed to present offers for more than one terminal and 
winners would compete for containers and general cargo. Duration of the contracts 
was set according to their investment needs (between 18 and 25 years). Global players 
started to operate in the port. P&O Ports was awarded terminals 1 and 2, and APM
Terminals acquired terminal 4 in 2001. Soon after Puerto Nuevo concessions were 
awarded, Dock Sud was concessioned by the Province of Buenos Aires. This 
operation was largely criticized, since the concession was granted without competitive 
bidding and payments to the Province were lower than what Puerto Nuevo’s operators 
had to disburse (although the required investments were higher). Moreover, Dock Sud 
concession was granted after Puerto Nuevo’s, which gave the new concessionaire an 
informational advantage over its competitors. 
The reform of the Argentinean port system is generally considered a success. 
According to Hoffman (2001), it has achieved the desired goals of increased 
throughput, lower costs and an almost fourfold increase in productivity. Private 
investment reached about US$ 200 million in five years, the number of cranes 
increased from 3 to 22 and throughput capacity increased from 400,000 to 2.5 million 
TEU a year. Stevedoring prices fell 8% per container, 11% for grain and 22% for 
general cargo. Container terminal charges reduced from US$ 450 before the reform to 
approximately US$ 220 in 1999. It is important to mention that even though there is a 
price cap for the tariffs of some container-related services, market rates are between 
30% and 10% below these marks, making them irrelevant. Productivity also increased 
dramatically. The number of handled tonnes per worker grew from 900 in 1991 to 
5,400 in 2001. Average ship stay was reduced from 70 to 15 hours between 1995 and 
2002 (Trujillo and Serebrisky, 2004). 
Colombia 
Most of Colombian cargo is handled by four ports: Buenaventura (in the Pacific 
coast), Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa Marta (in the Atlantic Coast). Until the 
reform, all common-user ports in Colombia were centrally managed by Colpuertos, a 
monopolistic state-owned company. Private companies were allowed to own their 
own terminals but not to supply services to third parties. 
Colpuertos management was characterized by high-priced low quality service, 
technological backwardness and corruption. Vessels had to wait more than 10 days to 
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enter the port, and Colpuertos had more than 11,000 employees. Despite high tariffs, 
the institution ran operation deficits of more than US$ 20 million (Gaviria, 1998). 
Colombia began reforming its port industry with the issue of Law 01 of 1991. This 
law sought to liquidate Colpuertos and to separate regulatory from operational 
activities. It created the Superintendencia General de Puertos to regulate the system 
and awarded concessions to specially-created entities called “Sociedades Portuarias 
Regionales” (SPR). SPR’s are private-public partnerships where the public sector 
(national, state and municipal governments) retain ownership and participates with 
30% of the shares. SPR are in charge of the infrastructure, own the superstructure and 
are not allowed to provide services directly. Concessionaires can set tariffs within 
regulated guidelines and coordinate with the government future investment plans. Port 
services are provided by competing operators which contract with the SPR to use the 
facilities. The new system also encourages private ports to provide services to third 
parties. Private ports do not have the restrictions imposed on SPR to provide 
stevedoring services, for example (Hoffman, 2001). 
The process of concessioning Colombian ports was finalized in 1993. The 
concessions were awarded for 20 years to the highest lease offer. According to 
Gaviria (1998), uncertainty produced during the concessioning process regarding the 
terms of the concession contracts and the role of the Superintendencia discouraged 
experienced foreign operators.  
Since their concession, the Atlantic ports of Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa Marta 
have engaged in a fierce inter-port competition, which is exacerbated by the presence 
of two privately-owned container terminals in Cartagena. Traffic increased so 
dramatically in Cartagena and Buenaventura that their respective SPR were obliged to 
seek an extension of their concession contracts in order to carry on unforeseen but 
required investments in infrastructure (Nathan Associates, 2004). 
The results of the reform were positive. In a few years, ship time in port was 
drastically reduced and productivity yields multiplied in all ports, as shown in table 
5.8. Productivity increase was translated into price reductions of up to 50%. In the 
case of containers, cargo-handling rates fell from US$ 600 to US$ 150 in 2001. SPR’s 
equity grew on average 2.2 times between 1994 and 1998 (Hoffman, 2001). 
Table 5.8: Gross Productivity Yields in Colombian Ports 1998 (ton/hour) 
SPR General Cargo Solid Bulk Containers 
Barranquilla 8,03 21,53 6,02 
Buenaventura 18,70 47,41 18,70 
Cartagena 7,97 n.a. 24,75 
Santa Marta 26,98 24,72 8,50 
Colpuertos 199034 6,85 7,04 5,05 
Source: Kent and Fox (2004) 
                                                
34 This row presents the yields Colpuertos achieved in 1990.  
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Table 5.9 presents performance indicators for the Port of Cartagena: 
Table 5.9: Performance Indicators for the Port of Cartagena 
Performance measure Colpuertos (1993) Concessionaire (2003) 
Containership waiting time 10 days 0 days 
Containership turnaround time 72 hours 7 hours 
Gross productivity/hour 7 moves/ship hour 52 moves/ship/hour 
Berth occupancy 90 percent 50 percent 
Bulk Cargo Productivity 500 ton/vessel/day 3,900-4,500 tons/vessel/day 
Hours worked per day 16 24 
Cargo dwell time 30+ days 2 days 
Port costs US$ 984 per move US$ 222 per move 
Source: Kent and Fox (2004) 
Mexico 
The Mexican port system is composed of 108 ports and terminals located in the 
country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Most of the cargo is handled by 27 commercial, 
industrial and tourist ports and 10 terminals specialized in oil and mineral ore. The 
most important ports are Veracruz, Tampico and Altamira in the Atlantic coast; and 
Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas in the Pacific side. Manzanillo and Veracruz alone 
handle 75% of Mexican containerized cargo. Before its reform, the Mexican port 
system was managed by the state-owned agency Puertos Mexicanos, the only one 
authorized to build port infrastructure and provide port services. As in previously 
analyzed cases, the system was inefficient, overmanned and did not generate enough 
revenues to cover its costs (Paredes, 2007). 
The reform of the Mexican port system started in 1993, when a new Ports Law was 
passed. The law created the Administraciones Portuarias Integrales (API); 
autonomous, self-financed agencies in charge of a port or several small terminals. The 
APIs are state-owned bodies whose boards include representatives of the state and 
municipal governments and private sector. APIs have rights over port assets and may 
grant them in concession to the private sector. Although exceptions apply, APIs are not 
allowed to supply port services directly. The federal government, through the 
Secretaría de Transporte (Mexico’s Ministry of Transport) supervises 16 APIs 
controlling the most important ports, while provincial governments are responsible for 
the oversight of 5 provincial ones. The Secretaria also acts as regulator in cases where 
competition is absent or not strong enough. This, however, has to be determined by 
the competition authority. Although port tariffs were liberalized, the tariffs charged by 
the APIs for the use of infrastructure are regulated using a price cap regime. 
Private participation has been introduced in almost every port through concessions. 
Initially, competition authorities ruled that no operator could manage more than one 
concession in each coast, but this restriction was later modified. As a result, 
Hutchinson Port Holdings, which has controlling interests in container terminals in 
Manzanillo and Veracruz, was able to form a joint venture to operate a similar 
terminal at Lazaro Cardenas. The markets for services such as pilotage and tug assist 
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were also deregulated and since then, entry is only subject to qualifications. Labor 
restrictions were also relaxed. Collective bargaining is only allowed at firm-level, thus 
allowing negotiation according to local conditions. Only Acapulco’s API, specialized 
in tourist services, has been privatized (Estache, Tovar and Trujillo, 2004). 
The introduction of competition brought important investments to the port system. 
Between 1993 and 2003, annual handling capacity almost doubled, passenger traffic 
more than doubled and container traffic quadrupled. In Manzanillo, for example, 
average port time for container ships reduced from 1.4 days in 1991 to 0.6 days in 
1994 (Hoffman, 2001). Moreover, between 1995 and 1998, cargo handling rates 
decreased between 34.5% and 21.7% for dry bulk and palletized goods, respectively; 
and 5.6% for container traffic. 
Two studies suggest that the reform brought overall efficiency gains to the Mexican 
port system. Estache, Gonzales and Trujillo (2001) found that efficiency gains for the 
industry reached between 6% and 8% per annum between 1996 and 1999. Moreover, 
the findings of Estache, Tovar and Trujillo (2004) suggest that the main contributors 
of efficiency gains in the Mexican case were the adoption of new technologies and 
capacity increases resulting from investments made right after the reform began.  
Peru 
Peru has seven common-user ports, spread along a coast of 2,500 km. The most 
important is Callao, which handles 70% of the total and 90% of the containerized 
cargo mobilized common-user ports. Since 1970, Peruvian ports have been operated 
by Enapu, a state-owned company dependent from the Ministry of Transport. As with 
other state monopolies, Enapu is overmanned, its tariffs are among the highest in the 
region and the service is poor (Defilippi, 2004).  
Since Peruvian ports constitute natural monopolies, a regulator, Ositran, was created 
in 1999. Ositran’s mission is to supervise and regulate not only ports, but airports, 
railways and highways as well.  
Attempts to reform the port system started in the early 1990s, when restrictive labor 
schemes were abolished. Although the first port privatization committees were 
organized in 1992, the first concession was awarded in only 1999, when the port of 
Matarani was transferred to the private sector. The concession of the remaining state-
run ports was scheduled for 2000, but political problems forced the suspension of the 
process and since then, only a greenfield project for a container terminal at Callao has 
been granted. The remaining ports are still operated by Enapu. 
The only terminal at Matarani Port was concessioned for a period of 30 years, to the 
bidder offering the highest initial payment to the government. In addition, the 
concessionaire has to pay the government monthly 5% of its gross revenues. There are 
no restrictions to the services the concessionaire can provide within the port, but it has 
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to grant free access to other companies providing stevedoring, pilotage, and tug assist 
services. Uncertainties about Ositran’s functions and last-minute changes to the 
concession contract discouraged two of the three pre-qualified bidders from 
participating in the final auction for Matarani. As a result, the concession was 
awarded to the only remaining bidder, which offered a payment barely above the 
required minimum (Alcazar and Lovaton, 2005).  
 
Unlike the ports that remain under state management, Matarani shows signs of 
increased efficiency. The investments made by the concessionaire, a professional 
management and an aggressive marketing campaign allowed increasing the port’s 
annual throughput by almost 50% between 1998 and 2003; as shown in figure 5.10 
(Ositran, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Annual Throughput in the Port of Matarani, 1998-200335 
 
During the same period, the number of workers in the port was roughly kept at the 
same level, for which labor productivity also increased by almost 50% . This trend is 
shown in figure 5.11. 
 
After the first five years of the concession, regulated prices were subject to revision 
by Ositran. The aim of price revisions is to pass on the consumers the efficiency gains 
obtained by the concessionaire between revision periods. The analysis determined that 
the concessionaire had obtained productivity gains of around 4.16% a year, for which 
the price cap of the port’s regulated prices (wharfage, berthage, mooring, and 
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storage), had to decrease annually at that rate. Moreover, increased competition in 
related port services has also resulted in lower handling rates for users (Defilippi and 
Flor, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Labor productivity at the port of Matarani, 1998-200336 
 
 
 
5.3 Access, competition and regulation in the port 
industry 
 
In competitive markets, firms compete with each other for selling their goods or 
services to customers, offering lower prices or improving their quality. In a 
competitive environment, companies lack “market power”, which is the ability of 
firms to raise price above the competitive level for a sustained period (Buccirossi, 
2008). There are, however, several reasons why markets may not operate properly. 
The first is agents in the market behaving in ways that foreclose competition. To deal 
with this problem, governments apply antitrust policies. The second is market 
structures that facilitate anti-competitive policies or impede competition to arise at all. 
To deal with this problem, governments implement regulatory policies.  
 
Antitrust policies are typically enforced by a specialized agency, while regulatory 
policies are usually enforced by a sectorial regulator. It is worth mentioning that some 
countries have both an antitrust agency and a sectorial regulator, while some countries 
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have one or neither. In some countries, such Australia and Papua New Guinea, both 
functions are performed by the same authority. 
Table 5.10 shows the typical role distribution between antitrust agency and sectoral 
regulator. 
Table 5.10: Antitrust agency and regulator: typical role distribution 
Agency Policy Objective 
Antitrust agency 
Prevention of collusive practices 
Behavior control 
Prevention of exclusionary 
practices 
Prevention of discriminatory 
practices 
Antitrust agency/Regulator Merger Control 
Preventing excessive 
concentration harming 
competition 
Regulator 
Price Regulation 
Mimic competitive outcomes 
Access Regulation 
Source: Motta (2004) and World Bank (2001) 
As mentioned before, in the particular case of the port industry, diverse factors such 
as the magnitude of the investments required to build a new terminal and the scarcity 
of suitable shores result in markets served by only a handful or firms. This situation 
may reduce the degree of rivalry in the market and thus, facilitate anti-competitive 
behavior. 
5.3.1 Antitrust policies in the port sector 
Antitrust policies are tools governments use to prevent market agents behaving in a 
way that deviates from fair competition. Many potentially anti-competitive practices 
in the port sector can be prevented using antitrust policies, although dealing with 
others might require sectoral regulation. Anti-competitive practices can be categorized 
as collusive, exclusionary and discriminatory (Motta, 2004). 
Collusive practices 
Collusive practices are agreements among firms who should be competitors to reduce 
their output to agreed upon levels; or to sell their output at an agreed upon price. This 
is known as “cartelization”, which  can be more or less difficult to occur depending on 
certain market conditions. The following ones facilitate cartelization (Ivaldi et al, 
2003): 
a. Reduced number of firms; 
b. Possibility of monitoring each other’s behavior; 
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c. Existence of similar firms; 
d. Homogeneous products; 
e. Existence of substantial entry barriers; 
f. Inexistence of substitutes; and, 
g. Inelastic demand. 
It can be seen that some of the characteristics of the port industry facilitate 
cartelization: port services are fairly homogeneous, the number of competitors tend to 
be reduced and there are substantial barriers to enter the market. Thus, cartelization is 
a likely behavior to occur in the port industry. However, unless special circumstances 
arise, cartels tend to be unsustainable in the long-run because the incentives to cheat 
are usually very large (Posner, 2001). 
Exclusionary practices 
Exclusionary practices are behaviors that attempt to exclude competitors from the 
market. Practices that only involve firms participating in the same market are called 
“horizontal”. Others that involve exclusion through discrimination of clients or 
suppliers are called “vertical” (Hovenkamp, 1999). 
Two are the most common horizontal exclusionary practices. The first one consists of 
attempting to monopolize the market by foreclosing competitors access to inputs that 
are necessary to compete. This problem will be analyzed later with more detail.  
The second common horizontal exclusionary practice is predatory pricing. It consists 
on a firm reducing prices below their costs with the intention of driving competitors 
out of the market. The idea is to raise prices to monopolistic levels once the 
competitors have left the market. Understandably, for this strategy to be profitable the 
value of losses incurred during the first period has to be lower than the profits 
obtained once the competitors have left the market. Nevertheless, for this to occur 
substantial barriers to enter the market must exist; otherwise, the monopolistic prices 
set during the second period might attract new competitors who would undermine the 
profitability of the strategy (Ivaldi et al, 2003). Considering that substantial entry 
barriers exist, predatory pricing is an anti-competitive practice that might occur in the 
port sector. This is what in fact occurred in Cartagena (Colombia), where Terminal 
Marítimo Muelles El Bosque, an integrated terminal operator providing all-in-one 
services, was accused of predatory behavior by its competitors in the pilotage and 
towage markets (World Bank, 2007). 
The kind of vertical restriction that might occur in the industry is called “exclusive 
dealing”. It arises when a consumer agrees to only acquire services supplied by a 
107
determined provider or, at least, not to do it from competitors (Buccirossi, 2008). Port 
terminals might try to extend their market power to other markets or to raise their 
rival’s costs by requiring their clients to deal exclusively with certain shipping 
companies or providers of complementary services. The fact that port services are 
complementary (vessels must be supplied by both piloting and tug assist to enter the 
port, for example) facilitates this behavior.  
Discriminatory practices 
These are practices that allow companies to obtain unfair benefits or to harm 
competitors by using their market power (Hovenkamp, 1999). Two are the ones that 
may occur in the port sector: price discrimination and tying. 
Price discrimination arises when (i) identical products are sold at different prices 
under identical cost conditions; or (ii), identical products are sold at common prices 
under different cost conditions. For example, port terminals may attempt to charge 
different prices to captive and transshipment cargo even if the cost of producing 
services for both kinds of clients is the same. Another option is terminals using their 
market power to avoid involving in standard commercial practices, such as granting 
clients discounts for volume transactions or early payment. 
Tying consists of “bundling” services to oblige consumers to purchase services that 
need with those not requested or required (Buccirossi, 2008). For example, terminal 
operators might condition the use of their infrastructure to the supply of other port 
services as well, such as warehousing or container stuffing/striping. This practice has 
the additional negative consequence of foreclosing competition in other markets. 
Merger control 
In addition, many antitrust agencies are in charge of imposing safeguards to prevent 
industry concentration harming consumers. The rationale behind merger control is 
that is preferable to avoid companies obtaining excessive market power than to avoid 
its abuse once it exists. 
Mergers and acquisitions are useful to the economy because they take advantage of 
scale economies and synergy, and promote innovation. However, these operations 
also reduce the number of competitors in the market and have the potential of 
reducing rivalry among remaining firms, which may lead to the occurrence of anti-
competitive practices (Whinston, 2006).  
The potential negative consequences of concentration (excessive prices, supply not 
meeting the needs of consumers) are exacerbated in industries such as ports, where 
high entry barriers may dissuade competitors to enter the market. For these reasons, 
port terminal mergers are commonly subject to previous authorization or operators are 
prohibited to possess other companies’ stock above certain level (as the case of 
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Chile). In some countries, regulators are even empowered to mandate divestiture 
when concentration reaches excessive levels. 
There are several remedies available to competition authorities to prevent the 
potential negative consequences of mergers (OECD, 2004): 
a. Merger prohibition. Consists on preventing a merger; 
b. Partial divestiture. Consists on allowing firms to proceed with a merger if 
they divest the assets or business units that may cause anti-competitive 
behavior; 
c. Conditional approval. Consists on allowing a merger to take place subject to 
monitoring of its post-merger behavior. The regulator can later order a 
complete divestiture if anti-competitive behavior is observed. 
5.3.2 Regulatory policies in the port sector 
There are certain markets where competition is unlikely to develop or it is undesirable 
for technical, safety or security reasons. In these circumstances a monopoly will arise.
Antitrust policies were designed to deal with anti-competitive behavior in markets 
where competition exists, but they are not adequate to deal with situation were 
competition does not exist. In these circumstances, economic regulation is needed. 
As discussed earlier, port competition occurs in several ways. But it has also been said 
that the port industry has several economic characteristics that may generate 
oligopolistic or monopolistic markets. According to the definitions given in chapter 2, 
ports terminals may become natural monopolies when demand is insufficient to 
exhaust their economies of scale or scope. In these circumstances, it will be cheaper to 
supply the existing demand with just one provider, since competition from a second 
terminal would lead to higher prices for all users. Therefore, competition would not 
develop and the monopolist would be able to extract rents from shippers or carriers, 
harming them and hindering the development of the country’s international trade.  
It is very important to underline that naturally monopolistic port terminals only arise 
in very particular circumstances: areas with relatively low economic activity where 
traffic is limited, inter-modal connections are bad or border crossings are 
problematical, such as developing countries or small islands. Although oligopolistic 
structures are common in the industry, most terminals do face some degree of 
competition. As explained before, competition can arise from other terminals located 
in the same port (intra-port competition), in a different one (inter-port competition), as 
well as with other logistics chains (inter-modal competition). Although antitrust 
suffices to deal with oligopolistic markets, economic regulation is necessary to deal 
with monopolistic ones. 
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Naturally monopolistic port terminals are located all over the world. For example, a 
survey by UNCTAD (2003) revealed that several African ports and their respective 
terminals have monopoly status. Van Niekerk (2005) also argues that many South 
African port terminals constitute effective monopolies. These are also found, for 
example, in Eastern Europe, where Odessa port plant (Ukraine) has a monopoly status 
in the shipment of ammonia and nitrogen fertilizers (ICPS, 2007). In Asia, Aden port 
terminal (Yemen) handles all the country’s containerized traffic. According to the 
World Bank (2007), Rèunion Island generates traffic for only one container terminal, 
for which the one located at its main port can also be considered a natural monopoly. 
Likewise, examples of naturally monopolistic terminals are found in Latin America. 
Tamayo, Paredes and Flor (1999) analyzed the main common-user Peruvian port 
terminals and concluded that all of them have a monopoly over one type of cargo or 
another. Moreover, Kent and Hochstein (1998), argue that Colombia, Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica have at least a dominant terminal in a near or total monopoly position. 
Even in a developed country like Australia, port terminals are subject to monitoring or 
regulation because of their monopolistic position (SAIIR, 2002). 
As discussed previously, the existence of monopolies warrants economic regulation, 
which aims to mimic prices and conditions of service to those that would have 
prevailed if markets were competitive. Economic regulation is based on two policies 
(Defilippi and Flor, 2008):  
a. Regulation of prices and quality of service (price regulation); and, 
b. Regulation of how firms access the facilities they need to compete in the 
market (access regulation).  
As Defilippi and Flor (2008) argue, price regulation is more costly. It requires the 
regulator to possess large amounts of information that is hard to collect, and to use 
unbiased decision-making processes that are difficult to implement, especially in a 
context of weak institutions. A more preferable policy is then to try introducing 
competition in as many markets as possible and only regulate the remaining ones. 
Depending on the particular situation, it may be possible for governments to induce 
some form of competition in their ports. For container terminals, for example, Kent 
and Hochstein (1998) provide a rule-of-thumb to assess the type of competition that 
can be introduced at different traffic levels. 
Table 5.11: Container terminals: competition options  
Type of competition Traffic level (TEUs)
Intra-terminal 30,000 
Inter-terminal 100,000 
Inter port  300,000 
Source: Kent and Hochstein (1998) 
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In situations where monopolistic and competitive markets are vertically-bundled, 
monopolistic terminal operators will seek to recover the profits foregone by regulation 
by controlling a related market (Paredes, 1997). This could be possible because 
international trade requires logistics services that are provided through supply chains. 
Since ports are crucial nodes in these chains, the party that controls a monopolistic 
terminal would be in position of excluding rivals from the provision of the other 
services that conform that chain. This can be done, for example, by giving a more 
favorable treatment to firms belonging to the same business group (granting exclusive 
rights to use terminal’s assets or allowing preferential entry to its premises), 
discriminating against non-related companies (not providing services with the same 
expediency or quality) or increasing entry barriers (requiring competitors to have 
over-qualified personnel, equipment with specific characteristics or disproportionately 
large insurance cover). OECD (2006) provides examples of such behavior in Europe. 
The limited traffic generated by small ports may facilitate this behavior, because it 
causes many port services to be provided by a handful of firms. This means that the 
few companies that act as shipping agencies also provide pilotage, towage, mooring 
and purveyance to ship-owners, and may act as customs brokers and cargo consignees 
too. In the abovementioned case of Matarani Port, for example, the same business 
conglomerate that holds the concession of the port’s single terminal provides all other 
mentioned services through related companies. Moreover, there have been complaints 
that the concessionaire has asked non-related firms for disproportionately large 
financial guarantees as a requisite to use the terminal’s facilities (Alcazar and 
Lavation, 2005). The case is similar in other ports, not necessarily as small. In the port 
of Cartagena (Colombia), for example, the concessionaire Sociedad Portuaria 
Regional de Cartagena has been accused of using its advantageous position (it is the 
exclusive provider of infrastructure and superstructure) to drive competing 
stevedoring companies out of the market (World Bank, 2007). In these situations, 
regulation is needed not to determine prices but to guarantee access of competing 
firms to non-monopolistic markets (access regulation).  
5.3.3 Access policies for naturally monopolistic port terminals 
Simply stated, an effective access regime should impede a monopolist to discriminate 
against non-related firms in the provision of competitive services. To achieve this, the 
regime should ensure that any firm is able to access terminal’s facilities under “fair” 
conditions, i.e., similar to those requested in competitive markets. However, the many 
factors policy makers should consider when designing such regimes converts access 
into one of the most complex regulatory policies (OECD, 2006). 
The first issue that arises is to what and for what to grant access. Not every port asset 
is required to provide port services nor every service requires safeguards for firms to 
enter the market. Since regulation is more costly to society and is more likely to 
spawn inefficiencies than allowing markets to work freely, regulators should be very 
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careful not to intervene when it is not warranted. One can recall from chapter 3 that 
the EFD is a useful criterion to decide when to intervene and to what facilities grant 
access, but also that its use carries large risks and trade-offs for which is necessary to 
avoid misuse. 
The second issue that arises when designing access policies is how much entry to 
allow. In theory, an optimal entry is the number of competitors that would enter the 
market if the terminal was not monopolistic. Unfortunately, this is not observable by 
the regulator and, as explained before, a regulated monopolist has incentives to 
restrict entry in order to favor itself or related firms. Moreover, since the regulator has 
less information about the true cost of providing infrastructure than the terminal 
operator, the probability of regulatory failure is high and its consequences dear. In 
fact, if access prices and conditions are set below the optimal, the terminal operator 
would not have the incentives to adequately maintain and expand the infrastructure, 
which could lead to congestion, delays and other inefficiencies. If access terms are set 
too high, a less-than-optimal number of firms will enter the market, for which 
economic rents will not be competed away and operational efficiencies will not be 
achieved (Laffont and Tirole, 1994).  
As we will see in the following chapters, formulating access policies involves making 
decisions or setting rules regarding four main issues: 
a. Vertical structure; 
b. Pricing;  
c. Non-price terms and conditions; and, 
d. The mechanism to expand the infrastructure. 
Vertical structure 
It refers to the provisions allowing or prohibiting terminal operators, for example, to 
integrate with shipping companies or to supply related services (storage, towage or 
bunkering). Under vertical integration, a single firm is allowed to supply several 
services, while vertical separation implies that several firms would be needed to 
provide different services (OECD, 2001).  
Vertical separation can be legal or operational. Legal separation implies that activities 
have to be performed by different companies; while operational separation only 
requires activities to be performed by different business units within the same 
company. To enforce operational separation, measures such as accounting separation 
are commonly implemented. 
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The importance of regulating vertical structure is that incumbents have radically 
different sets of incentives under integration or separation. When vertical separation is 
enforced the incumbent has no incentives to discriminate, since it cannot provide the 
service directly and there is no related company to favor with this behavior. It would 
be more profitable to charge for access to as many companies as possible, regardless 
of their affiliation. Vertical separation could then resolve the access problem outright 
if there were not economies of scope and transaction costs. Indeed, this policy would 
require services to be provided by different companies even if it is more efficient to 
supply them jointly, a practice that also involves transactions costs (coordination and 
administrative costs derived from having additional suppliers). As a consequence, 
vertical separation could cause higher prices than integration. 
One can notice the importance of economies of scope and transaction costs for the 
transport industry by observing its trend toward integration. Indeed, several shipping 
companies also operate container terminals (Maersk, MSC, APL, Evergreen, among 
others) and seem to be increasingly interested in land-side operations. The growth of 
inter-modalism and the fact that in many ports few firms provide several services also 
constitute examples of this trend (ADB, 2000). 
Another factor to consider when deciding about vertical structure is that reduced 
traffic also implies reduced businesses. In small ports, not allowing an operator to 
provide other services would reduce even more the port or terminal’s potential to 
generate profits and with that, the private sector’s interest in taking a concession (Flor 
and Defilippi, 2003). 
Pricing 
Designing an access regime requires deciding how access prices will be determined. 
There are two options: (i) regulation, with the already-discussed shortcomings caused 
by the information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm; and (ii), 
negotiation by the incumbent and the access seeker with regulatory intervention 
limited to cases when the parties do not reach an agreement. Regulators also face the 
problem of deciding what methodologies to use to set prices under option (i), or to 
settle disputes under option (ii).  
Section 3.2 discussed several pricing methodologies: ECPR, FDC, LRIC and global price 
caps. It showed that every methodology has advantages and shortcomings, for which 
is difficult to decide a priori which one to use in the port industry. However, when 
implementing access policies, a regulator should state clearly which methodology it 
would use under particular situations. 
Non-price terms and conditions 
Alternative policies to determine terms and conditions are negotiation, regulation or 
intermediate approaches, such as the publication of standard reference terms that can 
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be subject to further negotiation by the parties. Regulating non-price access conditions 
is especially difficult because it involves subtle issues that offer opportunities for 
discrimination. OECD (2006) gives several examples of non-price access deterrence in 
European ports:  
• In the UK, an incumbent (Sealink) owning a common-user port and providing a 
ferry boat service undermined an entrant’s (B&I) ability to operate by 
scheduling its own service to disrupt the loading and unloading of passengers 
by the entrant.  
. 
• The port of Rødby, Denmark, is owned by the state-owned company DSB, 
which also provides ferry services. A company interested in entering the ferry 
market (Stena) was denied access to the port on the grounds that it would 
prevent companies already operating in the port from expanding their 
activities. Moreover, Stena’s efforts to build a new terminal were blocked by 
the government on behalf of the state-owned incumbent. 
• In the port of Varna, Bulgaria, a catering firm complained that although it had 
acquired all of the permits required to cater and to dispose of waste from 
maritime vessels, it was unable to operate because the port management 
refused to dispose the waste brought by the caterer and also refused to allow 
its trucks entering port property. 
An important non-price issue when designing access policies is how to distribute 
berths’ available time among the ships calling at the port. Indeed, a shipping company 
may want to schedule a service where the ship arrives at a time when the berth is 
being used by another ship. Unless access rules have been adequately established (in 
this case, the terminal’s queuing policy), an integrated terminal operator might try to 
discriminate by favoring itself (if it is integrated with the shipping company) or the 
client that uses more of the other services it provides. One option to set these rules is 
to allocate the time slot to the company that was already using it, but this raises the 
question of what would happen if the shipping company wants to rent or sell the slot 
to a third party. On one hand, this would be desirable, since the scarce resource (the 
slot) would be ultimately used by the company that values it most. On the other hand, 
this might not be fair with the terminal operator, since it would not benefit from 
earnings generated by terminal’s assets. A second option is to auction the slot, which 
raises the question of what to do with the proceeds. If they are considered earnings, 
the monopolistic operator may end up obtaining supra-normal profits, thus evading 
regulation (Parker, 2000).  
The typical non-price terms included in access agreements are: 
a. Services that the access seeker will provide using incumbent’s assets; 
b. Assets that the access seeker will be allowed to use; 
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c. Minimal equipments, and their technical characteristics; 
d. Personnel, number and their qualifications; 
e. Schedule under which the services will be provided;
f. Procedures to coordinate activities between incumbents and the service 
provider; 
g. Responsibilities of the parties; 
h. Investments that need to be undertaken by either party; 
i. Guarantees that the parties will comply with the agreed terms. This may 
include insurance policies or other financial instruments such as letters of 
credit. 
The mechanism to expand the infrastructure 
The fourth element that designing an access regime involves is the set of incentives 
used to expand the infrastructure.  
The first option is through regulation. The regulator may monitor congestion and 
mandate the port operator to expand the infrastructure when it reaches certain levels. 
This option has, however, two main shortcomings. The first is caused by the 
abovementioned information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm. The 
regulator may ignore that a shift in demand has occurred, or the existence of cheaper 
options to expand infrastructure or new technologies used to ease the congestion 
without investing in expensive infrastructure. It is important to consider that 
mandating unwarranted infrastructure expansions harms consumers, since regulated 
tariffs are set taking into account these investments. The second shortcoming is that 
the mandate to expand infrastructure may be motivated for political, not technical, 
considerations. As explained in preceding chapters, one of the main regulatory 
failures is caused by the regulator’s capture from the monopolist. However, the 
regulator may also be captured by the government and willing to serve its political 
agenda. Therefore, allowing regulators to make this decision might increase 
regulatory risks and the private sector’s interest in taking out a concession. 
A second option is to give the incumbent economic incentives to expand the 
infrastructure when necessary. Under this approach regulators have several policy 
options: 
a. Giving financial rewards for keeping congestion under acceptable levels. If 
the rewards are profitable, the incumbent will be enticed to expand the 
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infrastructure when necessary. As we will see, this is the approach used in the 
UK’s electric industry. The problem with this option is that by paying the 
incumbent for doing what similar firms in competitive markets would anyway 
do, it allows obtaining monopolistic rents. 
b. Using market incentives. The problem with this approach, as seen in chapter 2, 
is that a monopolist has incentives to reduce supply, for which it might be 
more profitable not to expand the infrastructure. This option seems to be better 
suited for incumbents that face some degree of competition, either in the same 
market or in related ones. For example, a monopolistic terminal operator that 
faces inter-modal competition. As we will see, this is the option used in 
natural gas and railways industries in the US. 
c. Awarding subsidies. Under this approach, the government gives incumbents 
subsidies to undertake otherwise unprofitable investments or to provide 
otherwise unprofitable services. In network industries, this mechanism is used 
to cover poor, rural or isolated areas (in telecommunications these are called 
“universal service obligations”).  
The mechanism used for the concession of the Matarani port terminal (Peru) was to 
establish a threshold. The concessionaire has the duty of building a new berth once 
any of the actual ones reach an occupancy rate of 70% (Alcazar and Lavation, 2005). 
The concession of the Buevaventura port terminal (Colombia) did not foresee a 
mechanism to expand the terminal’s capacity, which caused congestion when traffic 
increased more that expected. Moreover, because of limitations on the duration of the 
concession contract, the concessionaire was reluctant to incur additional investment 
costs unless it could be assured of a reasonable cost recovery period for their added 
investments (Nathan Associates, 2004) 
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6. Network economics  
This chapter describes the main characteristics of network industries and their relation 
with diverse market structures. This discussion allows understanding how the 
complementarity between the components of a network may allow a monopolist 
controlling an essential input to extend its market power to related competitive 
markets.  
The chapter also analyses how these characteristics might lead to market structures 
that do not necessarily result from lack of competition or anti-competitive behavior.  
6.1 Architecture of networks 
A network is an interconnected system of links and nodes. Network industries are 
those which possess physical or electronic linkages that create networks. Industries 
with such characteristics that have raised public policy concern are telephone, 
broadcasting, cable television, electricity, water pipelines, sewage systems, oil 
pipelines, natural gas pipelines, road and highway systems, bus transport, truck 
transport, airlines, inland water transport, liner shipping, postal services, package 
delivery systems, refuse pick-up systems, airline computer reservation systems, bank 
automated teller machine systems, bank and non-bank credit card systems, bank debit 
card systems, bank check and payment clearance systems, local real estate broker 
multiple listings services and the internet (White, 1999). 
Figure 6.1 shows a simple star network that could represent a hub-and-spoke system.  
Cargo from either node is routed through a central node, the node S, which in this 
case may be a hub port as Gioia Tauro (Italy) or Balboa (Panama). This structure 
economizes on the number and length of links necessary to provide all possible node-
to-node transactions, but requires central nodes to have the capacity to handle all 
transactions among nodes. 
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It can be seen that the most distinctive feature of both type of networks is the 
complementarity between links and nodes. In fact, although there are many non-
network industries where final goods are composed of complementary components 
(such as electronics or equipment manufacturing), goods in network industries are 
produced using both links and nodes as production inputs. 
In networks where links and nodes are owned by different firms, the issues of 
interconnection, compatibility, and coordination become crucial for the production of 
composite goods. 
6.2 Economic characteristics of networks 
6.2.1 Externalities and complementarities 
Networks exhibit positive consumption and production externalities. This means that 
the value of a unit of a good increases with the expected number of units to be sold. 
For this reason, the demand curve slopes downward, but shifts upwards with increases 
in the number of units sold. The key reason of the appearance of network externalities 
is the complementarity between the components of a network (Farrell and Saloner, 
1985). For example, for a “n” components two-way network like the one depicted in 
figure 6.1, there are “n(n-1)” potential goods. An additional customer provides direct 
externalities to all other customers in the network by adding 2n potential goods 
through the addition of a new link to the existing links”.   
In typical one-way networks, however, the externality is indirect. In figure 6.5, for 
example, if all A-type goods are compatible with B-type ones, there are “mn” 
potential composite goods. An additional customer yields indirect externalities to 
other customers of the network by increasing the demand for components of types A 
and B, thus potentially increasing the number of varieties of each component that are 
available in the market.  
A different way to see this effect is through unexploited economies of scale. For 
example, if there are unexploited economies of scale in the provision of potable water, 
a new customer reduces the costs of serving all other customers of the network, thus 
generating positive externalities. 
6.2.2 Economies of scale, scope or density 
The links and nodes of a network may exhibit significant economies of scale, scope or 
density37 for some technologies and for low volumes of transactions. As a matter of 
                                                
37 Economies of scale and scope were defined in section 2.1.2. Economies of density arise when is 
cheaper to add a new link to an existing network than building a new one (Fernandez-Baca, 2006).  
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fact, either economies of scale or constant returns to scale can support the externalities 
of two-way networks and, as said before, the presence of unexploited economies of 
scale may explain the occurrence of externalities in one-way networks.  
Economies of scale, however, do not pervade all aspects of all links or nodes at all 
times. For some technologies, a sufficiently large volume of transactions may exhaust 
economies of scale, thus maintaining the average and marginal costs roughly constant, 
or even increase them for the relevant demand interval. In these cases, multiple 
competitors for some or all of the links and nodes of a network are likely to arise, as 
in shipping, airlines, mobile and long-distance telephony, etc. (Economides, 1996), As 
it can be seen from the examples given, the exhaustion of economies of scale, scope 
or density may occur for an entire network or for some parts of it. For example, the 
volume of traffic between two important ports like Rotterdam and Singapore are 
much greater than between Rotterdam and any minor port. Therefore, it is possible 
that the economies of scale of serving the pair of large port is exhausted with the 
larger volume, while unexploited economies of scale could still be available in 
services between Rotterdam and the minor port. 
It is worth noting that even if competition exists in most of the components of a 
network, the links and nodes where economies of scale, scope or density are not 
exhausted may become monopolies. Moreover, due to the feature of complementarity 
among the components of a network, the existence of monopoly in one of the links or 
nodes may be sufficient to capture all the potential rents from the transactions that use 
that component (Paredes, 1997). This can be illustrated by using figure 6.4. As we can 
see, the nodes SA and SB are needed to complete any transaction between Ai and Bj.
The monopoly ownership of SA is sufficient to capture any rents that are available 
from the transaction. But if node SB is also owned by a monopolist, its intention to 
maximize profits may lead to even higher prices, lower output and greater 
inefficiency in the network. In this case, vertical integration (the single ownership of 
both SA and SB) may be desirable and may even increase efficiency by eliminating the 
double-monopoly problem. 
The existence of a monopoly in a link or node of a network creates further problems 
when an incumbent competes in a related market with other firms in the provision of 
goods that use the monopolized link or node as an input. In that case, the monopolist 
has incentives to foreclose or refuse to deal with its competitors, or perform a price-
squeeze by overcharging them for the use of the node or link it controls exclusively 
(Kessides, 2004). This is the cause of the access problem. 
6.2.3 Compatibility and standards 
If a transaction within a network is to be successful, the various links and nodes must 
be compatible with each other. Depending on the industry, compatibility may involve 
not only formal technology, such as software or electronics, but also physical 
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standards like rail tracks, containers and runways. However, compatibility needs not 
to be perfect. Some decrease in quality or speed maybe acceptable as long as the 
transaction costs are not significantly increased. The way members of a network 
achieve compatibility is by agreeing in the set of standards on which transactions will 
be based upon. The problem arises in cases where the network is owned by different 
firms, since the adoption of one standard over another favors one participant over the 
others. To enhance their market power, incumbents may agree on a technology that 
discourages potential entrants or harms actual competitors (Economides and White, 
2004). 
 In this case, an explicit agreement or implicit understanding will be necessary. Such 
an agreement can be negotiated, imposed by the government or surge through 
imitation. Stover (1961) illustrates this point by describing how the railway industry 
in the US adopted a standard gauge during the nineteenth century: 
“The diversity of [track] gauge, especially in the South, (…) made impossible the 
cross-country shipment of freight without break of bulk. (…) Standard automatic 
couplers and air brakes could do little to speed or facilitate freight traffic as long as a 
diversity of [track] gauge persisted. In 1861 more than 46 per cent of the nation’s rail 
mileage was other than the 4 feet 8½ inch standard gauge (…). 
Several expedients were used in the sixties and seventies to permit the interchange of 
equipment between lines of different gauge. The “compromise car” was the simplest. 
Having wheels whose tread was five inches wide, the cars could be used on either 
standard-gauge track or track as wide as 4 feet 10 inches. However, careful railroad 
operators frowned upon the use of such cars because they claimed that many 
accidents could be traced to them. A second innovation, the car with wheels that 
could be made to slide along the axle, was no safer and was never widely adopted. 
Car hoists, or “elevating machines,” with the cars lifted to a set of trucks of different 
gauge, were much safer and were used extensively. . . . A number of lines also went 
to “double gauge,” the addition of a third rail, permitting the use of equipment of 
different gauge.  
There was no substitute for the adoption of a single gauge by the whole nation. In the 
early eighties most of the gauge divergence was found in the narrow-gauge lines of 
the mountain West and in the Old South, where the five-foot-gauge mileage had 
actually increased from 7,300 miles during the Civil War to more than 12,000 miles 
in 1880. The Chesapeake & Ohio, the Illinois Central, and the Mobile & Ohio had all 
changed to the narrower standard gauge by the middle eighties. James C. Clark, 
general manager of the Illinois Central lines south of Cairo, spent weeks of careful 
preparation for his change of gauge in the spring and early summer of 1881. On July 
29, 1881, between dawn and 3:00 P.M., 3,000 workers shifted the gauge on the 
entire 550-mile line.   
The rest of the South soon gave in. Representatives of southern lines totaling more 
than 13,000 miles agreed early in February 1886, to change their gauge the following 
May 31 and June 1. During the weeks before the day of the change, part of the 
southern rolling stock and motive power was changed to the narrower gauge and 
track gangs moved alternate inside spikes on one rail to the new position. . . . Using 
track gangs of from three to five men, ten roads west of the mountains shifted their 
rail on the last day of May. The remaining roads shifted June first. On both days the 
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work was accomplished between 3:30 A.M. and 4:00 P.M., during which all traffic 
was stopped. Southern railroads had truly become part of the national network, and 
passenger or freight trains could move from any southern depot to any part of the 
nation without change of trucks or bulk (…). 
An immediate dividend of increased operating efficiency resulted from gauge 
standardization as a system of more extensive car interchange developed among the 
railroad companies”38  
6.3 Consequences of network effects 
The characteristics of network industries discussed in the previous sections have 
several important implications over the structure of markets within network 
industries.  The first one is that that monopoly may maximize social surplus. This is 
because in the presence of robust network externalities, a large market share boosts 
economies of scale, scope or density, thus generating productive efficiency (goods or 
services will be produced using the least quantity of inputs). The problem, of course, 
is how to ensure that allocative efficiency (prices are set as close as possible to costs) 
is also reached, since a monopolist has no incentives to do it. A relevant characteristic 
of markets within network industries is that firms that can set the industry’s standards 
tend to have market shares several times larger than their followers. And this, in turn, 
tends to have a much larger share than the one of the third, and so on. This geometric 
sequence of market shares implies that in equilibrium, there is extreme market share 
and profit inequality (Economides and White, 1994).  
This characteristic can be the consequence of the fact that firms setting the market 
standard have also higher sales of complementary goods and, therefore, their goods 
are more valuable to consumers (Gabszewicz, Sonnac and Wauthy, 2001). This 
feedback results in even higher sales. On the contrary, firms with small market shares 
have lower sales of complementary goods, the feedback resulting in even lower sales. 
For example, it is easier for a fixed-telephony incumbent to sell a related service (for 
example, a mobile subscription) to an existing client than to a new firm that has to 
enter the market. One can argue many reasons for this result: the user already knows 
the incumbent, there is an additional cost of dealing with more providers, fears that 
compatibility may not be complete, etc. Nevertheless, since the position of the high 
sales firm allows it to charge high prices, low sales producers may not be driven out 
of business. The existence of large liner shipping companies along with relatively 
small ones may illustrate this point. Although the shipping industry has been 
immersed in a path toward consolidation (companies tend to be larger), small 
companies have not been driven out of business. 
Another important implication of the network effects is that additional users are not 
rewarded for the positive externalities they cause to others, although they may 
discriminate to favor large providers in order to maximize the network effect 
                                                
38 Source: Stover (1961), pp. 149-156.  
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(Spulber, 2008).  This can be the case of liner shipping or parcel services, in which 
new users would prefer to use the services of the firm with the largest coverage.   
A further implication of the existence of network effects is the importance of “path-
dependence”39, i.e., investments made in the past condition investments to be made in 
the future (Rena and Herani, 2007).  For example, since expansion projects in the rail 
industry use the existing infrastructure, they tend to perpetuate actual track standards, 
even though they or the network’s layout reflect economic conditions from the time 
when it was initially developed.   
6.4 Network effects and public policy40
As we have seen, one can expect competitive network markets in equilibrium to have 
a “winner-takes-most” structure, with significant inequalities in shares and profits.  
However, this outcome does not mean that competition is weak.  On the contrary, 
striving to become the top firm in the market and thus obtain most of the benefits 
makes competition very intense. Therefore, the existence of network effects may 
cause competition “for the market” to take precedence over competition “in the 
market”.   
Another important lesson for governments is that there should be no presumption that 
the inequality in profits among competitors is the necessary consequence of anti-
competitive actions by incumbent firms. As we have seen, market structures in this 
type of markets are expected to be unequal.   
The third important consequence of the existence of network effects is that the 
breakup of a monopoly into competing firms with incompatible standards may raise 
production costs and thus reduce social surplus. In this context, standardization is 
valuable even if it is achieved de facto by a monopolist.  
Lastly, policy makers should notice that free entry to markets within network 
industries does not lead to perfect competition.  In these industries, once few firms are 
in operation, the surge of new competitors does not change the market structure 
significantly.  Therefore, governments should not expect to affect the market structure 
in a significant way by encouraging competition through the elimination of entry 
barriers.   
  
                                                
39 “Path-dependence” is the dependence of a network on past decisions of producers and consumers. 
See Ellig and Lin (2000) 
40 White (1999) 
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7. Access regulation in the 
telecommunications industry 
A large part of theoretical body available today for regulating network industries was 
initially developed for telecommunications. Indeed, the problems posed by the British 
government’s decision of privatizing British Telecom encouraged economists to 
devise new ways to regulate private monopolies. Access regulation was practically 
created to allow the development of technical innovations as mobile telephony and the 
internet. Since then, a large number of countries have opted for restructuring their 
telecommunication industries. 
The following sections describe the economics of the telecommunications industry 
and the alternative policies followed to deal with the access problem. The particular 
approaches taken in the UK, US and Australia are analyzed. The last section 
summarizes the lessons for ports. 
7.1 Economic characteristics of the 
telecommunications industry 
Telecommunications is a network industry with the characteristics described in 
chapter 6. Telecommunication networks require complementary and compatible 
inputs to produce one call, and they exhibit economies of scale, scope and density. 
Moreover, the inclusion of a new subscriber increases the value of the network for all 
existing users. These externalities make some services to be produced cheaper if the 
market is provided by only one firm. 
Although a variety of technologies can be employed to provide telecommunications 
services, the basic architecture of telephone networks is similar to the one shown in 
figure 7.1. End users are connected to local switches. In order to complete a call, 
operators connect the local switches of both caller and receiver using alternative 
technologies.  
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Figure 7.1: A typical telecommunications network41 
 
The telecommunications industry shares with the port industry the characteristic that 
both produce public and private services. Indeed, the benefits produced by this 
industry are much larger than those captured by private transactions. 
Telecommunications constitute one of the basic components necessary to ensure 
access to information, considered a strategic factor to reduce poverty and enhance 
development (Chowdhury, 2002). As in ports, cost recovery from end users is 
possible and provision can be limited to those who pay for it. 
 
Telecommunication networks also share with ports the characteristic that their 
infrastructure supports several markets. Table 7.2 shows that telecommunications 
operators compete in five different markets: local, long distance (domestic and 
international) and mobile telephony, as well as in the provision of internet and data 
services.  
 
Table 7.1: Telecommunications markets: typical competitive structure 
Market Typical market structure 
Local telephony Monopoly 
Long distance Competitive 
Mobile telephony Competitive 
Internet services Competitive 
Data services Competitive 
 
                                                 
41 Source: Productivity Commission (1997) 
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It is important to note that in order to compete in these markets, operators should be 
interconnected, i.e., their networks should be linked in such a way that voice or data 
flow seamlessly between networks owned by different operators. In 
telecommunication contexts, interconnection agreements42 allow one operator to use 
parts of the networks of other operators, including both physical infrastructure and 
software systems. These agreements permit operators to give users of their own 
networks access to the users or services of other networks. 
Interconnection is required, for example, for a call made from a mobile network to be 
completed (terminated) in the fixed-line one owned by the incumbent (or another 
mobile operator). In the network depicted in figure 7.1, this would be implemented by 
linking the cellular switch of the mobile operator with the local switch of the 
incumbent. 
It is worth explaining how operators charge for their services in this industry. 
Although there are several options, the most used is the one known as “caller pays”. 
Networks set the tariffs for their subscribers. When a caller subscribed to company A 
calls another subscribed to company B, company A charges the caller and pays access 
charges to company B for the right of terminating the call in its network (also called 
“termination charges”). This situation creates incentives for companies to subsidize 
outgoing calls as a way to attract subscribers and later charge expensive access fees. 
This behavior prompted the European Commission to open an investigation into 
pricing between fixed and mobile networks in 1998 and to establish price caps for 
roaming charges in 2007 (European Parliament, 2007). 
Since local telephony almost universally constitutes a monopoly due to the described 
characteristics of distribution activities, its operator is typically regulated. As in ports, 
this incumbent has incentives to recover profits foregone by regulation by 
monopolizing any of the remaining markets (Paredes, 1997). This can be done by 
refusing to subscribe interconnection agreements with other operators or by 
discriminating in favor of itself or a related firm. Therefore, access regulation is 
required to safeguard competition. 
Incumbent’s ability to monopolize services in other markets comes from what is 
known as the “consumer lock-in problem”. This problem derives from the fact that in 
most countries telephone services are priced as a two-part tariff, comprising a fixed 
charge for subscription plus a variable one for usage. The existence of a fixed 
subscription charge has two main effects that reinforce the incumbent’s market power 
(Lapuerta, Benavides and Jorge, 2003): 
a. Fixed subscription charges lock in users to only one distribution network of 
each type for a period of time.   
                                                
42 In other industries, these would be called access agreements. 
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b. It causes users to be interested in the range of services offered by the company 
they are already subscribed (since subscribing to a second company would 
involve paying another fixed charge), thus creating a large entry barrier for 
new entrants.   
7.2 Markets and services 
As in similar industries, it is possible to decompose a telecommunications network 
into transmission and distribution activities.  
7.2.1 Transmission 
Although terminology varies among regions, transmission refers to the high-capacity 
(high-bandwidth) networks that connect the large switches of various operators (in 
terms of figure 7.1, these would be the transit or secondary switches).  
A number of technologies can be used to provide transmission services, such as 
cooper wires, coaxial cable, digital lines and wireless technologies, among others. The 
main cost characteristics of the most important technologies used for transmission 
activities are shown in table 7.1.  
Table 7.2: Cost characteristics of diverse transmission technologies 
Technology 
Initial 
Investment 
Sunk Costs 
Economies of 
Scale 
Economies of 
Scope 
Economies of 
Density 
Conventional 
Local Loop 
Large High Large Small Large 
xDSL Small Low 
Small (or 
negative) 
Medium Negative 
Improved 
Local Loop 
Large High Large Large Large 
CATV Large High Large Large Large 
Digital 
Powerline 
Medium Low Medium Small Small 
Fixed 
Wireless 
Narrowband 
Small Low Small Small 
Small (or 
negative) 
Fixed 
Wireless 
Broadband 
Small Low Small Medium 
Small (or 
negative) 
Mobile 
Wireless 
Medium Medium Medium Small Small 
Mobile 
Satellite 
Large High Medium Small Small 
Source: Cas (1999) 
131
According to Cas (1999), the high level of fixed and sunk costs of wire-based 
networks and the limited availability of frequencies for wireless networks, constitute 
entry barriers. However, given the variety of technologies and the large number of 
potential players involved, these barriers seem not to be as large as to prevent 
competition. Indeed, satellite services, for example, cover large regions and can be 
accessed from many parts of the world, allowing the aggregation of small demands 
that might not be large enough to sustain a local network. Likewise, many poor areas 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America are covered by mobile providers even if they are 
not serviced by fixed-wire operators. 
7.2.2 Distribution 
Distribution refers to the low-bandwidth services provided through a high geographic-
density network that connects local switches to final consumers, whether fixed-wire 
or wireless. In fixed-wire systems, the physical connection between the local switch 
with the final consumer is known as the “Local Loop” (see figure 7.1). As shown 
later, the local loop constitutes a key element for providing access. 
Fixed-wire distribution shows sizeable economies of density, for which the potential 
for competition for local telephony services is much more limited than in 
transmission. Economies of density arise from the fact that network costs per 
connection decrease rapidly as the number of connections increase, mostly because of 
shorter lines facilitate an efficient use of the network. Studies on interconnection costs 
report that population density and average line length together typically explain over 
80% of the variation in network costs (Edwards and Waverman, 2004).  
In addition to economies of density in distribution services, technologies such as 
fiber-optic cables also involve substantial installation costs and large economies of 
scale. This fact contributes to limit the potential for competition in fixed-wire 
distribution, even in metropolitan areas. In fact, several econometric models 
developed for the US suggest that only the most densely populated parts of large cities 
could expect to have two competing distribution networks (OECD, 2002a).  
In theory, wireless technologies could facilitate competition in local telephony, but 
their cost is still high compared to fixed-wire ones. However, this may change in the 
future. Indeed, in spite of its costs, mobile services are gradually becoming substitutes 
of fixed services, especially in low-populated areas (like rural zones) where deploying 
fixed-wire networks would result even more costly. Furthermore, cable networks are 
increasingly delivering telephony and high-speed internet services and new 
technologies are being tested to deliver voice, data and video products within the 
same line. It is worth noting that as substitutability increases; economic regulation of 
the industry will be less warranted. 
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This process may follow a similar path to the one occurred to European ports, where 
the disappearance of border controls, better transport infrastructure, containerization 
and other technological changes enlarged their historical hinterlands and allowed 
competition where previously was absent.  
7.3 Reform and regulation in the telecommunications 
industry 
The telecommunications industry has been heavily regulated almost since the 
invention of the telephone. Natural monopoly conditions and other network effects 
discouraged governments to rely on competitive markets for the organization of their 
national telecommunication industries. Therefore, prices, entry, ownership and 
availability of services were decided through administrative procedures (Melod, 
1997). 
Services were generally provided by state-owned companies legally protected from 
competition, which set prices and structured their supply to meet social goals and 
universal service obligations. This panorama changed radically from the 1980s. Since 
that time, a large number of governments have opted for restructuring their 
telecommunications industries, open their markets to competition and privatize their 
Public Telecommunications Operators (PTOs).  
Both technological advances and market changes motivated these reforms. For 
example, the development of technologies that allow reaching final users bypassing 
fixed-wire networks questioned the natural monopoly status of some services 
(Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001). In addition, the gradual increase in the demand for 
telecommunications services have made possible several operators to operate 
simultaneously while recovering their sunk costs.  
Intver, Olivier and Sepúlveda (2000) argue that other factors might have also 
motivated the restructuring of the industry: 
a. Government’s need to attract private sector capital to finance the expansion of 
existing networks; 
b. The growth of the internet, which increased data traffic and made apparent the 
need for upgrading existing networks;  
c. The growth of wireless services, that provided alternatives to fixed-wire 
networks and introduced new competitors; and, 
d. The development of an international telecommunications market, which 
changed the traditional structure of the industry and allowed private 
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companies to undertake investments that were previously only available to 
governments. 
It is worth noting that unlike ports, where privatization has not excluded public port 
authorities from continuing to provide port services (dredging, VTS, and security 
services, among others), PTOs have been privatized by transferring their control to 
private investors; thus excluding government from the direct provision of 
telecommunication services (Rozas, 2005). 
However, privatization has not implied that telecommunication services are not longer 
considered as public services; i.e., those that have to be provided even if it is not 
economic to do so (United Nations, 2001). On the contrary, one of the goals of 
regulation is precisely to ensure that the provision of telecommunication services is 
consistent with broader public policies.  
Considering the costs that regulation imposes on society and the possibility of 
regulatory failures, reforms implemented in the industry have been oriented at 
introducing competition in as many markets as possible; implementing economic 
regulation only in those that remain monopolistic. In this sense, privatization is not 
considered a goal per se (at least not from an economic viewpoint), but a reform tool 
to allow competition to be introduced in telecommunication markets (Rozas, 2005). 
Most countries that have restructured their industries have also created regulatory 
bodies or invested existing ministries with regulatory powers to oversight the 
privatized PTOs. Most regulatory agencies regulate principally three economic issues: 
price, quality and the conditions of access telecommunication markets (Melod, 1997). 
Table 7.3 shows how regulation is implemented in OECD countries after reform and 
privatization. It can be seen that in local telephony markets, regulation tend to be 
asymmetric (applies mostly to PTOs or dominant operators). It can also be seen that 
retail prices (those charged to subscribers) tend to be set using incentive-based 
methodologies (price-caps estimated using RPI-X or similar ones); while access 
charges are set using cost-based methodologies (ECPR, FDC or LRIC). It is worth noting 
that a number of countries do not regulate access charges to incumbent’s networks. 
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Table 7.3: Regulation of telecommunications in OECD countries 
Retail prices Access charges 
Local  (fixed-
wire) 
telephony 
Mobile 
markets 
Local (fixed-
wire) 
telephony 
Mobile 
markets 
Regulation applies to:     
All operators 3 2 4 3 
Dominant operators 5 3 8 7 
Only PTOs 15 2 5 0 
Other 1 0 1 1 
     
Type of regulation:      
Incentive-based 18 3 4 3 
Cost-based 3 1 13 8 
Discretionary 4 1 2 0 
Other 1 2 0 0 
     
No regulation 1 12 5 8 
     
Countries surveyed 27 19 24 19 
Source: Boylaud and Nicoletti, (2001) 
As for mobile markets, table 7.3 shows that most countries do not regulate retail 
prices (presumably because of existing competition), but those who do it apply 
different approaches. It also shows that access charges tend to be set using cost-based 
methodologies. 
The alternative to sector-specific regulation to set access prices and terms is to rely on 
general antitrust law. The experience with this option is nonetheless discouraging. 
New Zealand, for example, fully liberalized its telecommunications market in the late 
1980s and relied primarily on antitrust instruments to regulate access. But when a 
competitor already operating in the long distance market attempted to provide local 
telephone services the incumbent refused reaching an agreement on access terms, for 
which the dispute had to be appealed to the final arbiter, the UK’s Privy Council of the 
House of Lords (New Zealand's Supreme Court). The court took four years to settle 
the dispute. The main controversy was the setting of access prices, which lower courts 
were unable to do. In 2001, a telecommunications regulation unit was created within 
the antitrust authority, and a law passed requiring access prices to be set according to 
the LRIC methodology (Kerf, Nieto and Géradin, 2005a). 
7.4 Access arrangements in the telecommunications 
industry 
As in the port industry, incumbents lack of incentives to agree on interconnection 
terms with access seekers. In the absence of a regulatory framework, they may refuse 
to agree on interconnection terms (as the New Zealand case illustrates), delay 
agreements or set expensive access charges. They can do so because they control the 
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fixed-wire network, including the local loop that links the network with the 
subscriber’s premises. Without access to the local loop, providers of long distance, 
mobile, internet or data services would not be able to enter these markets. 
Two are the main policies to overcome the incumbent’s market power: 
Interconnection Agreements and Local Loop Unbundling (OECD, 2002a). As 
explained earlier, interconnection agreements allow operators to reach other 
operator’s subscribers by connecting their networks. It is worth noting that even 
though this policy is aimed primarily at reducing the incumbent’s market power, it is 
applied to all telephone service providers too. This ensures that all networks are 
interconnected, allowing any user to be reached from any telephone regardless the 
network they are subscribed to. 
According to Intven, Oliver and Sepúlveda, (2000), many telecommunication 
regulators use the EFD is the guiding principle to decide to which network components 
operators should provide access. In this industry, essential facilities include local 
loops, public right-of-ways, telephone numbers, frequency spectrum and support 
structures such as poles and ducts.   
In many countries access terms are negotiated by incumbents and access seekers 
(Jamison, 1998a). However, given the natural reluctance of incumbents to 
interconnect with competitors, regulatory supervision is required to establish 
reasonable interconnection agreements on a timely basis. To ensure agreement on 
terms and prices, regulators have adopted combinations of the following policies: 
a. Establishing guidelines that reduce the scope of negotiations to issues where 
the information asymmetry between regulator and incumbent is still large. 
These guidelines are implemented to avoid incumbents trying to delay 
agreements by negotiating conditions that have become a standard in the 
industry or have previously been granted to other operators. The increasing 
availability of interconnection agreements (from the same or similar countries) 
facilitates the establishment of these guidelines. 
The main problem with this approach is that regulators may fail to recognize 
topics that should be left open to negotiation. As in ports, non-price access 
terms in telecommunications involve subtle issues that are difficult to detect, 
measure and regulate, such as the hearing of noises during calls or the number 
of calls that not reach their destination. These can be attributed to normal 
failures or sabotage from incumbents. 
b. Setting default interconnection agreements that would be implemented if 
negotiations fail. If the terms of these default agreements are less convenient 
for the incumbent than those it expects to reach through negotiation, it will be 
encouraged to negotiate. This is the approach implemented by the Federal 
Communications Commission of the US since 1996. 
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One problem with this approach is that some default terms may result 
favorable for the incumbent, thus reducing its incentives to negotiate an 
agreement. The information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm 
may induce regulators to make this mistake. On the contrary, if the terms of 
the default agreement are set too low access seekers would not have incentives 
to negotiate. In this case, implementing the agreement might result in excess 
entry and may disincentive the incumbent to maintain and expand the 
infrastructure. 
c. Establish deadlines for various stages of the negotiation process. This policy 
has the advantage of limiting the incumbent’s ability to delay negotiations. 
The problem is that regulated negotiation periods tend to be lengthy, because 
regulators need to ensure that periods in between deadlines are large enough as 
to allow and effective negotiation of interconnection terms.  
d. Establish industry technical committees to deal with technical issues or the 
adoption of standards. The main advantage of this policy is that reduces the 
information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm. The main 
inconvenience is that in developing countries is hard to find experts with deep 
knowledge of the industry not related to any of the network operators. Hiring 
international consultants constitutes an option but it tends to make the 
negotiation process more expensive to the access seeker. 
e. Create incentives to complete interconnection agreements. This is the 
approach used by US legislation. The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
establishes that local operators will not be able to enter the long distance 
market unless they open their networks to competition by establishing 
interconnection agreements with other operators. 
In recent years, many countries have further encouraged competition by implementing 
a policy known as “local loop unbundling” (LLU) aimed at facilitating competition in 
internet provision markets. While interconnection arrangements mandate incumbents 
to provide competitors access to the local loop, while under LLU incumbents must 
lease them the local loop and related facilities. This operations allows competing 
operators to substitute the services provided by the incumbent. 
LLU requires incumbents to provide competitors access to components of their 
networks on a stand-alone basis. The EFD is also used as a criterion to determine 
exactly which components of the network need to be leased. According to the OECD
(2002a), LLU policies have the following main benefits: 
a. This policy incentives incumbents to innovate constantly, since lack of 
innovation may result in loss of market share to competitors. 
b. LLU also prevents inefficient investment, since competitors do not have to 
invest in duplicating the local loop. 
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The implementation of LLU, however, has not been exempted from criticisms. The 
main ones are the following: 
a. LLU reduces incentives for building new networks, since it allows competitors 
to enter the market using the one owned by the incumbent. This may maintain 
incumbents' dominance even if natural monopoly conditions do not prevail 
anymore. 
b. If access is priced wrongly, excess entry will occur. Since the collection of 
these charges will not suffice for maintaining and expanding existing 
networks, the incumbent will not have incentives to do it. 
c. It requires detailed technical coordination between operators, which may result 
in higher levels of technical failures. 
d. This policy also requires detailed regulatory intervention, therefore increasing 
regulatory risks. 
These disadvantages seem to have deterred regulators to implement this policy. 
Indeed, even though a number of countries have implemented local loop unbundling, 
new entrants have found extremely difficult to compete with incumbent operators.  As 
a consequence, penetration has been slow. In the United States, the country with the 
highest number of unbundled loops, these represent only 5.5% of the total lines. In 
Japan, the rate is 2.78% and in Denmark, 1.47%.  In other countries, the penetration is 
even lower (Umino, 2003). Besides the lock-in problem discussed earlier, other 
factors might explain this slow penetration. For example, inherited advantages from 
the time when PTOs were public-owned monopolies reinforce incumbents’ market 
power. Indeed, state-owned PTOs had little difficulty in obtaining rights-of-way to 
build their networks, which new entrants are unlikely to obtain.  
It is worth mentioning that something similar occurred with ports. When they were 
operated under the premise of constituting “growth poles”, port authorities could 
expect to be transferred a critical asset such as land at a price that did not reflect its 
opportunity cost (Haralambides, 1997a). Private entrants are unlikely to obtain a 
similar treatment, which reinforces incumbents’ market power. 
Since LLU requires incumbents to provide access to components of their networks on 
a stand-alone basis, the implementation of this policy has impacted prices in two 
ways. First, it has encouraged the elimination of the typical cross-subsidization of 
subscriber line charges through usage charges43. Second, it has forced the de-
                                                
43 Telecommunication services are priced as a two-part tariff: a fixed charge for subscription plus a 
variable one for usage. To make these services affordable to most users, state-owned incumbents had 
the tendency of cross-subsidizing the cost of subscription charges with usage ones. The existence of 
cross-subsidies is not desirable under a policy that promotes competition in as many markets as 
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averaging of geographically-averaged charges, i.e., services that are priced evenly 
within a geographic area regardless the fact that costs may differ for particular users 
(Umino, 2003). This effect enhances operational efficiency, since services are charged 
according to their real cost. 
It is worth mentioning that low-income users and others located in rural or low-
density areas (those that use to benefit from geographically-averaged charges) still 
receive subsidies, although their source has changed. Indeed, PTOs in most countries 
are expected to meet “universal service obligations”, which are requirements aimed at 
assuring that consumers with special needs receive telecommunications services 
(Tardiff and Taylor, 2003).  
The costs incurred by providing universal service obligations are funded in different 
ways.  In the UK, costs are met by the PTOs themselves. In the US, companies obtain 
support from a federal fund to which all operators must contribute. In Australia, costs 
are calculated annually and apportioned by all operators (OECD, 2002a). Other 
countries finance universal service obligations with general tax revenues (Chile) or 
with revenues from spectrum auctions (Guatemala). In Peru, rural telephony is 
financed by a fund constituted by 1% of all telephone bills (Rozas, 2005).  
7.5 Reform, regulation and access regimes in selected 
countries 
7.5.1 United Kingdom  
Until 1981 British Telecom (BT) enjoyed a monopoly on all aspects of network 
operation and equipment supply. Its origins date back to the establishment of the 
Electric Telegraph Company in 1846 and the emergence of other private firms that 
developed the first telephone networks in UK in the 19th century. These companies 
later merged, were taken over or collapsed until they were eventually transferred to 
the Post Office in 1912 (with just one exception). In 1969, the Post Office 
Telecommunications became established as a public corporation, holding the 
exclusive right of providing telecommunication services. It name was changed to 
British Telecom in 1980, remaining under control of the Post Office. BT was 
privatized in 1984 without restructuring, as the sole owner of the existing network. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1984 set the framework for BT’s privatization.  The 
Act abolished BT’s exclusive rights to provide certain services, created the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel) to regulate the industry and established new duties for 
                                                                                                                                           
possible because it discourages competitors (they would have to compete by offering services at non-
subsidized prices). 
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the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.  Both agencies have the duty to promote 
the interests of consumers and maintain and promote effective competition44. 
In preparation for the incumbent’s privatization, a second operator, Mercury, was 
licensed in 1982 to compete initially in local and domestic long-distance markets, 
although later the company was authorized to compete in the international long-
distance as well.  Until 1991, the government followed a duopoly policy, for which no 
other company was allowed to compete with BT and Mercury. During the 1980s, the 
latter provided services only to city-based business customers and high-value 
residential users, representing only marginal competition to BT. This duopoly policy 
continued until 1991, when the regulator awarded licenses to other companies to 
provide services in virtually all markets with the exception on international long 
distance, where BT and Mercury retained exclusive rights until the end of 1996 
(Laffont and Tirole, 2000). 
At the time of privatization, there was a cross-subsidy from international to local and 
rural calls. In this scenario, complete liberalization would have resulted in prices for 
local calls which would not allow BT to recover the cost of providing the service.  The 
problem was dealt by restricting the rate of adjustment of the fixed charge while 
capping the overall weighted price, and setting access charges to include a deficit 
charge. This deficit charge was nonetheless waived until an entrant Mercury had a 
market share of 10 percent or BT’s market share fell below 85 percent. This situation 
ended in 1996 when BT was authorized to rebalance its rates (Valletti, 1998). A 
similar duopoly policy was followed for cellular services. The only two licenses were 
awarded to Cellnet (partly owned by BT) and Racal-Vodafone. These companies 
offered mobile service on an exclusive basis until two further mobile operators were 
licensed in 1990. 
Under the UK’s interconnection regime, all operators are required to interconnect with 
all other operators. Operators designated to have “significant market power” have 
special obligations: 
a. To set transparent and cost-oriented access charges; 
  
b. To provide interconnection to other operators on the same terms as for their 
own services;  
c. To offer access at any technically feasible point; and, 
d. To keep separate accounts for different services. 
                                                
44 In December 2003, the Office of Communications (Ofcom) assumed the duties of Oftel, The 
Independent Television Commission, The Broadcasting Standards Commission, The 
Radiocommunications Agency and The Radio Authority.
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The access regime has changed through the years. When it was first implemented, a 
larger role was given to negotiation for setting access price and non-price issues. 
Nowadays, most of these terms are regulated by Ofcom. Operators wishing to 
interconnect with BT must agree to the conditions established in a document called the 
“Standard Interconnect Agreement”, produced and published by the incumbent after 
discussions other operators. This document covers basic terms and conditions, billing, 
technical matters, and over 100 schedules for particular services; and is regularly 
updated under Ofcom’s supervision. Parties are not allowed to negotiate individual 
terms. Operators seeking access must be registered with the regulator and undertake a 
series of steps, such as supplying call routing plans, before a standard interconnect 
agreement can be signed. Access charges are also published. These charges have been 
developed jointly by the regulator and the incumbent, in consultation with other 
operators and representatives of the consumers. Access charges are set for four-year 
periods and indexed on the basis of an RPI-X formula, using the LRIC methodology and 
current cost accounting asset valuations. Disputes over access charges are referred to 
the regulator (OECD, 2002b). 
An interesting case arose in 1997, when two mobile operators (Vodafone and O2) 
were determined as having significant market power in the mobile market. Unlike 
fixed incumbent operators, they were not obliged to offer cost-oriented access 
charges. An Oftel review concluded that call termination charges (access charges paid 
by a caller’s network for the right of terminate the calls on the receiver’s one) for 
fixed-line users were excessive, for which the regulator referred the companies to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC)45. The MMC ruled in favor of Oftel, for 
which the two operators were required to make a significant reduction in their call 
termination charges and accept price caps. In 2001, Oftel carried out a further review 
of competition in the mobile market. The review concluded that the pricing of call 
termination on mobile networks was excessive and to the detriment of customers. In 
light of these findings, the regulator decided to continue with the price caps over the 
next four years and apply it to all mobile operators (Oftel, 2003). 
LLU was not adopted in the UK until 2001. Oftel established that the methodology to 
estimate charges for unbundled components should be based in LRIC plus a mark-up 
to allow the incumbent to recover common costs. The regulator also set the following 
pricing principles: 
a. The price of the local loop and other necessary inputs will be cost-oriented; 
b. BT should be able to recover all the costs incurred in providing local loops; 
and, 
c. The charges will be initially geographically averaged, but BT may request its 
de-averaging if this is justified. 
                                                
45 At the time the agency carrying out investigations regarding abuse of market power. The MMC was 
later replaced by the Competition Commission. 
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Universal service obligations are placed on the operators with significant market 
power, which also have to meet their costs. They must provide telephone services at 
uniform tariffs, free access to emergency services, public telephony, operator 
assistance, directory services, and special tariffs for disabled people and low income 
users, among others (OECD, 2002b).  
7.5.2 United States 
The telecommunications industry in the US is regulated jointly by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs).  
The FCC has jurisdiction over all inter-state matters and some intra-state matters where 
the federal law prevails. State PUCs have jurisdiction over intra-state matters such as 
local long-distance, prices and entry conditions into local markets. 
Until 1984, AT&T was the largest provider of telecommunications services in the 
country.  It was integrated not only in the long-distance and local telephony markets, 
but also into equipment manufacturing and research and development. AT&T was 
organized into several local operating companies and a long-distance carrier. The 
local operating entities were regulated at state level by PUCs, while the long distance 
carrier was regulated by the FCC. AT&T’s monopoly was initially challenged in 1972, 
when MCI was granted permission to build and operate a microwave link between 
Chicago and St. Louis. This link also allowed other operators to compete in major 
city-pair routes. The behavior of AT&T toward its rivals induced the Department of 
Justice to bring an antitrust case against the firm in 1974. The case was finally settled 
in 1982, requiring the breakup of the company into seven regional companies. As a 
result, the country was partitioned into 192 local areas each served by a local 
company. The companies resulting from AT&T’s break up (called “baby Bells”) were 
banned from supplying long-distance services, which were to be provided by 
competing long-distance carriers (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). 
In 1996, the US congress passed the Telecommunications Act, aimed at promoting 
competition and reducing the regulatory burden in telecommunications markets. It 
was implemented by three major FCC orders on local competition, universal service; 
and access charging. The Telecommunications Act set the framework under which 
competitive access providers could enter local markets and established that the 
regional Bells could enter the long-distance market if they opened their local markets 
for competition. In particular, the Act requires incumbents to undertake the following 
actions: 
a. Interconnect their networks with those of other carriers at just, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory rates; 
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b. To lease unbundled network elements, at just, reasonable and non-
discriminatory rates; 
c. Sell retail services at wholesale rates for resale by competitors to end users. 
The Telecommunications Act regards local loops as essential facilities controlled by 
the incumbent, mandating that interconnection should be provided at least at four pre-
established points (Kahn, 2004).  
LLU was implemented in 2003, when the FCC ordered PTOs to provide unbundled 
access to a list of elements. Charges for interconnection, termination fees and 
unbundled network elements are set at state level by the PUCs, although parties are 
free to negotiate other rates, terms and conditions. 
Besides the efforts of US regulators, the implementation of the Telecommunications 
Act has not been easy. Incumbents legally challenged the new access rules in the 
courts, arguing that they constituted regulatory expropriation. In May 2002, however, 
the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to choose LRIC as methodology to 
estimate costs, although the uncertainty produced by these legal actions might explain 
the minimal penetration of unbundled local loops discussed in the previous section. It 
is also worth noting that despite the possibility of entering the long-distance market, 
many local companies have decided not to open their markets for competition (Kahn, 
2004). The Act did not establish any deadline to do so.   
Universal service obligations in the US have traditionally aimed at providing 
consumers in rural and insular areas with telecommunications services comparable to 
those in urban areas. Carriers satisfying certain conditions can obtain support from the 
federal Universal Service Fund, which is financed with contributions from all carriers 
(including wireless) according to their revenues. Other universal service programs 
subsidize the monthly telephone bills of low income customers and provide discounts 
to schools, libraries and rural health care centers to connect to the internet (Jacobs, 
1999). 
7.5.3 Australia 
Australia liberalized its telecommunications industry in 1997. At the time, only three 
operators were licensed in Australia: Telstra (the incumbent), Optus and Vodafone. 
The two former companies provided both fixed and mobile telephone services, while 
Vodafone participated in the mobile market only. 
The industry is regulated by the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission 
(ACCC), which applies incentive regulation in the form of price-caps (using the RPI-X
methodology) to Telstra only. In establishing an access regime for the industry, the 
government considered that the particular characteristics of telecommunications 
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require a regime that includes additional features to those contained in the National 
Access Regime, described in chapter 3. The access regime applicable to the 
telecommunications industry is contained in the Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 
1974.  According to this legislation, only eligible services previously declared by the 
ACCC are covered by the regime. Eligible services are: i) a telecommunications 
service between two or more points, at least one of which is in Australia, or; ii) a 
service that facilitates supply of such a carriage service. The ACCC can declare eligible 
services in one of two ways: (i) in accordance with a recommendation of the industry 
self-regulatory body, or; (ii) after holding a public inquiry, which can be requested by 
an access seeker or anyone providing supporting information (Productivity 
Commission, 1997). 
A service can be effectively declared to be subject to access regulation if such an 
arrangement is found to be in the long-term interest of the users. The ACCC is required 
to assess this issue using the following criteria: 
a. The objective of promoting competition in the final market. 
b. The objective of achieving universal connectivity in relation to services that 
involve telecommunications between final users. 
c. The objective of encouraging the efficient use and the efficient investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
The ACCC may grant certain exemptions, but it can only revoke a declaration after a 
public inquiry has been held. Once a service has been declared, “standard access 
obligations” apply to those parties supplying the service, including the incumbent and 
non-dominant firms. These obligations address issues such as technical and 
operational standards, fault detection and rectification, accounts and access to services 
provided by specific customer equipment, such as set-top boxes for cable TV.   
The standard access obligations do not specify neither the price nor many other terms 
and conditions for the supply of a declared service. These may be determined by three 
means: 
a. Commercial negotiation. 
b. An undertaking provided by the incumbent to the ACCC specifying the terms 
and conditions upon which it would provide access to a declared service.  
c. Arbitration. When negotiations fail either party can request the ACCC
arbitration of their dispute. 
The ACCC may only accept undertakings if their terms promote the long-term interests 
of end users. If accepted, access undertakings are enforceable in the courts and serve 
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as the base for any subsequent arbitration of access disputes.  In those cases where the 
ACCC is required to estimate access charges, the methodology used is LRIC.   
The ACCC ordered the implementation of LLU in 1999. In 2002, it took a further step 
by mandating the incumbent to share its lines with competitors. This sharing allows 
specialized broadband operators to supply data services without providing voice 
services. The implementation of LLU in Australia was reached in a relatively short 
time and with little controversy, for which coordination between the ACCC and the 
industry proved to be useful.  Almost all issues concerning the provision of technical 
resources and equipment interconnection were solved through bilateral negotiation 
between the incumbent and new entrants (Umino, 2003). 
Universal services obligations in Australia are aimed at assuring that 
telecommunications services are reasonably accessible to all people, regardless of 
their location. These include standard telephone services, special services for the 
disabled and public telephony, among others. The policy is implemented and 
regulated at state level. The costs of providing these services are calculated annually, 
and all carriers are required to contribute in proportion to their revenues. In most 
states, telephone companies tender to provide these services (OECD, 2002a). 
7. 6 Lessons for a port access regime 
It has been shown that ports and telecommunication networks share several economic 
characteristics, such as the presence of economies of scale, scope and density that 
create monopolies that need to be regulated. Public goods are also produced within 
these industries, and in both their supply can be limited to those that pay for them. A 
further similarity is that advantages inherited from the time when port and telephone 
services were provided solely by public operators limit the contestability of several 
markets of both industries.  
A more important similarity is that services produced in both industries require 
complimentary inputs that may be produced by just one firm (the incumbent) or by 
several competing operators. Indeed, as explained in chapter 6, the completion of the 
port logistics chain requires, at least, the provision of several services feasible of 
being produced by only one firm or business group supplying integrated services (as it 
occurs in Matarani, Barranquilla or Cartagena) or by several competing companies. In 
telecommunications, long-distance, mobile, internet and data services can be 
produced by just one firm (the incumbent) or several competing operators. In both 
industries, the firm controlling a “key” facility (a monopolistic terminal or the local 
loop) will have the ability to exclude competitors and monopolize related markets 
unless access rules are applied. 
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Although reform in both industries involved privatization, it is still common to find 
public port authorities managing public-user ports. In telecommunications, however, 
privatization practically excluded the public sector from the provision of services. 
An important lesson for port regulators is the verification that access regulation 
cannot rely on general antitrust law. As shown by the New Zealand experience, courts 
are unable to set access charges terms, which allows incumbents to delay entry by 
engaging in lengthy procedures. Moreover, many regulators in this industry have 
adopted policies to ensure that the incumbent does not delay negotiations, such as 
establishing deadlines for various stages of the process, reducing the number of topics 
subject to negotiation, or setting default interconnection agreements. 
Table 7.4 presents the characteristics of the access regimes implemented in the UK, US
and Australian telecommunications industries.  
Table 7.4: Main characteristics of telecommunications access regimes  
UK US Australia 
Vertical 
structure 
Integration allowed for 
long-distance; legal 
separation required for 
mobile; LLU for internet 
services 
Integration allowed for 
long-distance to 
incumbents opening their 
networks; legal separation 
required for mobile; LLU
for internet services 
Integration allowed for 
long-distance and mobile; 
LLU for internet services; 
sharing for data services 
Access pricing 
Set jointly by the regulator 
and the incumbent in 
consultation with other 
operators  
Set at state level, although 
parties are free to 
negotiate other rates 
Negotiated 
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Regulated via “standard 
interconnect agreement” 
Set at state level, but 
parties are free to re-
negotiate them.  
Main ones regulated via 
“standard access 
obligations”. Others are 
negotiated. 
Mechanism to 
expand the 
infrastructure 
Universal service 
obligations 
Universal service 
obligations 
Universal service 
obligations 
The first lesson for port regulators is that integration with open access constitutes a 
workable option to organize an industry. This is not a trivial result, considering the 
substantial market power that private incumbents enjoy, large enough to prompt 
regulators to intervene even in competitive markets (European Parliament, 2007); the 
discussed “consumer lock-in problem” (Lapuerta, Benavides and Jorge, 2003), and 
the slow penetration of competitors even after LLU policies have been implemented 
(Umino, 2003). 
As for access pricing, negotiation seems to play an important role in this industry. In 
the UK, charges were developed through negotiation between the incumbent and the 
regulator, in consultation with operators and consumers. In the US, access prices are 
set at state level by the PUCs, although parties are free to negotiate other rates. In 
Australia, the determination of access prices is subject to a negotiation-arbitration 
framework consistent with the National Access Regime. The main lesson for port 
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regulators is that negotiation constitutes an efficient mechanism to set access charges, 
for which they should only intervene when negotiations are lengthy or parties are 
unlikely to reach an agreement. Regarding pricing methodologies, it has been seen 
that telecommunication regulators favor the use of incentive regulation through price-
caps for retail prices (rates to be paid by final users) and cost-based methodologies 
(ECPR, FDC or LRIC) for setting access prices (rates to be paid by operators that need to 
use the infrastructure controlled by the monopolist). In ports, this would be similar to 
use price caps to set wharfage or berthage, but a cost-based methodology to set the 
rates to be charged to providers of nautical or ancillary services for the use of a 
monopolistic terminal’s infrastructure. 
Port regulators should take note that it seems to be less room for negotiation in setting 
non-price access terms. Indeed, in the US basic non-price conditions are set by state 
regulators or by the Telecommunications Act, which requires access to be provided in 
at least four pre-determined points). Parties are free to negotiate only complementary 
terms. The case is similar in Australia, where some conditions are already set via 
“standard access obligations”. Others can be set by negotiation, arbitration or a pre-
approved access undertaking. In the UK, non-price access conditions have been 
established in a “Standard Interconnect Agreement”, discussed by the incumbent and 
other operators and approved by the regulator. Further negotiation of these terms is 
discouraged. It is also important to highlight that in all countries analyzed, the assets 
that are considered essential facilities have been specifically described in the 
legislation establishing the country’s access regime. This facilitates negotiations and 
reduces regulatory risks.  The lesson port regulators can draw is that even though the 
regulation asymmetry between them and regulated firms can be large, there are some 
access terms that can be set outright. The dilemma in this case does not seem to be 
between setting terms trough an administrative decision or by allowing parties to 
negotiate, but to determine which mechanism is better suited to determine a particular 
access term. 
As for the set of incentives used to expand the infrastructure, it is customary in the 
industry to impose universal service obligations upon their incumbents to assure that 
services are provided to all users, including population segments with special needs 
and those located in high cost areas. In the port sector, this policy would be equivalent 
to the regulator mandating the terminal operator to expand the infrastructure when it 
reaches certain congestion levels.  
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8. Access regulation in the electricity 
supply industry 
The electricity supply industry (ESI) is the second main network industry having 
experienced substantial restructuring since the early 1980s. Chile was the first country 
to introduce competition in electricity markets, and since then, many other countries 
have introduced market-oriented reforms in their respective industries (OECD/IEA, 
2001). 
The following sections describe the main characteristics of the ESI and how the access 
problem has been approached in different countries.  The specific cases of UK, US and 
Australia are also analyzed. 
8.1 Economic characteristics of the electricity supply 
industry 
An electric system is made of interconnected generating plants, high-voltage 
transmission systems and low-voltage distribution networks that supply power to an 
entire area (see figure 8.1). The activities of an electric system are coordinated by an 
operator that can be independent or perform also other activities. 
FThe next section will exp
and integrated company t
characteristics of electricit
difficult to coordinate (
electricity is that it canno
balanced all the time; i.e
demand for electricity is 
features, and the fact that
considered reliable, imply
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industry have in common
electricity and port service
In the ESI, the continuous 
plants delivering a base lo
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customer to be compensated with a reduction of demand from other, thus reducing the 
need for reserve capacity and diminishing operational costs. The presence of 
externalities also reinforces the natural monopoly characteristics of the ESI. Electricity 
does not flow along a defined path, but will divide and flow over all possible paths in 
quantities that are inversely proportional to the resistance of the path. Therefore, the 
ability of one plant to transmit electricity between two points of the system will 
depend on the activities of the remaining plants transmitting at the same time. 
Moreover, failures in any node or link of the network, such as line congestion or the 
shut down of a generation plant, affect the operation of the whole system. These 
characteristics require a centralized management of the system. Centralized 
coordination between generation and transmission also results in further economies of 
scale, such as the following ones (OECD, 2001): 
a. Relatively small demands can be aggregated to take advantage of economies 
of scale at plant level. 
b. The aggregation of segments with different consumption patterns reduces 
demand variability, thus allowing a more efficient use of installed capacity. 
c. The requirements of capacity to be kept in reserve are lower in an integrated 
system than in the case of several systems operating independently. 
d. Integrated coordination allows the full use of cheaper generation technologies 
before the more expensive ones are deployed. 
8.2 Markets and services 
Electricity supply entails three main activities: generation, transmission and 
distribution. In later years, the activity of retailing has also arisen as a consequence of 
reforms in the ESI. Two of these activities (transmission and distribution), possess 
characteristics of a natural monopoly; while the remaining two (generation and 
retailing) are typically considered competitive. As in ports, all of these markets 
produce inputs that are required to deliver electricity to industries and households; 
i.e., to produce one unit of the industry’s product. Controlling one market would 
allow an integrated company to gain control of the other markets. 
8.2.1 Generation 
Generation involves the transformation of a different form of energy into electricity.  
Electricity can be produced by burning oil, natural gas and coal; or using nuclear 
power, hydro power or wind turbines, among others. Fossil fuels and nuclear power 
produce steam to propel electricity-generation turbines. Falling water and wind do the 
same in the remaining technologies.   
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Each of these technologies has a different cost structure, as shown in table 8.1. 
Nuclear and hydro technologies have large capital costs and low variable ones. 
Indeed, the use of nuclear plants involves long construction times and large 
decommissioning costs, but operational costs are relatively low and constant during 
the economic life of the plant. Hydro power typically requires large investments and 
long construction times, but their variable costs are almost negligible. On the other 
hand, the use of oil and gas involves lower capital costs than nuclear and hydro 
power, but their variable costs are subject to variations in the market price of these 
fuels, which can be substantial. The use of coal is also facing rising environmental 
opposition, and its use is increasingly restricted.
Table 8.1: Cost structure of main generation technologies 
Technology Capital costs Operational costs 
Hydro power High Low 
Nuclear power High Low 
Wind power Medium Medium 
Oil-fired Low 
Variable (subject to market 
price variability) 
Gas-fired Low 
Variable (subject to market 
prices) 
Coal-fired Low 
Low (but increasing 
environmental opposition) 
Source: Steiner (2000) 
The different cost structures of generation technologies allow plants to operate 
according to a least-cost merit order. As explained before, physical balance of an 
electric system is achieved by having few generating plants delivering a base load and 
leaving the remaining ones in stand-by until they are needed. As demand increases, 
most electricity networks use nuclear and hydro power as base load, dispatching 
further generators in a merit order based on their variable cost. 
It is important to mention that generation plants sell both capacity and energy. 
Capacity is the guarantee that a client can demand electricity up to certain level and is 
measured in watts (W). Energy is the electricity flow and is measured in watts per 
hour (Wh). 
8.2.2 Transmission 
Transmission refers to the transport of electricity from the point where generators 
deliver it to the network, to the point (called “node”) where distributors withdraw it.  
A transmission network can be constituted by several interconnected lines or sub-
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networks, owned by one or several companies. Since electricity losses increase with 
the distance and decrease with the voltage at which it is transmitted, electricity is 
transported at high-voltages.  
Traditionally, the operation of the system has been considered a transmission activity. 
System operation involves the management of the system to coordinate activities 
between generation, transmission and distribution companies; maintain the voltage 
and prevent breakdowns. As it will be seen later, some reform options imply the 
unbundling of system operation from transmission activities. 
Transmission presents sizeable economies of scale. According to OECD (2001), the 
cost per MW per mile of a 765kV transmission line is at least 30% less than a 500kV
line, and 85% less that a 138kV line. Other studies suggest that transmission capacity 
increases 1.6 times the cost of transmitting one extra MW (Hjalmarsson, 1996). 
Furthermore, since electricity losses decrease with the voltage at which it is 
transported, higher-capacity transmission lines suffer less losses than lower-capacity 
ones, thus strengthening the activity’s economies of scale.  
Transmission charges are typically structured as two-part tariffs, with a fixed 
component for capacity (kW per period of time) and a variable one (Wh) for energy.  
Since the initial investments constitute the larger part of the total costs, the fixed one 
is usually the largest component of the tariff (Rothwell and Gomez, 2003). 
Two are the main methodologies used to estimate the fixed component of 
transmission charges: “postage stamp” and network use. Under postage stamp, all 
fixed costs are allocated among the users using a simple parameter, such as the 
installed capacity of a generator or the contracted capacity of a distributor; 
independently of their actual use of the network. Under the second methodology, 
costs are apportioned to the users proportionally to their physical use if the system, 
which can be, in turn, estimated using several alternative methods (De La Cruz and 
García, 2003).   
There are several approaches to deal with network congestion. The first is called 
“zonal pricing” and divides the network into several separate zones. Each zone 
represents a different market and transmission prices are set to reflect the price-
difference between zones. “Nodal pricing” is a variant of this approach in which 
prices are calculated for each point of connection. Alternatively, system operators 
may auction available capacity, granting tradable capacity rights. This is the option 
used in Norway and in several US regional markets. Another approach is “counter 
trading”. In a counter-trade system there is only one market. If market participants 
require more transmission capacity than what is available, the system operator has to 
pay operators to free capacity. The financial loss that this transaction implies is meant 
to encourage the transmission owner to enlarge the capacity of the network. This is 
the system used in the UK (OECD, 2003). 
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Many countries (several Latin American among them) do not require their owners to 
expand the transmission network. It is usually proposed and financed by users with 
the approval of the regulator, the system operator or both (Fischer and Serra, 2000). In 
countries where the system is still operated by an integrated monopoly, such as 
Mexico or France, central planning is still used to determine network expansion. 
8.2.3 Distribution 
Distribution refers to the transport of electricity, from the node where it is withdrawn 
from the transmission system, to the place where is finally consumed.  This activity is 
performed over high-voltage, medium voltage and low voltage systems. 
Distribution is also considered a natural monopoly, due to the presence of 
considerable economies of scale and density, as well as of sunk costs. One of the 
sources of economies of scale are the costs of obtaining rights-of-way, which 
represent a large part of the initial investments and are insensitive to the amount of 
energy distributed by the network. A right-of-way, in this context, is a strip of land 
that a distribution company uses to build an electricity line. It usually allows 
companies to clear the land from trees, buildings and other structures that could 
interfere with the operation of the network (Rothwell and Gomez, 2003).   
In the presence of idle capacity, both transmission and distribution present economies 
of density, since it is more efficient to transmit using existing lines or to connect a 
new user to the existing wire system, than building new grids.  Idle capacity is likely 
to arise in these activities because of indivisibilities in the scale of the plant and due to 
the use of standardized voltages.  Furthermore, both activities present large sunk costs 
due to the low residual value of many of their investments, such as civil works, wires 
and towers, for example.  
8.2.4 Retailing 
Retailing is the purchase of electricity from generators and re-sale to final users. It 
involves metering, marketing and billing. Before reform, this activity was not 
performed separately from distribution. When retailing is allowed, retailers buy 
electricity at the exchange (at wholesale prices) and sell it (at retail prices) to final 
customers. Competition among retailers keeps prices close to costs (Hunt, 2002). 
Retailing can be, however, subject to regulation when customers under certain 
consumption threshold are not allowed to choose their supplier, as in Belgium or 
Ireland. In these cases, users buy electricity at regulated prices set by the regulator. 
Even though vertical separation of retailing from distribution is usually enforced, in 
some countries, as the UK, for example; generators are allowed to perform retailing. 
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8.3 Reform and regulation in the electricity supply 
industry 
Electricity is used as input for the production of most goods and services, and its 
importance for the working of an economy is evident. However, due to the 
characteristics of electricity discussed in the previous section, its production requires 
constant coordination and monitoring to ensure the reliability of the system.  In almost 
every country, this coordination is achieved by delegating the exclusive supply of 
electricity to integrated monopolies.   
The argument for an integrated monopoly was strengthened by the large economies of 
scale and density present in the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity. Under this system, a single electricity company owned and operated all 
generation and transmission assets, also acting as system operator. With the notable 
exceptions of the US, Japan, Germany and Spain, all of these companies were publicly 
owned. Distribution networks could also be owned by this company or others, usually 
municipally-owned. Since competition was absent, prices under this organizational 
arrangement were set through centrally-planned processes. 
During the early 1980s, this traditional structure began to change. According to 
Kessides (2004), the main forces behind the reform of the ESI differed between 
developed and developing countries. In developed countries, the oil crises of the 
1970s induce them to try reducing their dependence on oil for electricity generation, 
which led to invest in alternative and expensive-to-build options such as nuclear 
power and large coal-fired generation plants. However, budget pressures and attempts 
by governments to contain inflation reduced electricity revenues, delayed necessary 
investments and undermined the public’s confidence in state-owned integrated 
utilities. Moreover, the increasing availability of cheap gas in Western Europe and the 
US and the development of combined-cycle gas turbines further reduced the minimal 
scale of generation plants, weakening the natural-monopoly argument. In this context, 
well-integrated electricity networks, an array of power plants and excess capacity 
made competition in generation feasible and attractive. In developing countries, the 
main driver for reform has been the poor performance of public-run electricity 
companies, in a context of increasing demand. Political considerations tended to push 
prices down, impeding the adequate maintenance and expansion of the network. 
Inadequate coverage and unreliable supply were considered one on the main 
hindrances for industrial development. 
The reforms implemented in the industry aimed at creating a market for electricity.  
This is achieved by fostering competition among generation companies and allowing 
electricity prices to be set by supply and demand interaction. The final price for 
electricity would then be the exchange (market) price plus the cost of using 
(regulated) transmission and distribution networks. However, since both networks are 
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needed to deliver electricity to final users and they are almost universally naturally 
monopolistic, regulation of these activities is required (Chao and Wilson, 1999).  
It is important to note that open access is essential for this model to work (Newbery, 
2001a). Indeed, if network owners are integrated and have the ability to discriminate 
again competitors in the generation market, they might try to do so by establishing 
expensive access terms or by denying access to new generation plants. As explained 
before, an open access regime limits integrated network owners to recoup profits 
foregone by regulation. 
Although specific measures differ from country to country, the typical electric system 
arising after reform has the following characteristics (Guasch and Spiller, 1999; 
Steiner, 2000; OECD/IEA, 2001): 
a. The industry has been vertically separated 46 into generation, transmission, and 
distribution activities. Some countries allow retailing as a separate activity. 
Vertical and horizontal integration is limited. 
b. Electricity is generated by competing companies. Each company can own one 
or several generation plants. 
c. The transmission network remains centrally operated, even though different 
companies may own parts of it. An open-access regime is implemented to 
allow new generation capacity to connect to the network and to promote its 
expansion. 
d. Distribution networks have been allocated to franchised companies47, each 
covering a determined area. Since these networks do not overlap, no 
competition occurs at this level. 
e. A system operator has been appointed to coordinate the activities of the 
electric system. Depending on the reform model, the appointed system 
operator can be transmission owner or an entirely independent body. 
f. Prices are set in an electricity exchange, created to allow interaction between 
supply (generators) and demand (distribution or retailing companies). The 
rules of how these exchanges work vary from country to country. Section 8.4 
shows how they work in UK, US and Australia. 
g. A regulatory authority has been created to oversee the electricity exchange, 
regulate prices for transmission and distribution and supervise the functioning 
of access regimes. 
                                                
46 Either operationally or legally separated (see section 3.1) 
47 Through privatization or not 
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h. Large users are allowed to buy electricity directly from the generators at 
market rates. Electricity prices for small users are typically regulated. 
i. Some countries have further separated the functions of distribution network 
owner and electricity retailer.  
It is worth noting that even though reform has implied some form of privatization, it 
has not been necessarily the case. In the US, for example, private utilities were 
allowed before reform and some companies remain municipal or state-owned 
afterwards. 
8.4 Access arrangements in the electricity supply 
industry 
Three have been the basic models under which the ESI have been restructured: single 
buyer, wholesale and retail competition. They imply different access arrangements. 
Under the single-buyer model, a single agency buys electricity from competing 
generators and sells it to distribution companies and large users. In this model, the 
price at which the single buyer sells electricity is the price of purchase plus 
transmission costs, which are regulated. The single buyer can be an integrated 
company, a transmission company acting as system operator, or an independent 
system operator. In its extreme form, the single buyer buys all energy in the market 
and has the monopoly to sell it, deciding how much and from whom to buy. Another 
option is the single buyer acting only as the aggregator of demands from final users, 
not deciding how much of from whom to buy. This is the model adopted by countries 
such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and Hungary. Under this system, access price 
and non-price terms are regulated (Lovei, 2000). 
Under wholesale competition, distribution companies buy electricity from competing 
generators, use the transmission network (paying the regulated price) and deliver it to 
their franchised areas. Transmission networks operate under open access 
arrangements and only final users consuming over certain threshold are able to 
contract directly with generators (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2002).  
Under retail competition, independent companies are allowed to buy electricity from 
competing generators and deliver it directly to final users, using both transmission and 
distribution networks owned by other companies. Unlike the previous case, 
distribution companies only maintain the network, since users are retailer’s clients. In 
this model, both transmission and distribution networks operate under open access 
arrangements (OECD/IEA, 2001).  
Although there have been a debate on the costs and benefits of introducing retail 
competition (Newbery, 2001a), countries such as the UK and Australia have already 
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implemented it. In the US, where distribution regulation lies within state regulators, 
the degree of retail competition varies from state to state. In the EU, Directive 
2003/54/EC establishes retail competition for all consumers not later than July 2007. 
Some countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Australia and some states in the US, 
have further unbundled their ESIs separating the function of system operator from 
transmission ownership. The aim of this policy is to avoid transmission operators 
managing the system in a way that favor their own commercial interests. For example, 
they might try to avoid future congestion by pursuing transmission-based solutions 
(such as building new transmission lines) even if less costly alternatives exist, such as 
building generation in another location. Critics of this arrangement, however, claim 
that it is inherently inefficient, since independent system operators are non-profit 
organizations with complex governance structures which do not bear the costs of their 
decisions (Arizu, Dunn and Tenenbaum, 2001). 
It can be seen that all three restructuring models require open access to transmission
or distribution grids. Under the single-buyer model, both price and non-price terms for 
access are explicitly regulated. Under the two latter models, wholesale and retail 
competition, some or all of the terms, as well as the access charges might be subject to 
negotiation. 
8.5 Reform, regulation and access regimes in selected 
countries 
8.5.1 United Kingdom 
The reform of the UK’s electricity system followed different paths in each of its 
constituent countries: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, the 
electricity system was privatized as integrated regulated utilities in 1991 (with the 
exception of two nuclear plants privatized in 1996). Nowadays, there are two 
vertically integrated companies that compete for customers. Their activities are 
regulated. In Northern Ireland, generation plants were vertically separated from 
transmission, distribution and retailing, which remain as a regulated monopoly. All of 
these companies were privatized by 1993. In England and Wales, the restructuring of 
the ESI involved the vertical separation and privatization of the state-owned 
generation, transmission and distribution assets and the creation of a power exchange, 
the Electricity Pool.  
The Electricity Act of 1989 divided the generation plants of the state-owned Central 
Electricity Generating Board of England and Wales, into three companies: National 
Power, with 40 generation plants; PowerGen, with 23 generation plants; and, Nuclear 
Electric, with 12 nuclear plants. All companies but Nuclear Electric were privatized 
by 1991. The most modern nuclear facilities were privatized in 1996 and the 
remaining ones still remain state-owned to date.  
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estimates. The pool determined which generation plants were to be used to meet 
expected demand. The price was determined by the most expensive generator used 
during each half-hour slot and applied to all dispatched generators. Generators in 
stand-by received a capacity payment according to the degree to which capacity was 
needed (Littlechild, 2000). 
This system design had the main flaw of facilitating collusion. Indeed, even though 
there were more than 40 generation companies, two of them (PowerGen and National 
Power) set the price most of the time. The problem subsided despite the regulator 
asked both companies to divest some generation capacity in 1993. As a consequence, 
Offer regulator was forced to set a price cap between 1994 and 1996. Another 
important problem was the governance structure of the pool. Voting rights were 
distributed among generators and retailers according to their market shares and 
changes had to be approved by 65% of the voting rights. This structure limited the 
regulator’s powers and thus reinforced the status quo (Newbery, 1999).   
In 2000, through the Utilities Act, the government changed radically the exchange 
rules by introducing NETA (New Electricity Trading Arrangements), which replaced 
the pool in March 2001. The Act also merged the regulators of electricity and gas into 
Ofgem, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. The main feature of NETA is that 
electricity trading is no longer done through a centralized market. Electricity prices 
are negotiated directly between buyer and seller, for which there is no single price. In 
2005, the government extended these arrangements to include generation plants 
located in Scotland; creating an integrated market in the whole Great Britain. This 
measure, however, also increased demand for new transmission infrastructure (Parker, 
2000). 
Transmission is operated under an open access regime, for which any new generation 
plant can connect to the system subject to capacity availability. The main non-price 
terms of access are also regulated and set in the “Connection and Use of System 
Code”. These are supplemented by bilateral agreements which establish the works 
required for the connection to be possible. New users are obliged to pay a 
transmission connection charge, bearing the direct costs of connecting to the 
transmission network. This charge is negotiated between the parties. 
The method used to set access prices and non-price terms has changed through the 
years. Nowadays, the revenues of both transmission and distribution network 
companies are set by the regulator using the RPI-X methodology for a five-year period. 
These controls restrict the amount of money companies can earn from their regulated 
businesses. Transmission charges are set annually by the regulator using the LRMC
methodology and paid by both generation and distribution companies (Ofgem, 2007).  
The Utility Act of 2000 separated completely the functions of retailer and distribution 
network owner. Nevertheless, no vertical separation is enforced between retailing and 
generation, and in fact several generators have entered the retailing market. Retailers 
are allowed to operate nationwide, paying distributors for the use of their networks. 
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To manage short-term congestion, NGET operates a balancing mechanism based on the 
difference between contractual positions and NGET’s own demand forecasts. It 
provides financial incentives to all market participants to avoid congestion. Incentive 
schemes are given each year to NGET to perform its role as system operator in an 
efficient and economic manner. If actual costs are below the target NGET is expected 
to achieve, the company receives a payment. Otherwise, it receives a penalty. This 
incentive scheme is designed by the regulator in consultation with other industry 
parties. 
Network expansion plans of transmission and distribution companies are scrutinized 
by the regulator at the beginning of each price review. The price caps for the 
following periods take into account the projected investments and the regulator 
remunerates only those that are considered prudent, at the estimated cost of capital. 
According to Parker (2002), this methodology is nonetheless prone to regulatory 
failures given the information asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated 
firm. 
8.5.2 United States 
The electric industry in the US is vast, diverse and geographically segmented.  
According to the International Energy Agency, it accounts for about 10% of the 
physical capital investment of the country, and has annual sales exceeding US$200 
billion (IEA, 2002b).  
There are three main interconnected electricity systems in the US, comprising both 
transmission networks and pools of generation plants: the Eastern Interconnected 
System, comprising two-thirds of the states; the Western Interconnected System, 
comprising the states west of the Rocky Mountains; and the Texas Interconnected 
System, comprising mostly the state of Texas. 
Regulatory powers in this industry are shared among federal, state, and some 
municipal regulators. The regulator at national level is the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (Ferc). The Ferc has authority over all privately-owned lines involved in 
interstate transmission. Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), at state level, have 
jurisdiction over local generation transmission and distribution assets, but usually not 
over municipal companies. 
Participants in the US electricity industry can be grouped into five broad categories: 
a. Vertically integrated, privately-owned utilities;  
b. State and municipal utilities and authorities. Due to their public-owned status, 
they are not regulated; 
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c. Federally-owned utilities that generate and transmit electricity; 
d. Privately-owned generators not affiliated to an integrated utility; and,  
e. Retailers, called “brokers” or “marketers” in the US.  
Since the early 1990s, the US government has been implementing reforms aimed to 
increase competition in the ESI.  In 1992, the Congress passed the “Federal Power and 
Energy Policy Act”, which promoted open and non-discriminatory access to the 
transmission network. Further steps toward the adoption of and open-access regime 
were taken by the Ferc in 1996, with the issue of orders 888 and 889 (IEA, 2002b).  
Order 888 required all companies owning transmission assets to publish open-access 
tariffs separately from others. Transmission tariffs would be set by the transmission 
owner, but according to cost-based methodologies and taking into account a set of 
minimum terms and conditions indicated by the Order. Since the Ferc does not have 
legal powers to order divestiture of privately-owned companies, Order 888 could only 
mandate operational separation. Nevertheless, it encouraged the formation of 
“independent system operators” (ISOs). ISOs are formed by companies in a particular 
region which transfer control (but not ownership) of their transmission assets to an ISO
responsible for managing the electricity exchange and the transmission network. It is 
important to mention that even though the formation of ISOs was encouraged, its 
adoption was not mandatory. To be authorized, ISOs must satisfy a series of 
requirements to assure their autonomy, such as fair and non-discriminatory 
governance, independence from financial interests of participants, open-access under 
one tariff, among others. ISOs do not necessarily have responsibility for the expansion 
of the transmission system (Brown and Sedano, 2003). 
Order 889 aimed to standardize how operationally-separated utilities should carry on 
transmission and other activities. It established the “Open-Access Same-Time 
Information System” that regulate the disclosure of information that transmission 
companies must provide to market participants.  Operational unbundling, nonetheless, 
seemed not to be working. Complaints of discriminatory behavior among integrated 
utilities persisted. Furthermore, according to Arizu, Dunn and Tenenbaum (2001), the 
Ferc concluded in 1999 that operational unbundling was “inefficient, unfair, and 
difficult to enforce”. Moreover, some state PUCs, such as California’s and Arizona’s, 
opted for providing financial incentives to integrated utilities to divest their generation 
assets.  
In 2000 the commission issued Order 2000, encouraging the formation of “regional 
transmission organizations” (RTOs), electricity systems covering a wide area with a 
governance structure similar to that of the ISOs. Both ISOs and RTOs are called 
“organized markets”. They operate day-ahead and real-time electricity exchanges. Up 
to date, there are five organized markets: ISO-NE (New England region), NYISO (New 
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York State), PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland) ERCOT (most of Texas) 
and CAISO (most of California). Their location can be seen in figure 8.3. 
Figure 8.3: Organized Markets in the United States49
Order 888 and 889 were modified by Order 890, which modified the minimum access 
terms and conditions indicated in Order 888 and required more information to be 
disclosed under the system devised in Order 889. This reform was necessary because 
opportunities for discrimination continued to exist even though operational separation 
was imposed. For this reason, the Ferc issued in 2007 a new order establishing 
financial incentives to encourage investment in and expansion of transmission 
networks. This order gives incentive rates of return on equity for new investment, 
higher rates of return for companies that are members of ISOs or RTOs, accelerated 
depreciation, and deferred income taxes, among others.  
Since regulation of distribution and supply lies within the jurisdiction of state 
regulators, the introduction of retail competition in the US has not been uniform.  
States accounting for approximately half of the population have implemented some 
degree of retail competition, but the process is underway at both federal and state 
levels.  Some states have decided not to implement retail competition based on studies 
that show that marker power might arise due to high-concentration levels in 
transmission (OECD, 2003). 
8.5.3 Australia 
Although Australia began restructuring its ESI in the early 1990s, an interstate market 
for electricity was not established until 1998. As in the previously analyzed countries, 
the reform also involved the vertical separation of integrated companies, the 
                                                
49 Source: Ferc (2004) 
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implementation of open-access transmission, and the gradual introduction of retail 
competition. 
The Australian electricity system is not integrated country-wide due to its physical 
and demographical characteristics: long distances, scarce population concentrated in 
the east and southwest of the country, few large cities, etc. (see in figure 8.4.).   
Figure 8.4: Transmission networks in Australia50
Before 1990, each Australian state owned its own electric system, either through an 
integrated utility or a combination of several agencies. Decisions about price and 
network expansions were made by governments through these utilities. Interstate 
trade was limited and regulatory powers lay within state regulators. Reform started in 
1990-91, when the executive branches of the commonwealth and state governments 
approved plans to develop a single wholesale electricity market in eastern and 
southern Australia. These plans involved the restructuring of the ESI and the 
development of a new regulatory framework over a period of eight years. 
In 1993-94, a council created to devise the development of an interstate electricity 
market proposed the National Electricity Code (the Code), consistent with the 
National Access Regime described in chapter 3. The Code, enforced by an ad-hoc
administrator51, was adopted by the states participating in the NEM in 1996. The Code 
contains three separate but related elements: 
                                                
50 Source: IEA (2001) 
51 The National Electricity Code Administrator 
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a. Established market rules governing how electricity buyers and sellers trade 
and how the system is operated. 
b. An access code that establishes non-price access terms and delineates 
principles for setting access prices. 
c. Administrative arrangements that state how disputes are settled and how the 
Code is changed, among others.  
The Code also established that the National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO) will be the system operator. 
Simultaneously, the Australian ESI was vertically separated in all jurisdictions 
participating in the NEM. Generation assets were further divided into competing 
business and “ring-fencing” arrangements were implemented to prevent information 
flows and discriminatory behavior. The industry was completely privatized in 
Victoria in 1994, but remains publicly owned in Tasmania, Queensland and New 
South Wales. The South Australian ESI was concessioned to the private sector in 
2000. States also handed over some of their regulatory roles to independent 
regulators. The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) is the national agency regulating 
transmission and wholesale markets52, while state agencies regulate distribution and 
supply.   
In 1998, an electricity exchange was created called the National Electricity Market 
(NEM), operated by NEMMCO. Although it is called “national”, it only comprises 
eastern and southern Australia: Queensland, South Australia, New South Wales, 
Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. There are additional regional 
systems in the remaining states. The NEM accounted for 93% of total Australian 
generation in 2002 (ACCC, 2004). 
The NEM is a mandatory auction market in which generators of more than 30 MW and 
customers trade electricity. Generators submit bids specifying the amounts they are 
willing to supply at certain prices. These bids are used by NEMMCO to build a dispatch 
schedule, although scheduling can be constrained by congestion in the interconnectors 
linking two regions, thus prompting inter-regional price differences. Prices for each 
region are calculated ex post. There is a cap on spot prices.  
Prices of transmission and distribution activities are set by the regulator through price-
caps estimated using the RPI-X methodology. Charges are paid entirely by final users. 
The allocation of these charges among consumer groups varies among states. In South 
Australia, for example, transmission charges are averaged among all users, while in 
Victoria it depends on the location of buyers and sellers. 
                                                
52 This function was performed by the ACCC until July 2005, when the AER was created to regulate both 
electricity and energy markets.  The AER is a constituent part of the ACCC, but a separate legal entity.  
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Transmission companies also receive revenues from congestion, although in an 
indirect way. When congestion occurs, the price in the importing region is higher than 
in the exporting region and part of the surplus revenues generated by these differences 
are used to reduce the transmission costs paid by final users (Gans and King, 2000). 
In Australia, the owners of the transmission assets in each region of the NEM are also 
the network planners, with the exception of Victoria. In this state, a separate body 
devises the plans for network expansion that the owners of transmission assets will 
have to undertake.  
In order to ensure that transmission or distribution network expansions are effectively 
needed, the investments will only be remunerated through regulated tariffs if they 
pass a “regulatory test”, consisting of the following: 
a. If the new investment minimizes the net present value of the cost of meeting 
the service standards set out in the Code; or, 
b. If the net present value of the profit generated by the expansion is the highest 
among a number of alternative projects, timings and market development 
scenarios. 
Alternatively, investors can undertake unregulated investments in transmission assets 
(IEA, 2001). Unregulated investments are made at the investor’s risk and there are no 
restrictions in network expansions within a region.   
Retail competition has been progressively introduced the states that conform the NEM
since 1994. Although the pace and thresholds were different among states, all end-
users are able to choose their electricity retailer since January 2003 (ACCC, 2004).   
8.6 Lessons for a port access regime 
It can be seen that several features of the ESI, such as the need to maintain the system 
balanced continually, make the organization structure of this industry unique. 
Electricity networks share with ports the characteristics of economies of scale, 
presenting externalities and producing public goods. These characteristics, among 
others, were used as arguments for allowing only integrated utilities to supply 
electricity. 
Another characteristic of the ESI shared with ports is that the delivery of electricity to 
final users requires inputs produced in several markets. Moreover, some of these 
markets (transmission and distribution) are monopolistic and the remaining ones 
(generation and retailing) competitive. If left unregulated, monopolists (the owners of 
the transmission or distribution grids) will seek to obtain rents by restricting access to 
their networks (thus restricting supply) or by integrating up- or downstream and then 
discriminating against non-related companies. In the maritime industry, as explained 
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in Chapter 5, the completion of the logistics chain also requires activities that are 
produced sequentially and in several markets. A port terminal operator that holds an 
unregulated monopoly would obtain economic rents by restricting access; or, if it is an 
integrated monopolist, by granting access only to related companies. 
The are also similarities in the reform path followed in the ESI and in the port industry. 
Indeed, reform did not exclude totally the public sector from the provision of services. 
In the US, for example, while transmission assets are mostly privately-owned, 
generation, and distribution present a mix of private and public ownership at federal, 
state and municipal levels. The ESI also remains state-owned in several Australian 
states. As explained in section 5.1.2, port services are provided under several 
organizational models. According to the classification made by Baird (1999), only 
one out of four organizational models totally excludes the public sector, and most 
ports are organized according to one of the remaining ones. Moreover, in many ports 
of the EU, the public sector continues to provide port services directly (European 
Commission, 2006). 
As explained in chapter 5, port reform was driven by the need to adapt the industry’s 
organization to new economic and technical developments, such as globalization and 
containerization. In the case of the ESI, reform drivers were similar. Technological 
advances, such as the development of combined-cycle turbines, and market 
developments, such as the availability of cheap gas; weakened the natural-monopoly 
argument and made competition possible, at least in generation. 
Table 8.2 shows the main characteristics of access regimes in the ESIs of UK, US and 
Australia.  
Table 8.2: Main characteristics of ESI access regimes 
UK US Australia 
Vertical 
structure 
Legal separation between 
transmission, distribution 
and other activities. 
Integration allowed for 
generation and retailing. 
Operational separation; 
incentives given for 
divestiture and the 
formation of ISOs and 
RTOs. 
Separation. Integration 
subsists among some 
public-owned companies. 
Access pricing 
Transmission charges set 
annually using LRMC. 
Total revenues set using 
RPI-X. Connection charges 
are negotiated.
Set by transmission 
owners according to 
guidelines set by the Ferc. 
Regulated using price-
caps (RPI-X methodology) 
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Main terms are regulated 
by a Code. Others are 
negotiated. 
For integrated utilities, 
regulated minimum terms. 
In organized markets, set 
by the system operator. 
Regulated by the National 
Electricity Code. 
Mechanism to 
expand the 
infrastructure 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered necessary are 
remunerated 
In organized markets, the 
system operator decides 
when expansions are 
needed. Integrated 
operators face market 
incentives.  
Regulated. The regulator 
will only remunerate 
investments passing the 
"Regulatory Test". 
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One can recall from section 3.1 that deciding over the vertical structure of an industry 
implied a trade-off between allowing some discrimination to occur (by allowing 
integration) and increasing transaction costs (by ordering separation). From the 
structures adopted after reform in the analyzed countries, one can draw the conclusion 
that regulators in the ESI consider that discrimination is very likely to occur, since 
vertical separation seems to be the norm. Indeed, as shown in table 8.2, the UK’s 
transmission owner is not allowed to participate in the remaining activities even 
though integration is allowed between generation and retailing. In the US, integration 
is only allowed because regulators lack of powers to order divestiture; and in 
Australia integration only subsists among public-owned utilities. This trend is 
probably related to the fact that reforms in the ESI were aimed at creating markets for 
electricity that require vertically-separated utilities to operate properly. Indeed, as 
shown by the US experience, any arrangement short of a complete vertical separation 
seems to be ineffective in preventing discrimination from occurring (Arizu, Dunn and 
Tenenbaum, 2001). 
The first lesson for port regulators is that, when deciding over vertical structure of the 
industry, regulators need to compare the expected costs of discrimination with those 
of ordering vertical separation. As the experience in the ESI shows, it might be 
preferable to incur extra transaction costs than allowing discrimination to occur.  
One can also see from table 8.2 that the room for negotiated access prices is small in 
the ESI. Indeed, negotiation is used in a single country (UK), and only to determine 
one-time charges to be paid for connecting to the transmission network.  
As for the methodologies used to price access, lessons for ports are not as clear as in 
the telecommunications industry. As one can recall from the previous chapter, in that 
industry retail prices are estimated using price caps while access prices are set using 
cost-based methodologies. In the ESI, however, methodologies vary according to the 
country. In the UK, transmission charges are calculated using LRMC (a cost-based 
methodology). RPI-X is complementarily used to cap overall revenues for transmission 
and distribution companies. In the US, the methodology ordered by the Ferc is cost-
based, while in Australia the regulator uses price caps.  
Although there is not information regarding the criteria used by lawmakers and 
regulators to decide over using price caps or cost-based methodologies, these 
decisions were probably linked to the incentives given to the regulated companies by 
each pricing methodology. As discussed in chapter 2, the most effective regulation 
schemes are those, such as price caps, that reward regulated firms €1 for each €1 they 
save (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Under this scheme, the regulated firm enjoys the cost 
reductions until the next price review. For this mechanism to work, however, prices 
have to be set for periods long enough to incentive firms to reduce costs. For this 
reason, it does not seem well suited for open access regimes designed to incentive 
potential entrants to negotiate their access terms (like the British one). The lesson for 
ports is that price caps seems to be better suited for setting access prices in regulated 
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regimes, while cost-based methodologies such as FDC or LRIC seem to be better for 
regimes that favor the use of negotiation for pricing access. 
The lesson for ports regarding non-price access conditions is that, unlike 
telecommunications, the mechanisms to determine them are similar to those used to 
determine access pricing. Indeed, the UK uses an intermediate approach: main terms 
are regulated (set in the “Connection and Use of System Code”), but negotiation is 
used for setting complementary conditions. In the US, regulation is used for integrated 
utilities but unbundled ones (“Organized Markets”) can set their own following 
guidelines set by the regulator. In Australia, non-price terms and conditions for access 
are regulated (set in the National Electricity Code). 
As for the mechanism to expand the infrastructure, one can see that the approach in 
the ESI seem to be an intermediate between regulation and market incentives. Indeed, 
in both UK and Australia, even though expansions are proposed by the asset’s owner 
(arguably following market incentives), these need to be approved by the regulator. In 
reformed US utilities (Organized Markets), system operators act as planners, ordering 
expansions when they consider are needed.  
There are two main lessons for port regulators concerning the mechanism to expand 
the infrastructure. The first is that the decision regarding the expansion of the 
infrastructure cannot be left to the monopolist. As discussed in chapter 1, unregulated 
monopolists have incentives to create artificial scarcity by not expanding the 
infrastructure, while regulated ones have incentives to invest excessively (to earn 
returns over capital investments). The second lesson regards the two options 
regulators seem to have to deal with this problem, each with important shortcomings. 
The first is to allow an independent planner to decide over infrastructure expansions, 
as in the US ESI. Arguably, independent system operators have enough information to 
make opportune and demand-adjusted decisions, but, as discussed in section 8.4, they 
may lack of incentives to make the right decisions (they do not bear the cost of their 
mistakes) and tend to have complex governance structures. The second option is to 
allow the asset owner to propose expansions but only approve those that are 
considered necessary, as in UK and Australia. As argued by Parker (2002), this option 
is prone to regulatory failures given the information asymmetries between the 
regulator and the regulated firm. 
Although the need to create a market is unique to this and the natural gas industries, 
important lessons for ports could be drawn from this experience. It could be seen that 
even though the approaches are similar, they vary from country to country. The UK
was the first developed country to restructure its ESI, and as such, was also the first to 
suffer the consequences of a flawed regulatory design. As corroborated later, 
privatization failed to create enough rivalry among generators, and errors in the 
design of the electricity market allowed some of them to obtain economic rents by 
exercising their market power. Moreover, flaws in the design of the market’s 
governance structure further limited the ability of the regulator to introduce the 
necessary changes. In the US, the fact that most integrated utilities were already 
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private and that regulators lack authority to order their divestiture made the reform 
difficult to carry on. As explained, complaints of discriminatory behavior from 
integrated utilities persisted even after the implementation of an open-access regime. 
In this context, the only chance to regulators to introduce adequate levels of 
competition was to encourage the formation of “organized markets” such as ISOs and 
RTOs, even by giving financial incentives.  
Australia, on the other hand, reformed its ESI after the other analyzed countries and 
was able to reap from their experiences. The design of the NEM, for example, is 
similar to that of the England and Wales pool; but measures were taken to avoid 
market power abuse, the feature that forced UK regulators to replace the pool with 
NETA. As in the US, the Australian ESI is regulated at federal and state levels, but since 
states agreed to hand over some of their regulatory powers to independent agencies, 
the resulting regulatory framework is simpler.   
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9. Access regulation in the natural 
gas industry 
The natural gas industry has also been under restructuring since the early 1980s. It 
will be shown, however, that the pace of the reform has been slower than in 
telecommunications or electricity. 
The following sections describe the economic characteristics of the natural gas 
industry and the access arrangements that allow competition to occur in certain 
activities with sub-additive costs.  As in previous chapters, the particular cases of the 
UK, US and Australia are discussed. 
9.1 Economic characteristics of the natural gas 
industry 
Natural gas is an energy source. In most of its applications, it is burned as a fuel to 
produce heat. Households consume it mainly for heating and cooking, while 
industries use it to generate electricity and in a number of industrial processes. In 
some countries, natural gas is also used as car fuel. 
Two physical characteristics of natural gas determine to a large extent the economic 
structure of the industry. First, natural gas is found in geological basins that are 
concentrated in certain parts of the world (North Sea, North America, Russia, North 
Africa, Middle East, etc). This favors disproportionately geographical areas located 
close to them, in a similar way as shippers located close to large ports benefit from 
better connectivity and a broader supply of services. However, unlike ports, basins 
cannot be duplicated, giving their countries (or the companies which exploit these 
areas) an enormous bargaining power over customers in importing countries. Second, 
natural gas needs to be extracted and transported to consumption centers, which are 
usually located far from production basins. As in ports, these activities require large 
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capital investments (much of them sunk) that generate entry barriers and reduce 
competition (Gallick, 1993). 
The chain of activities needed to extract and deliver natural gas is illustrated in figure 
9.1. The product is extracted from underground wells, sometimes as a by-product of 
oil production. Once it is extracted, the gas is transported to a nearby plant where it is 
cleaned and processed. Then, the gas is injected into a high-pressure pipeline and 
transported to a facility called “city gate”, where it is injected into a low-pressure 
network to its final destination. Gas can also be transported by other means as 
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), for which it has to be cooled down, and re-gasified later. 
Japan, for example, imports LNG from Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries 
because the country does not have sufficient domestic production (APERC, 2003). 
Figure 9.1: The natural gas supply chain53
High-pressure networks are conventionally regarded as transport and the low-
pressure one as distribution. As in other previously studied industries, transport and 
distribution networks exhibit economies of scale and density.  
                                                
53 Source: Productivity Commission (2004) 
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It is worth noting that, as an energy source, natural gas competes with other energy 
sources, such as coal, oil and electricity. The price of these commodities acts as a 
ceiling on the price of gas (Newbery, 1999). The extent to which these commodities 
represent an effective competition vary from country to country.  In the US, for 
example, where the price of electricity is relatively low compared to natural gas, inter-
fuel competition is intense. But in the UK, where gas is relatively cheap, inter-fuel 
competition is more limited. Another important characteristic of natural gas is that its 
demand is highly seasonal. Demand for electricity production is higher in summer due 
to higher air-conditioning, while household demand peaks in winter because of 
heating requirements. 
9.2 Markets and services 
The supply of natural gas can be decomposed in four activities: production, 
transmission, distribution, storage and retailing.   
9.2.1 Production  
Production comprises the activities of drilling, extraction and processing of natural 
gas. The construction of the facilities required to perform these activities (sometimes 
in the middle of the sea) involves a series of relatively large, sunk, investments that 
may incentive opportunistic behavior among gas buyers once the investments are 
made. For this reason, a large part of the investments is carried out under long-term 
contracts (up to 30 years) agreed beforehand that contain “take-or-pay” clauses. These 
clauses specify a price that has to be paid even if it the gas is not taken, thus giving 
assurances to producers that their investments will be remunerated (Newbery, 1999).  
Although economies of scale in gas production exist, these seem not to be as large as 
to impede competition. Indeed, although production fields are unevenly distributed 
around the world, there are in many countries enough fields to sustain competition 
among producers. Moreover, there can be competition with producers located in 
different areas, such as Russia, Algeria and the North Sea, which supply the 
continental European market (IEA, 1994). 
9.2.2 Transport 
Transport (or transmission) involves transporting natural gas from the production well 
to the “city gate”, where it is delivered to high-volume consumers such as retailers, 
distribution companies or electricity producers. Transporting natural gas requires a 
network composed of pipelines and compression stations that exhibit sizeable 
economies of scale. According to Lawrey (1998), the sources of economies of scale in 
natural gas transport networks are: 
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a. The cost of obtaining rights-of-way, which are insensitive to the volume of gas 
that is finally traded. 
b. The fact that investments in pipeline networks are indivisible. As in the 
construction of a new port or terminal, they can only be undertaken in a large 
scale to be economical. 
c. The cost of transport capacity decreases rapidly when wider pipelines are 
used. For example, capacity for transporting one billion cubic meters a year 
falls from US$270,000 a mile for a 15-inch pipeline to US$100,000 a mile for a 
36-inch pipeline (IEA, 1994). 
d. The cost of compression also decreases rapidly when more powerful stations 
are used. Indeed, the cost of an 80-bar compression station is lower than the 
cost of two 40-bar compression stations. 
Although specific arrangements vary from country to country, transport rates are 
typically structured as a cost-based, two-part tariff. The first component is usually 
charged for the capacity that is reserved, while the second is charged for the actual 
amount of gas that is transported. In Austria, France, Germany and The Netherlands, 
transport prices are charged according to distance; but other countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden, the UK and Finland follow a “postage stamp” approach, which is a 
flat fee charged independently of the gas’ entry and exit points.   
In this industry, transport capacity is usually commercialized on “firm” and 
“interruptible” basis. Under the former, capacity is reserved for the client. However, 
since demand is seasonal, pipelines usually have spare capacity that can be sold on a 
spot or “interruptible” basis. Users under “interruptible” contracts only receive 
services if capacity is available. Customers willing to contract interruptible services 
are those with higher demand elasticity; i.e., those that can switch from one fuel to 
another according to short-term price variations, such as electricity generators using 
combined-cycle gas turbines (FERC, 2004). 
In most cases, transport networks are considered natural monopolies. Nonetheless, the 
capability of their owners of exercising market power can be constrained by several 
factors, such as the size and concentration of users or the availability of substitutes. 
Indeed, if users are few or some are relatively large, they may have enough bargaining 
power to overcome transport owners’ market power. Likewise, market power can also 
be constrained by competition, which can occur depending on the location of the 
production fields. For example, in Australia, Sydney is served from two different gas 
basins located northwest and south from the city: Moomba-Sydney and Longford-
Sidney, respectively. The location of these fields allows competition between the 
pipelines transporting gas from these basins to the city (Productivity Commission, 
2004). A similar situation occurs in Austria, where the country is supplied by two 
competing gas companies that own their transport networks (OECD, 2000). 
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Competition in transport can also occur if demand is sufficiently large relative to the 
capacity of individual pipelines. In this case, competition may arise even if producers 
are located relatively close to one another.  
One issue that facilitates competition among transport networks is that high-pressure 
systems are normally built at a standard size. This makes transport costs more uniform 
and distance-related than otherwise. 
9.2.3 Distribution 
This activity is carried out by distribution companies, which receive natural gas at 
“city gates” and distribute it to small and medium gas users through low-pressure 
networks (see figure 9.1). Unless this activity has been separated from retailing, 
distribution involves buying the gas, transporting it through the distribution network 
and selling it to the customers (Gallick, 1993).  
As in other network industries, distribution exhibits sizable economies of density that 
make competition difficult to occur. As discussed in chapter 6, economies of density 
arise from the fact that once a trunk pipeline has been installed, the marginal cost of 
making further connections is relatively small. For these reasons, gas distribution is 
generally considered a natural monopoly, for which distribution companies are 
regulated.  
The degree of public/private ownership of distribution companies varies across 
countries. In the Netherlands, for example, there are 35 distribution companies, 
owned by regional and local authorities. Eleven of them also distribute electricity and 
heat. In Belgium, even though 19 of the 23 distribution companies have private 
shareholders, public shareholders hold the majority of votes, even when they hold a 
minority of stocks (IEA, 2000). 
9.2.4 Storage 
As explained before, demand for natural gas is highly seasonal. Since it costs more to 
build a new network (or expand an existing one) to cope with peak demands, there is 
a demand for services smoothing the flow of gas through the network. Smoothing is 
done by increasing the flow at off-peak times and reducing it at peak times.  
Figure 8.2 shows natural gas consumption in the US in 2002, where winter demand 
almost doubles summer consumption levels (Ferc, 2004). It illustrates how storage 
allows the network to cope with demand seasonality and maintain production levels 
relatively unchanged.  
174
Figure 9.2: Natural gas consumption in the US, 2002 (Ferc, 2004) 
Gas can be stored in different types of facilities, such as LNG plants, depleted gas 
reservoirs, or in the pipeline network itself (by increasing pressure).  
Even though there is scope for competition in this activity, it may remain regulated, as 
in the UK. In the US, most gas storage facilities are owned by pipeline companies or 
distribution companies, for which its terms and pricing policies are subject to 
regulation either by the Ferc or by the states. 
9.2.5 Retailing 
Retailers interact between buyers and sellers of natural gas and transport services, 
making some of all of the arrangements, from gas purchase to final delivery, on behalf 
of their customers. As in the ESI, retailing arose as a result of the industry reforms.  
Retailing is a competitive activity. There are over 260 independent retailers in the US
and almost 200 in the UK. They can operate independently or affiliated to gas 
producing company (NERA, 2002).   
9.3 Reform and regulation of the natural gas industry 
The traditional structure of the natural gas industry has been that of an integrated 
monopoly, in which a public-owned company owns the production wells, the pipeline 
system, and the gas transported through the system. In the US, the structure was 
somewhat different, since the production wells and the transport networks have been 
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usually privately owned. The argument for an integrated monopoly was strengthened 
by the large economies of scale or density present in the industry’s composing 
activities.  
The restructuring process of the natural gas industry started with the passage of the 
Natural Gas Policy Act by the US Congress, in 1978. It gained momentum after the 
privatization of British Gas in 1986 and since then, similar policies have been adopted 
by other countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America (APERC, 2003). Notable among 
the deregulation efforts are the EU Gas Directives 98/30/EC and 2003/55/EC, aimed at 
establishing a European-wide gas market54. These directives establish an open access 
regime for storage facilities and state that storage operators must be legally separated 
from transport operators. 
As in the ESI, reform in the natural gas industry required the creation of a market 
where gas could be priced independently to transport and distribution. For this market 
to develop, rival gas producers must have access to pipeline networks and there must 
be a mechanism for allowing consumers to choose among gas producers. In the US, 
for example, where a large number of private producers existed, competition was 
encouraged when prices at the wellhead were liberalized in the late 1970s. As we will 
see, integrated monopolists were later encouraged to separate their activities and offer 
transport services to third parties. In the UK, the incumbent was privatized as an 
integrated monopoly but under open access provisions. Other countries followed a 
similar path (NERA, 2000). 
Some countries have further unbundled their natural gas industries by separating 
distribution from retailing. As explained before, distribution companies acted both as 
the owner of the distribution network and as a retailer, buying gas from producers and 
selling it to consumers. However, since the price at which the gas is purchased is 
passed on to consumers, distribution companies have weak incentives to buy 
efficiently. Separating both activities places the purchase decision in the hands of 
those who have strong incentives to buy gas efficiently, thereby encouraging 
competition in upstream markets (production and transport). Separating both activities 
also improves the quality of regulation, because instead of monitoring a competitive 
market (retailing) and a monopolistic one (distribution), regulators can focus only in 
the latter. 
It is worth noting that even though there is a tendency toward privatization, not all the 
countries reforming their natural gas industries have decided to do so. This is most 
evident in Europe, where some of the countries are complying with their legal 
obligation of implementing EU gas liberalization directives, but have not gone farther 
in this process (France, for example).  
Reforms carried out in the natural gas industry have three common characteristics 
(Kessides, 1994):  
                                                
54 The Directive 2003/55/EC replaced the Directive 98/30/EC 
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a. Vertical separation has been implemented between transport and other 
activities. The degree of integration among the other activities varies 
according to the country. Depending on the country, separation may be legal 
or operational.   
b. An open-access regime applies to transport pipelines that were historically 
controlled by incumbent monopolists. 
c. Prices for those having enough bargaining power (retailers and large 
customers, for example) are not regulated.  
d. The industry is regulated by an overall energy regulator which also oversights 
electricity markets55.  
9.4 Access arrangements in the natural gas industry
Although the model of natural gas delivery through an integrated monopolist started 
to evolve in the late 1970s, it took a series of court and regulatory decisions and the 
threat of bankruptcy for a workable access regime to develop in the US. As it will be 
explained in the next section, the path taken in the UK was different but not less 
tortuous, including several investigations from antitrust authorities and an Act from 
parliament. Other countries such as Argentina, and Peru, having learned from these 
previous experiences, decided to restructure its gas industry adopting an open access 
regime from the beginning.  
Open access, however, is not universally accepted as the most beneficial regime. 
During the debate previous to the adoption of the EU Gas Directive, for example, 
some countries argued that the unbundling required to implement open access would 
make domestic companies lose bargaining power vis-à-vis off-shore companies with 
substantial market power, as those located in Russia and Algeria. Other arguments 
against open access is that reduces the time horizon over which agents are willing to 
contract, incrementing the risk of investments and therefore increasing supply costs. 
There are three types of access arrangements under which pipelines traditionally 
operate (Newbery, 1999): 
a. The pipeline may act as a private carrier, when it is owned by the same 
company that owns the producing well and the gas transported through the 
pipeline. 
                                                
55 In the UK, where Ofgas was initially created with the single purpose of regulating the privatized 
British Gas, this agency was later merged with Offer to create Ofgem. In Australia, the Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER) was created within the ACCC to fulfill this task. 
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b. The pipeline may act as a contract carrier, when only provides transport 
services to shippers. It is free to determine whether or not to accept contracts. 
c. The pipeline may act as a common carrier, when it is required to offer 
transport services on a non-discriminatory basis.  
In various countries, reference conditions to access pipelines (both price and non-
price terms) are proposed by the pipeline owner and approved by the regulator, 
although access seekers are usually free to negotiate different terms for their particular 
requirements. This is the case of us and Australia, for example. 
In the EU, the common access regime has changed since it was initially proposed. The 
first Gas Directive (98/30/EC) distinguished two forms of open access: regulated 
“Third Party Access” (TPA) and negotiated TPA. Under regulated TPA, users obtain the 
right to access the system on the basis of terms, conditions and rates set by regulators. 
Under negotiated TPA, only main terms conditions are pre-established; the rest are 
negotiated individually. The second Gas Directive (2003/55/EC), however, ruled out 
negotiated access, establishing the regulated option as the standard model for 
accessing transport and distribution networks. The negotiated option remains open for 
storage and upstream facilities such as off-shore pipelines. 
9.5 Reform, regulation and access regimes in selected 
countries 
9.5.1 United Kingdom 
According to the OECD, the UK is the third largest gas market in the world, after the US
and Russia (OECD, 2002b).  Most of the gas comes from offshore gas fields located in 
the North Sea and injected into the system at several beachhead facilities, of which St. 
Fergus, in Scotland, is the main one.  The transport system is connected to the rest of 
Europe via a link to Belgium as seen in figure 8.3.  A second link to Norway is under 
construction.   
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Figure 9.3: The UK Natural Gas System56
The UK natural gas industry was publicly owned until it was privatized under the Gas 
Act of 1986. Nowadays, a single company (Transco) operates the UK’s high-pressure 
transport pipeline and two main storage facilities. There is a strong competition in gas 
trade, with 100 wholesale and 90 retail traders.  
In 1986, British Gas (BG) was privatized as an integrated monopoly; involved in gas 
production, transport, distribution, storage, and retail sale of gas appliances. In 
parallel, the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas) was created to regulate BG’s competitive 
behavior. Under the conditions of BG’s privatization, the company had the exclusive 
right to distribute gas to small customers57, which represented 70% of the demand. 
Prices in this regulated market had to be set by Ofgas using the RPI-X methodology. 
The price of gas for large customers was not subject to regulation and access for 
entering this market was encouraged. Access price and non-price terms for transport 
had to be negotiated between BG and access seekers, but Ofgas could intervene and 
set access price and conditions if parties could not agree (Juris, 1998) 
                                                
56 Source: Parker (2002) 
57 Those consuming up to 25,000 therms per year. One therm equals 100,000 British Thermal Units 
(BTUs). 
179
At the time of privatization, policy makers did not expect integration to deter 
competition, since producers could sell gas to large users and access the transport 
network for its delivery at negotiated terms. However, competition could only be 
introduced after a series of inquiries and procedures by antitrust authorities that ended 
with the vertical separation of BG.  
BG was referred for the first time to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
in 1987. The Office of Fair Trade (OFT) argued that the company was discriminating 
among consumers and that no entry had produced as a consequence of BG’s 
anticompetitive behavior. The MMC concluded that certain company policies were 
effectively against the public interest, such as price discrimination, lack of 
transparency in transport pricing, and a monopsonistic position as the only purchaser 
of the gas produced in the North Sea. The MMC recommended enhancing the 
transparency of BG’s activities, ending its discriminatory behavior and limiting its 
purchases of North Sea gas (Weir, 1999).   
After another inquiry, the OFT concluded in 1991 that the implementation of MMC’s 
recommendations had not been sufficient to promote effective competition in the 
industry. According to the OFT, three factors were impeding competition: i) BG’s 
monopolistic position in small-consumer market; ii) BG’s dominance in the large-user 
market made difficult for competitors to obtain enough gas supplies; and iii), BG’s 
ownership of the transport system. The OFT also found that BG was able to deter entry 
by discriminating against competitors and by cross-subsidizing non-regulated 
activities with regulated revenues. In 1992, the government, following OFT‘s 
recommendations, made a further attempt to promote competition in the retail sector 
by substantially reducing the consumption threshold under which BG held supply 
exclusivity. In 1993, BG was referred for the second time to the MMC, and this agency 
found again that BG’s practices were against public interest. MMC recommended legal 
separation between BG’s transport and other activities and to remove its exclusive 
right to supply small customers. These recommendations were not fully adopted 
before the passing of the Gas Act of 1995, which ordered transport under non-
discriminatory conditions, separate price caps for transport and storage, and price caps 
for gas distribution. As a consequence, BG’s activities were legally separated in the 
following years. Production and retailing activities were transferred to a company 
called Centrica; while transport, storage and distribution were transferred to BG
Transco. Both companies remained part of the same holding until 2000. In 1997, a 
dispute between BG and Ofgas about the adequate estimation of the X factor for 
transport and storage motivated a further referral of BG to the MMC. The MMC decided 
that storage rights at the two main storage facilities (which granted BG significant 
market power) had to be auctioned, leaving RPI-X regulation for the remaining storage 
facilities (Weir, 1999).  
The Gas Act of 1995 also required the formulation of a Network Code that set price  
and non-price access terms to transport and storage facilities. According to the 
Network Code, transport charges were to be subject to price caps using the RPI-X
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methodology. The Network Code worked relatively well until 1998, when capacity 
constraints began to appear. To allocate capacity rights under these new 
circumstances, the regulator authorized the implementation of short-term auctions. 
The auctions were held every six months allowing secondary trading (i.e., shippers 
could sell not-used contracted firm capacity to other companies). However, if the 
actual capacity was lower than the rights auctioned, Transco had to buy them back at 
market prices. This mechanism was intended to give the company economic 
incentives to expand the transport network. This solution, however, introduced two 
distortions. First, since transport is a regulated business, Transco’s revenues are 
capped. In this context, the auctions resulted in an over-collection of revenues. 
Indeed, in March 2001 the company recovered £370 million against a target of £54 
million. It was not clear what to do with these revenues. Second, the short-term 
character of the auctions and the fact that Transco could keep at least part of the 
revenues distorted the company’s incentives to expand capacity. To address these 
problems, Ofgem proposed in 2002 the implementation of long-term capacity 
auctions (5 years) and a new system of incentives for Transco. Under the new regime, 
the regulator would set targets for capacity expansions and Transco would be more 
exposed to buy-back costs (Parker, 2000). 
9.5.2 United States 
The US gas market is the largest of the world. It is composed by 6,800 producers that 
sell gas to 1,300 distribution companies and other shippers through a 250,000 km 
high-pressure pipeline system. The most important production area is the Gulf of 
Mexico, while imports from Canada account for 17% of the US. Many users have 
access to more than one pipeline and a series of hubs and markets centers facilitate 
transactions (Ferc, 2004). 
Figure 8.4 shows the flow patterns of the US natural gas trade.  
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Figure 9.4: The US Natural Gas System (Ferc, 2004)
Until the 1930s, most gas production and consumption took place at local level, for 
which the activity was regulated by the states. In 1938, the US Congress passed the 
Natural Gas Act, which granted the federal government powers over the parts of the 
industry involved in interstate trade. In 1954, a decision by the Supreme Court 
expanded oil federal regulation to include gas production. As a result, prices at 
wellhead for gas to be sold out of the state were to be regulated by the Ferc, while 
those for in-state consumption were to be set by local regulators. This decision also 
stated that interstate prices should be calculated using historic costs, which led to 
much lower prices than in intrastate markets. The logical consequence of this decision 
was that producers were discouraged to sell gas out of the states.   
  
This flawed regulation led to a disconnected network of pipelines. As a result of the 
lack of connection, each city was served using its dedicated gas supplies. The 
situation gradually worsened until 1978, when the Congress passed the Natural Gas 
Policy Act which proposed the gradual deregulation of wellhead prices. After the 
passing of the Act, many pipelines committed to purchase large quantities of gas 
under contracts containing take-or-pay clauses that required them to pay for gas even 
if it was not consumed. However, the Act had also raised the price of gas for 
industrial users and prohibited its use for electricity generation and other industrial 
uses. Both factors threatened bankruptcy, since demand reduced dramatically and 
pipelines were left with idle capacity and expensive take-or-pay contracts (NERA, 
2002).  
In 1987, the Ferc forced pipeline owners to adopt an open access regime. The 
regulator established two mechanisms to allow passing the costs of the stranded take-
or-pay contracts to consumers: companies could add a surcharge to their rates, or 
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adopt an open access regime and collect up to 50% of past take-or-pay costs in the 
form of a fixed monthly amount, absorbing themselves an equal proportion of the 
costs. Most pipelines opted for the second mechanism, which provided them with a 
guaranteed stable cash flow and secured them a profit. By 1988, all the major 
transporters had become open-access pipelines. 
A series of court decisions questioning led the regulator to issue Order 636, which 
established an open access regime for gas transport. This order, that still regulates the 
activity, requires all pipelines to provide unbundled transport and storage services 
under non-discriminatory basis. Pipeline owners can be involved in gas production or 
retailing, but have to be separated from these activities and offer other users the same 
quality of service as the one provided to related companies. The Ferc also established 
further standards of conduct to prevent preferential treatment. Under this system, 
access terms and conditions are set by each pipeline, but they have to be consistent 
with the guidelines issued by the Ferc. These conditions are public and open to 
inspection by the regulator. Minimum and maximum charges are set by the pipeline 
themselves following Ferc guidelines58. In certain circumstances, the Ferc allows 
market-based and negotiated rates. Market-based rates are authorized when the 
pipeline demonstrates it lacks market power and have been mostly authorized for 
storage services. Negotiated rates apply for specific requirements and may exceed 
maximum rates, but should not preclude shippers opting for services under regulated 
rates and conditions.  
Pipelines may use several methods to allocate capacity. Available capacity has to be 
disclosed on the company’s electronic boards or web sites. Existing firm capacity is 
allocated on a first come, first serve basis but not-used firm capacity can be allocated 
on interruptible basis even if it has been fully committed. Holders of firm capacity 
rights can resell it to other users. For new developments, the Ferc generally requires 
pipelines to hold open seasons. Authorizations are granted when there is sufficient 
interest from shippers. 
According to OECD (2000), this access regime greatly benefited the industry. As open 
access spread through the pipeline network, gas producers in fields with low prices 
demanded transport connections to access customers in areas with high prices, leading 
to increased interconnection and the development of spot markets at interconnection 
points. The maximum flow between most points has also increased because open 
access has created paths around former bottlenecks. There are nowadays 21 major 
interstate pipelines having in average 70 holders of transport rights.  
                                                
58 Rates for firm service are structured as a two-part tariff using the “Straight Fixed-Variable” method.  
Under this method, a fixed “reservation charge” covers the fixed costs of the pipelines; while a variable 
“usage cost”, covers all variable costs. Since customers on the interruptible service do not possess 
reserved capacity, they only pay a volumetric rate that is different to the firm service’s usage charge.  
This volumetric rate usually includes a proportion of fixed charges. Rates can be differentiated by mile, 
zone or follow a “postage stamp” approach 
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9.5.3 Australia 
The physical and demographical characteristics of Australia are different to those in 
the UK and the US. The country has a vast territory and a relatively small population, 
mostly concentrated in the southwest coast. The natural gas industry developed in the 
form of isolated networks connecting producing basins and consumptions areas, with 
little or no competition or interconnection. When the industry began, in the 1960s, it 
was characterized by monopolistic structures along the production chain (ACCC, 
2000). 
Competition in Australia is still limited in production, transport and distribution.  
Natural gas is extracted from 11 basins, although around 95% comes from only three 
of them: Canarvon, Gippsland and Cooper-Eromanga.  Production fields are linked to 
consumption centers through 20,000 km of transport pipelines, as seen in figure 8.5. 
Figure 9.5: The Australian Natural Gas System (ACCC, 2000) 
During the 1990s, the Australian government took steps to liberalize the industry and 
promote competition. Reform started in 1991, when the government drafted a national 
strategy for the industry. Later, in 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (the 
Council) agreed to remove administrative barriers to interstate gas trade and 
implementing the separation of transport and distribution from other activities. A 
second set of reforms involved the restructuring of the Australian natural gas industry. 
States agreed to separate transport and distribution activities and create separate 
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corporations. Integration of transport and distribution is allowed but these activities 
should be legally separated from gas production and retailing. They also agreed to 
establish “ring-fencing” arrangements for private retailing companies, which require 
separate accounts, different personnel and limits on information exchange. 
The third set of reforms consisted on the adoption of an open access regime.  
Although the National Access Regime implemented in 1995 provided a general 
benchmark applied to all essential facilities, the Council considered that the 
substantial degree of market power enjoyed by the pipelines required an industry-
specific regime. As a consequence, the Gas Pipelines Access Code (the Gas Code) 
was implemented in 1997. The Gas Code is applicable only to those pipelines that 
were listed when the code was passed or those later included by the NCC . The criteria 
under which the  NCC must analyze whether to declare a pipeline covered by the gas 
Code are the following (Productivity Commission, 2004): 
a. Access to the service would promote competition in at least one market other 
than the market for the services provided by means of the pipeline; 
b. It would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another pipeline to provide 
the service; 
c. Access can be provided without undue risk to human health and safety; and, 
d. Access to the services provided by means of the pipeline would not be 
contrary to the public interest 
Once a pipeline has been covered, its owner must submit an access undertaking for 
approval from to the regulator. An undertaking describes price and non-price terms 
for access seekers. Even if the access undertaking is approved by the regulator, the 
pipeline owner and any access seeker are free to negotiate other price and non-price 
terms of access (except queuing policy). Reference transport charges are set by the 
pipelines using one of the cost-based methodologies stipulated in the Gas Code. 
Regulators have some discretion to determine which costs can be included and can 
use benchmarking to asses if they are excessively priced. In case of dispute, the 
reference charges and terms stipulated in the access arrangement apply. 
The Australian gas access regime also provides access seekers the right to 
interconnect with a part of an existing transport or distribution pipeline. In this case, 
operators are required to unbundle their services to allow third parties access only to 
the components of the network they require. Regulators may also mandate the 
expansion of a pipeline if it is justified by the requirements of a prospective user.   
Since the launch of the reforms, the structure of gas markets in Australia has changed 
significantly. A number of major gas facilities have been privatized, such as three 
distribution companies and one transport pipeline in the state of Victoria. The 
introduction of retail competition has also encouraged competition between gas basins 
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and transport pipelines, such as those that serve the Sidney market (Gippsland and 
Cooper basins and Moomba-Sydney and Longford-Sidney pipelines, respectively) . In 
response to this changing context, the Australian government initiated a review of the 
Gas Access Regime. The review, carried out by the Productivity Commission (the 
federal government’s advisor on microeconomic policy), identified several problems. 
During the inquiry, the Commission found that the fact that reference tariffs would 
prevail in case of a dispute has discouraged negotiation and thus led to de facto cost-
based regulation. This and other findings led the Commission to formulate two main 
recommendations. First, to make the Gas Code more consistent with the National 
Access Regime by establishing more specific pricing principles and allowing the use 
of methodologies different to cost-based ones (incentive regulation, for example). 
Second, the Commission considered that market power abuse can be prevented by a 
credible threat of more intrusive regulation, for which recommended to adopt a 
monitoring approach when the benefits of regulation are not clear. This “light-
handed” option would allow pipelines to set their own access terms and conditions, 
including pricing, queuing, capacity trading and expansion; but they would be subject 
to the anticompetitive provisions contemplated in the Gas Code (Productivity 
Commission, 2004). 
9.5 Lessons for a port access regime 
An increasing number of countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America are 
undertaking reforms to make their gas markets more competitive.  In these countries, 
open access seems to provide the framework to promote competition.   
Since gas basins are unevenly distributed, location plays an important role in this 
industry. If an area is located close to more than one production field, competition can 
arise despite the economies of scale or density present exhibited in pipeline networks. 
This situation is similar to the one where the hinterlands of two or more ports overlap, 
as in the Hamburg – La Havre range. 
Table 9.1 presents the characteristics of the access regimes implemented in the natural 
gas industries of the UK, US and Australia.  
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Table 9.1: Main characteristics of natural gas access regimes 
UK US Australia 
Vertical 
structure 
Legal separation. 
Integration is allowed 
between transport, storage 
and distribution; and 
between production and 
retailing. 
Operational separation. 
Integration is allowed 
between transport and 
storage.  
Legal separation. 
Integration is allowed  
between transport, storage 
and distribution; and 
between production and 
retailing 
Access pricing 
Regulated. Charges 
capped using RPI-X. 
Set by the pipeline owner 
using a regulated 
methodology. 
For transport, negotiable 
reference tariffs estimated 
using a regulated 
methodology.  
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Regulated. Set in the 
Network Code 
Set by the pipeline owner 
but consistent with 
regulated guidelines  
Negotiable reference 
terms established using 
regulated guidelines 
Mechanism to 
expand the 
infrastructure 
Regulated. Ofgem set 
expansion targets. 
Market incentives 
Market incentives, but the 
regulator can order 
expansions if requested by 
access seekers 
Several lessons can be learned from the efforts to adequately regulate the natural gas 
industry. The first lesson can be drawn from the UK experience: that the market power 
of the incumbent cannot be underestimated. Indeed, the integrated structure under 
which BG was privatized reinforced the information asymmetry between regulator and 
regulated firm, allowing the company to discriminate among users and to deter 
competition even if an open access regime was put in place.  
The second lesson for port regulators is that establishing an open access regime might 
not be sufficient to encourage entry and competition. As the UK case shows, as long as 
the incumbent has incentives and the ability to discourage entry, the latter will not 
occur. In this country, acceptable competition levels were only achieved when the 
monopolistic activity (transport) was completely separated from the competitive ones 
(production and retailing). In the US, competition did no develop until pipelines were 
obliged to separate transport from gas trading activities.  
It is worth noting that in the natural gas industry as in the ESI, the introduction of 
competition required the creation of centralized markets (for natural gas and 
electricity) that were inexistent previous to the industry reforms. Vertical separation 
(either legal or operational) seems to be a necessary requirement for the creation of 
these markets. 
The third main lesson port regulators can learn comes from the US. It can be seen that 
bad regulation can be as effective in preventing the development of markets as 
leaving the industry unregulated. In this country, regulation establishing different 
prices for inter- and intra-state trade and forbidding its use for certain purposes led to 
a disconnected network of pipelines and an artificially-reduced demand that 
threatened pipeline owners with bankruptcy.  
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The fourth main lesson to be learned from port regulators regards the relationship 
between negotiation and the pricing methodology. The natural gas industry seems to 
confirm what was observed in the previous chapter, that the use of price caps seems to 
be better suited for regimes where negotiation is not expected (as the UK). In the US
and Australia, where negotiation is encouraged, access charges are set using cost-
based methodologies. 
A further lesson for port regulators regarding access pricing is that the establishment 
of reference charges seems to discourage negotiation. Indeed, as an inquiry by the 
Australian Government found, the incentives set by these arrangements seem to have 
led to a de facto cost-based regulation (Productivity Commission, 2004).  
Regarding non-price access terms, one can see that the methodology to establish them 
in the analyzed countries is the same used for pricing: regulation in UK, and negotiable 
reference terms established using regulated guidelines in US and Australia. As for the 
mechanism to expand the infrastructure, each country uses a different approach. In the 
UK, the regulator uses a mix of administrative-set targets and economic incentives (the 
pipeline owner is exposed to buy-back costs) to encourage the pipeline owner to 
invest adequately. In the US and Australia, it is presumed that demand would 
encourage incumbents to expand capacity. In the former, however, the regulator 
requires them to hold open seasons to assess demand. In the latter, the regulator may 
order the expansion of a pipeline if it is justified by the requirements of a prospective 
user. 
Regarding the issue of capacity expansions, the UK experience also provides an 
interesting lesson for port regulators. It can be seen that the use of auctions constitutes 
a useful tool to allocate installed capacity, but it does not provide incentives to expand
the infrastructure. Moreover, allowing the incumbent to keep at least part of the 
proceed would be perverse, since a more acute scarcity would produce higher 
revenues. For these reasons, auctions should be used together with other economic 
incentives, such as expose the incumbent to buy-back costs.  
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10. Access regulation in the rail 
industry 
Due to its natural monopoly characteristics and the strategic importance that railways 
play in the development of the economy, the rail industry has been heavily regulated 
in most parts of the world. Prices, entry, operations and vertical structure have been 
typically subject to some form of government control. However, public dissatisfaction 
with traditional forms of regulation led to the restructuring of the industry in countries 
such as Japan, Sweden the US, and the UK. Since then, many other countries have 
followed through.  
The following sections describe the economic characteristics of the rail industry, and 
the main approaches taken to deal with the access problem in several countries. As in 
previous chapters, the cases of the UK, US and Australia are discussed in detail. 
10.1 Economic characteristics of the rail industry 
Rail activities can be broken down into i), infrastructure provision, and ii); train 
services. Infrastructure provision involves the supply of tracks, stations, terminals and 
other ancillary facilities59; and related services, such as signaling and traffic 
management. Train services involve the transport of passengers and freight among 
different origins and destinations (see figure 10.1).  
                                                
59 Storage yards, marshalling yards, sidings, switches, fueling and maintenance stations, among others. 
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Figure 10.1: Rail activities 
Rail activities possess the features that characterize network industries, such as sunk 
costs, economies of scale and scope, and externalities. Sunk costs, for example, arise 
because rail tracks, rights-of-way and other assets that represent a large part of the 
total investment costs have little value for activities other than rail transport. Once 
made, these investments are unrecoverable. 
Economies of scale arise because the large share of fixed costs associated with rail 
operations prevent total costs to rise proportionately with traffic volume. Indeed, costs 
of track, rights-of-way, locomotive power, crew and related facilities change little if 
the train carries 10 or 500 passengers. And most ancillary infrastructure (yards, 
sidings, switches, etc.) can be used for a large number of shippers without further 
investment requirements (Kessides and Willig, 1995). This characteristic is similar to 
that of liner shipping, where running costs are relatively stable regardless the number 
of containers transported.  
Rail operations also exhibit a particular type of economies of scale known as 
“economies of density”. In train services, economies of density arise because is 
cheaper to add additional cars to scheduled services than operating new trains. Ivaldi 
and McCullough (2001) measured economies of density for Class I freight railroads in 
the US. They found that returns to density amount to 1.65; i.e., doubling the number of 
services would only increase costs by 65%.  
Economies of scope derive from the multi-product nature of the industry, which 
implies that the same labor, facilities and equipment used for producing services for 
one market can be to produce services in a different one. For example, tracks and 
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ancillary infrastructure used for passenger services, can also be employed to provide 
freight services at proportionally lower additional cost.  
A distinctive feature of this industry is that rail companies are typically multi-product 
firms producing a multi-dimensional output. In fact, rail companies typically produce 
different types of transport services for different users at different origins and 
destinations, at different quality levels. The combination of these dimensions has 
different implications in the cost structure of rail companies. For example, long-
distance passenger carriers have a different cost structure than local or regional ones, 
although they can coexist in certain routes (Campos, 2002). 
It is worth noting that the multi-product nature of the rail industry, combined with the 
fact that many of the costs incurred are fixed, joint or common60, have the effect of 
making arbitrary any system to allocate costs among particular services. Some costs 
may be attributed to a particular type of traffic, such as stations to passenger traffic 
and terminals to freight, but others, such as energy, cannot. This is an important 
feature for regulating access, since this arbitrariness can be used to deter competition 
by charging predatory prices in competitive services (Campos and Cantos, (1999).  
Railways also exhibit positive externalities, since the network’s value increases for 
the existing users when a new link is added. Moreover, as suggested by Button 
(1993), railways may also create positive externalities for the transport system as a 
whole. Indeed, costs derived from congestion, accidents or environmental impact 
would be substantially reduced if part of the road traffic were transferred to railways, 
since road transport does not fully internalize these costs. 
An important characteristic of the rail industry, also shared with ports, is that tracks, 
stations and rolling stock can only be expanded in discrete amounts, while demand 
may fluctuate in small amounts. As a consequence, periods of excess capacity may be 
followed by periods of great congestion. This raises the question of how rail services 
should be priced. They can be estimated according to short, medium or long-term 
costs, and may or may not include congestion charges. Moreover, since railways are 
part of an overall transport system, efficient pricing for rail also depends on factors 
which cannot be controlled by rail managers, such as policies regarding other 
transport modes. Furthermore, pricing decisions may require complementary 
measures to achieve economic efficiency, which are also beyond the reach of rail 
managers, such the granting of subsidies to certain types of users.  
A last characteristic of the industry, although a non-technical one, is that railway 
transport has been typically considered as a social service. The low rolling resistance 
of steel wheels on steel rails make rail transport fuel efficient and relatively 
inexpensive, and the industry is regarded as a mechanism to integrate distant areas, to 
                                                
60 Joint costs are those incurred in production processes involving several products that can be 
separated or distinguished. A common cost cannot be traced to each product individually (Fernandez-
Baca, 2006). 
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promote economic development and as a guarantee for minimum transport services 
for particular segments of the population (Campos and Cantos, 1999). 
10.2 Markets and services 
As in ports, the rail logistics chain is composed by inputs produced in both 
monopolistic and competitive markets. Indeed, while infrastructure provision is 
considered a monopolistic activity whose duplication generates additional costs to 
users, train services can be provided in competitive markets. Inputs from both 
activities are simultaneously required to transport passengers and freight.  
Rail markets can be distinguished by whether the service involves the transport of 
passengers or freight and the origin and destination of the service. Competition for a 
particular market can come from other train operators or from other transport modes. 
The extent of competition, however, depends on geographic, demographic and 
economic factors (De Rus, Campos and Nombela, 2003). In the US, Canada and 
Australia, for example, long distances and low population density limit passenger 
services. In Europe, shorter distances and higher population densities make rail 
passenger transport feasible. For passenger traffic, flexibility confers advantages to 
road transport over rail for short distances. For long distances, air transport has the 
advantage presumably because time savings overcome the higher costs involved. But 
rail has advantages over other modes for medium-range transport, especially if traffic 
flows in relatively consistent patterns.  
In freight, the ratio of value-added to transport costs confers advantages to one 
transport mode over other. Rail, for example, has advantages for transporting bulk 
commodities such as coal, forest and oil because their low value-added per unit of 
weight requires transport in large shipments, and because they are less sensitive to the 
long transit times involved. In the US, for example, 43.5% of the rail freight carried in 
2006 was coal and other bulks such as chemicals, farm products, metallic and non-
metallic minerals, and oil accounted for almost 30% (Association of American 
Railroads, 2006). Rail also has cost advantages in long-distance shipments. Indeed, 
according to Eurostat (2007), 83% of the freight carried by rail in the EU is transported 
150 km or more. However, where navigable waterways exist, waterborne transport 
represents an important source of competition for commodities of the same 
characteristics.  Trucking, on the other hand, has advantages in small, short-distance, 
time-sensitive shipments of products with high value added. Pipelines also compete 
with rail for oil products and other liquid bulk. Although relatively inflexible, 
pipelines are considered as energy-efficient, cost-effective transport modes, that may 
reduce the environmental impacts involved in the transport of fuels. 
It is worth noting that the exertion of monopoly power by rail operators may be 
limited in a more indirect way. For example, since rail-transported coal competes with 
pipeline-transported oil and natural gas for the generation of electricity, inter-fuel 
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competition may limit the price rail companies can charge for transporting coal 
(Kessides, 2004). Geographic proximity may also facilitate competition, especially for 
large customers. Indeed, proximity may allow captive users to ship their freight to 
competing railways by truck, or to lay a dedicated link connecting their facilities with 
the tracks of a competing railway. Another option may be for large users to induce 
competition by locating their plants close to the railway company that offers better 
conditions. In reality, however, it is very difficult for the shippers of some 
commodities to avoid operators’ market power unless alternative transport options 
exist or an adequate regulatory framework has been implemented. 
10.3 Reform and regulation in the rail industry 
The rail industry has shown a steady decline in both developed and developing 
countries since the 1970s. For example, the industry’s share in both passenger and 
freight traffic more than halved in the 43 countries belonging to the European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport. As seen in table 10.1, the share of rail in 
passenger traffic fell from 22.6% in 1970 to 10.4% in 2002.   
Table 10.1: Share of rail in total passenger transport, ECMT countries61
1970 2002 
Western Europe 10.3% 6.8% 
Eastern Europe 48.6% 11.1% 
Commonwealth of Independent States 70.9% 49.0% 
Total 22.6% 10.4% 
Source: ECMT (2004b) 
Analogously, the percentage of freight traffic transported by rail fell from 73.6% to 
34.4% during the same period (see table 10.2). 
Table 10.2: Share of rail in total freight transport, ECMT countries62
1970 2002 
Western Europe 29.5% 13.8% 
Eastern Europe 76.2% 35.8% 
Commonwealth of Independent States 85.9% 43.9% 
Total 73.6% 34.4% 
Source: ECMT (2004b) 
Several factors contributed to the industry’s decline. On the one hand, the changes 
occurred in transport markets. In many countries, rail networks were determined by 
technologies, market and consumer locations of the 19th century. In passenger 
markets, technological changes in air and road transport made these modes more 
competitive than rail. In freight, the development of more sophisticated logistics 
systems has given preference to other modes, especially road and air transport. The 
fact that high value-added products are less sensitive to transport costs also confers 
                                                
61 Measured in thousand million passenger-kilometers 
62 Measured in thousand million ton-kilometers 
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advantages to other transport modes. On the other hand, political interference in 
investment and operational policies often forced rail companies to provide 
unprofitable services without receiving the corresponding subsidies, thus reducing the 
amount of resources required to adequately maintain and expand the network. 
Political interference also reduced rail companies’ ability to withstand pressures from 
trade unions, which artificially increased the cost of providing train services. 
Moreover, rigid management structures and lack of competitive incentives made 
many state-owned companies unresponsive to customer needs (OECD, 2005). 
According to the same source, the poor performance of rail companies can be related 
to a problem known as “soft budget constraint”. As explained before, railway 
transport has been typically considered as a social service, for which governments 
find it very hard to limit the size of the subsidy offered to rail companies, regardless 
of their efficiency. Governments are also reluctant to reduce subsidies because 
railways face competition from other transport modes, such as roads, which are not 
efficiently priced. Indeed, even though various forms of road pricing are becoming 
common, road users are not fully charged for some of the costs of using the road, such 
as the cost of providing the infrastructure or the cost of congestion. Reducing 
subsidies would incentive traffic switch from rail to road. If the government is not 
willing to commit to a reduction of subsidies, managers face modest incentives to 
improve rail companies’ performance.   
The industry’s first serious problems appeared during the 1970s, where tight 
regulation and increasing road competition caused the bankruptcy of several major 
rail companies in the US. The Congress was then forced to intervene to avoid the 
disappearance of passenger services. During the 1980s, rail companies in other parts 
of the world experienced similar problems. In Japan, accumulated debts worth more 
than US$ 300 billion led Japan National Railways to a severe financial crisis. In 
Sweden, a series of problems led the state-owed Statens Järnvägar to increasing 
deficits that reduced investment and service levels. In UK, a series of recurring crises 
since the late 1950s had made British Railways economically weak. At the time, rail 
companies in Africa and Latin America faced similar problems, which were worsened 
by the lack of public funds.  
In these circumstances, governments were forced to intervene. In Japan, the state-
owned railways were split into nine different infrastructure, passenger and rail traffic 
companies in 1986. In Sweden and the UK, the reforms initiated also separated 
infrastructure provision from train operations. In the 1990s, other countries such as 
Argentina and New Zealand followed through. Table 10.3 shows the characteristics of 
the reform processes undertaken in these countries. It is worth noting that even though 
most reform programs sought to introduce competition in rail markets, this was not 
their main driver. Reform was primarily aimed at reducing the heavy financial burden 
that railways imposed over public budgets (Guriev, Pittman and Shevyakhova, 2003). 
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Given the sizable economies of scale, scope and density that arise from having a 
national-wide rail network operated by a single rail company, one would expect 
reform programs aimed at reducing this financial burden while maintaining the 
integrated structure. In reality, however, few countries opted for doing so. One of the 
few was New Zealand, and the results were not encouraging. 
In 1993, the government privatized the public-owned New Zealand Rail Ltd. as a 
single, integrated company. In this country, railways face strong competition from 
road and water transport options, for which previous restructuring was not deemed 
necessary. More importantly, the government chose the privatization option to make 
clear its commitment not to continue subsidizing the industry. At the beginning, new 
technology was introduced and productivity, as well as profits, rose considerably. 
However, around the seventh year after privatization, the company was put under 
financial distress because the new owners had not invested enough in maintaining and 
improving the infrastructure. The result was a series of problems related to lack of 
maintenance, safety concerns and reduced service quality. In these circumstances, the 
“soft budget constraint” problem discussed previously appeared. In 2004, the 
government could not withhold its promise not to continue subsidizing the industry, 
and took over the network. Since then, it is investing an important amount upgrading 
the network (Williams, Greig and Wallis, 2005).  
In other countries, governments chose to reform their industries without maintaining a 
single integrated rail company, opting for dividing the system into competing regional 
networks or implementing open access regimes. In the EU, for example, reforms were 
oriented at introducing vertical separation, implementing open-access regimes and 
liberalizing freight and passenger markets. Between 1991 and 1995, the European 
Commission issued Directives 91/440/EC, 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC; separating 
infrastructure from train services (operationally, at least), and requiring incumbents to 
grant access to third parties under non-discriminating conditions. Moreover, since 
2001, the Commission has issued three so-called “railway packages”. The first two 
were aimed at introducing competition in freight markets while the third, issued in 
late 2007, sought to liberalize international passenger services. 
During the 1990s, Latin American countries chose to reform their rail sectors by 
separating and concessioning their networks to the private sector. In Argentina, the 
network was separated into six freight and seven passenger networks, and 
concessioned as vertically-integrated companies. In Brazil and Mexico, whose 
railways only provided freight services, the network was also separated and 
concessioned to be run as vertically-integrated companies. According to Sharp (2005), 
the overall results of the Latin American rail reform programs are positive: 
governments were relieved of financial burdens, service quality improved, investment 
increased and the rail market share stopped declining. However, since their main aim 
was to reduce financial burdens, not enough attention was given to achieving social 
objectives such as accessibility and affordability to small shippers and passengers, for 
which the results on these fields are not encouraging. 
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In Africa, thirteen railways were concessioned between 1993 and 2005. Two of them 
were cancelled, one was affected by war and another suffered from natural disasters. 
According to Bullock (2005), despite these problems the results are encouraging. 
Throughput has generally increased and the railways are arguably performing better 
than if they had not been concessioned. 
Although specific measures are different from country to country, the reforms carried 
out in the rail industry have four common characteristics (OECD, 2005): 
a. Horizontal and vertical restructuring. As discussed in the next section, this 
may involve the vertical separation of the industry (legal, as in UK and 
Sweden; or operational, as in Italy and the Netherlands); or the partition of the 
network into integrated competing rail companies (as in Brazil or Mexico). 
b. Rebalance of the roles played by the public and private sectors. Reform has 
given the private sector a larger role in providing competitive services, 
especially in freight markets. In several countries a regulator was set up to 
monitor the industry, such as the Federal Railway Office (Eisenbahn-
Bundesamt) in Germany, the Office of the Rail Regulator in UK or the Swedish 
Rail Agency (Järnvägsstyrelsen). In Europe, the public sector continues to 
provide rail services directly, while in Latin America they have been almost 
entirely concessioned to the private sector. 
c. More flexibility has been granted to rail companies to set prices and shut down 
non-profitable services. 
d. Subsidies to operators have been granted using open bidding mechanisms, 
thus improving the transparency of their allocation. 
10.4 Access arrangements in the rail industry 
After twenty years of reform in the railway industry, three restructuring models have 
emerged: i) competition between integrated rail companies (without access), ii) 
vertical integration with competitive access, and iii), vertical separation. All of these 
options address the relationships between rail companies, markets served and 
functions performed, including ownership, maintenance and improvement of 
facilities, operation management, marketing, and financial activities. 
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10.4.1 Competition between integrated rail companies 
As discussed before, nation-wide networks operated by an integrated company 
maximize the economies of scale, scope and density present in rail operations. 
However, in absence of effective competition, vertical integration leads to lack of 
commercial dynamism, low productivity, poor service quality, among other results. 
(Guriev, Pittman and Shevyakhova, 2003). Therefore, the first restructuring option 
consists on separating the system into regional networks. In this way, competition 
from other rail networks or transport modes would incentive the operators of regional 
networks to achieve efficiency and improve service levels.  
This restructuring option has the advantage that in the presence of effective 
competition, regulatory intervention is only necessary in cases where shippers do not 
have any alternative transport option. Only in these cases, regulation of prices, quality 
or access would be warranted. 
One country whose government chose this restructuring option is Mexico. The state-
owned Mexican railways were divided into three regional networks and concessioned 
to the private sector during the mid-1990s. No concessionaire has exclusive access to 
major cities and all of them serve Mexico City (the county’s main economic center). 
Two railways, located in the north of the country, have access to ports located in both 
oceans and extend as far as the border with the US. They were concessioned to 
regional companies which entered the business in order to develop inter-modal 
transport systems (Campos, 2002). Since its concession, the industry’s productivity 
has improved notably and railways have recovered market share from roads. Other 
countries that have restructured their industries under this model are Cameroon, Côte 
D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Argentina, and Brazil. Two further countries also operate 
under the system of competing integrated rail companies: US (which will be analyzed 
in detail later) and Canada. In the latter, two rail companies (Canadian National and 
Canadian Pacific) operate networks covering the southern part of the country, from 
coast to coast, and serving all major cities. Both companies also have tracks 
connecting their networks with main US mid-west cities: Detroit, Chicago and 
Minneapolis.  
The main disadvantage of separating the national network is reduced connectivity. 
Indeed, the more fragmented the rail system, the less likely that a rail company can 
provide any given end-to-end service. As a result, shippers wanting to send freight to 
a certain destination may need to send it first to an intermediate point and from there 
make arrangements with a second rail company to carry it to its final destination 
(Campos, 2002). 
This restructuring option seems to be especially attractive for large, freight dominated 
railways like those of US, Canada and Mexico. Less dense networks are unlikely to 
have multiple paths connecting the same origin-destination pairs, for which the 
resulting level of competition may not be intense enough as to eliminate inefficiencies 
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and limit market power. And even if it is possible to separate the network in such a 
way that all origin-destination pairs are connected, it is unlikely that the alternatives 
will be similarly attractive to passengers. Indeed, since passenger traffic is more time-
sensitive than freight, only few users would be willing to switch to alternative options 
involving longer routes or more train changes. It would be necessary to duplicate 
expensive infrastructure to achieve competition. 
10.4.2 Vertical integration with access 
The second restructuring option seeks to preserve economies of scale scope and 
density and to introduce a competitive discipline even in markets where no other 
transport option exists. Under this option, integrated rail companies operate the 
infrastructure and provide train services, but they are obliged to grant third parties 
access to the infrastructure under non-discriminating terms.  
In theory, this restructuring option has two main benefits. First, it enhances 
competition, since train companies compete with each other in the same routes and 
shippers are even allowed to transport their own freight. Competition ensures that rail 
services users need are produced efficiently and sold at an efficient prices. Second, 
unlike the previous option where the network was separated, preserving and 
integrated system provides a greater scope for seamless end-to-end services. 
In reality, however, open access has not attracted as much entry as expected. 
Incumbents still have large market shares or totally dominate the market, especially in 
the passenger segment. In the Netherlands, for example, a second company called 
“Lovers Rail” was allowed to compete for passenger traffic in two routes 
(Amsterdam-Haarlem and Amsterdam-Nijmegen) in 1996, but it had to withdraw 
after only three years. The company left the market complaining that the incumbent 
was not neutral in allocating paths (periods in which a company can use the shared 
infrastructure). In Germany, only one other company competes for passengers with 
the incumbent DB (and only in two routes), although there are charter companies 
providing seasonal services in international routes (Van de Velde, 2000).  
Competition seems to be more intense in freight markets, although market shares of 
competing companies are small in comparison with those of the incumbents. In 
Germany and Switzerland, for example, the competitors of the incumbent operators 
had only reached a market share of 6.9% and 12%, respectively; after at least four 
years of open access (OECD, 2005). According to Pittman (2005), this lack of entry 
can be explained because the economies of scale, scope and density enjoyed by 
integrated railway operators are so large that prevent competition from non-integrated 
companies. 
The main problem with this option is similar to those in other industries: the 
incumbent has incentives to discriminate in favor of its own train services. In fact, it 
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relies heavily on the regulator’s ability to set adequate access terms, ensure efficient 
and timely investments, identify incumbents’ discriminatory behavior and manage 
congestion, among others. As argued by Pittman (2005) and Fagan (2007), 
infrastructure is more closely related in this industry than in others, making this task a 
very difficult one; and especially difficult for developing countries without 
experienced regulators.  
10.4.3 Vertical separation 
Under this option, infrastructure services are provided by an entity separated from the 
companies supplying train services, with the infrastructure owned by the government, 
a consortium of operators or a regulated private entity. This is the model used in 
Sweden and the UK.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the nature of the access problem is different under vertical 
separation. In theory, separation would allow a more effective competition among 
providers of train services, since the incumbent would not have incentives to 
discriminate nor foreclose entry. However, vertical separation can create coordination 
problems, undermine economies of scope and impose higher transaction costs. In fact, 
separation implies tasks that were previously coordinated within a single management 
structure need to be negotiated in processes that are costly: reaching a deal requires 
time, its implementation requires supervision and differences may require some kind 
of arbitration. For example, high-speed passenger services can only be provided if the 
track reaches higher maintenance standards than for regular services. Under vertical 
separation, the terms of such coordination need to be reflected in contracts whose 
negotiation is lengthy and costly. Separation also requires rail companies to have 
personnel that would not be required under integration. In the UK, for example, where 
a system of financial penalties has been implemented to deal with delays, rail 
companies employ more than 300 people to operate it (OECD, 2005).  
There is some econometric evidence that the costs that vertical separation imposes are 
considerable. Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) analyzed Class I railways in the US for 
the period 1978-2001 and concluded that a fully integrated firm would have a 20-40% 
cost advantage over a vertically separated company. Further problems of separation is 
that it requires complicated timetabling and path allocation that hinder investment 
planning, since the interests of the network owner and train services providers do not 
necessarily coincide.  
Vertical separation has not been more successful that the previous option in 
generating competitive entry. In Sweden, for example, the reform implemented in 
1988 separated the functions of the state-owned rail operator Statens Järnvägar (SJ). 
The National Rail Administration took the responsibility of maintaining and operating 
the infrastructure, while SJ was required to continue providing train services, but 
under commercial terms. In passenger markets, SJ operates commercially viable 
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routes in the national trunk system (regional governments have responsibility over 
regional systems). Non-commercially viable routes are franchised to the bidder asking 
the least subsidy. In this market, SJ has a market share of 77%. In freight markets, the 
incumbent provides services through subsidiaries, which compete with more than 10 
other companies. The largest competitor, however, only holds 12% of the market; 
while SJ controls 85% (Statens Järnvägar, 2005). 
The EU first tried to adopt a model of vertical integration with competitive access.  
Indeed, the directives 91/440/EC, 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC required member states to 
separate the cost accounting records of infrastructure facilities from those of train 
services and to allow the use of that infrastructure by third parties. This model, 
however, was not yet adopted by all member states when the first “railway package” 
was issued. This package favors the adoption of a model of vertical separation, setting 
deadlines for the complete separation of infrastructure from train services and the 
implementation of an open access regime. The second rail package was aimed at 
introducing competition in freight markets while the third sought to liberalize 
international passenger services. 
It can be seen that no restructuring model to be superior. Conserving a national-wide 
integrated rail operator leads to inefficiencies. Dividing the system into regional 
networks reduced connectivity and is difficult to implement in non-dense networks 
and passenger markets. Implementing access policies does not necessarily lead to 
effective competition and requires regulatory skills that may be difficult to find in 
developing countries; and separation imposes sizeable transaction costs that might 
even discourage entry. 
10.5 Reform, regulation and access regimes in 
selected countries 
10.5.1 United Kingdom 
Railways in the UK were built by the private sector during the 19th century.  
Nowadays, the network comprises 21,000 miles of tracks, 2,500 stations, more than 
9,000 level crossings and 40,000 bridges and tunnels (Network Rail, 2005). Figure 9.2 
shows the current British rail system. 
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maintenance services. Infrastructure services were to be provided by Railtrack, a 
company prohibited to provide train services. These include track, signaling, bridges, 
tunnels, and certain stations, freight terminals, sidings, yards, warehouses and other 
facilities. Passenger services were to be provided by train companies operating in 
franchised routes. Freight services were divided into six corporations: three 
regionally-separated bulk companies and three additional ones specialized in 
container traffic, non-bulk international services and postal services, respectively. 
Likewise, BR’s rolling stock was distributed among three companies which would 
lease the equipment to train operating companies. 
The structure of the freight businesses nonetheless changed after the initial separation.  
Three companies were sold to a single operator (English Welsh Scottish Railways), 
which later acquired two more of the privatized companies, and at present carries a 
large part of the rail freight.   
Responsibility for regulating the privatized industry was divided between the Rail 
Regulator and the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising. The Rail Regulator is an 
independent agency responsible for supervising access to track and rail markets. The 
regulator must ensure that the infrastructure operator’s income (access charges and 
transfers from the government) is sufficient to finance the maintenance and 
enhancement of the network. The main responsibility of the Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising was to auction passenger services and to monitor the conditions offered 
by train operating companies. In 2001, this office was replaced by the Strategic Rail 
Authority and entrusted with wider responsibilities. This authority franchises the 
routes to the highest bidder or to the operator which requires the least subsidy. Most 
of the routes are, however, franchised through the second method. 
Access charges for passenger services are set by the Rail Regulator in the form of 
price-caps, using the RPI-X methodology, in five-year periods. The regulated revenue 
of the infrastructure operator is a function of the value of the network assets, the 
returns the regulator considers the company needs to finance investments and the 
costs of operating and maintaining the railway to achieve standards set by the 
regulator. Plans for upgrading and expanding the network are scrutinized by the 
regulator and only those that are considered necessary are allowed to be remunerated 
by access charges. Most non-price access terms are set by the regulator. 
For the first review period following the privatization of the company (1996-2001), 
access charges for passenger services were calculated to cover all of Railtrack’s costs 
and investments. For the second review period (2001-2006), the government decided 
to subsidize network usage to encourage rail transport, for which one third of the 
company’s investment plans were to be financed by the Strategic Rail Authority.  
In the case of freight, criteria for setting access charges changed from the first to the 
second review period. During the first one, access charges were negotiated directly 
with individual operators and the resulting contracts reviewed and approved by the 
regulator. The criteria to approve freight access charges were the following: 
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a. The structure of charges should enable the network operator to recover its total 
freight costs plus any expected contribution to shared common costs; 
b. Charges must be set below stand-alone costs; and, 
c. Charges should be neither higher nor lower than for other operators taking into 
account specific factors related to the services provided. 
The regulator changed its approach for the second review period. It noticed that 
access charges represented a large part of rail freight costs, and therefore had a direct 
impact on the choice between rail and road transport. In line with the government’s 
policy to encourage freight to switch to rail, the Rail Regulator concluded that a more 
deterministic procedure would be used to set access charges. Under this new 
approach, scope for negotiations would be reduced and charges would be set by the 
Rail Regulator according to published criteria: facilitation of competition, reduction 
of entry barriers and entry encouragement. Negotiation would only be used to settle 
issues such as the split between fixed and variable costs and the performance regime. 
This change in approach resulted in a reduction of access charges of approximately 
50%, thus encouraging freight to switch to rail. The Strategic Rail Authority agreed to 
finance the deficit in Railtrack’s revenue originated by this reduction and to pay for 
the specific costs of major enhancements to the network required by freight traffic. 
Other changes were to estimate charges using longer term efficiency gains, 
differentiated by commodity according to the likelihood of competition from other 
transport modes.  Charges for iron ore and coal, for example, would reflect only half 
of the efficiency gains, since higher rates would encourage these commodities to 
switch to road.  Overall, freight access charges were reduced by approximately 50% 
(Drew, 1994).. 
It is worth noting that the underestimation of the amount of investments needed to 
upgrade the network, and a series of events triggered by the accident occurred at 
Hatfield in 2000 led to Railtrack’s bankruptcy in 2001. The accident prompted a large 
program of repairs and replacements that disrupted timetables and led to long delays 
across the network. Railtrack was forced to spend vast sums, both on replacing track 
and on compensating the train operators for the resulting delays to their services. 
Partly as a result of the Hatfield accident, Railtrack predicted a funding gap of almost 
£5 billion between 2001 and 2006.  In 2002, Railtrack went bankrupt and was 
restructured into a “not for profit company” and renamed Network Rail. This new 
company is financed entirely by debt, with the government providing a guarantee 
(Thompson, 2004)64. In a review of the British restructuring and privatization process, 
this author arrived to the following conclusions: 
                                                
64 According to Thompson (2004), Network Rail “is a specific form of legal entity under U.K. law 
that occupies a “not for dividend” status. It was set up for the sole purpose of acquiring Railtrack and 
enabling the business to come out of administration. It is a company limited by guarantee, owned by 
members rather than shareholders, which does not pay dividends. The Board of the new company is 
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a. The British was one of the most contentious of rail reforms. At the time of 
privatization, there was no real consensus on the problem to solve and the 
options to be pursued. 
b. Criticisms have been directed mainly at the costs of the restructuring process 
and the fragmented nature of the services that resulted.  
c. Separation of infrastructure from operations cause problems of complexity and 
created transaction costs. It was not, though, the cause of increased accidents. 
Moreover, the safety record has improved significantly under the new system. 
d. The objective of the government of transferring a significant degree of risk 
(demand, operating cost and investment scheduling) to the private sector 
turned out to be unrealistic and was not achieved. 
e. Passenger and freight traffic have grown rapidly, with passenger demand at 
levels higher than at any point in the last 60 years. Investment levels in 
equipment and infrastructure are higher than they have ever been. 
10.5.2 United States 
The rail industry in the US is one of the largest in the world. The geography and 
economic structure of the country causes the industry to be dominated by freight 
traffic. There are about 500 private freight companies, out of which seven mobilize 
nearly 80% of the cargo. The remaining portion is transported by regional firms that 
operate branch lines that feed into the major networks. These small rail companies 
tend to operate on low-density routes that major companies abandoned after the 
regulatory reforms of the 1970s (Krohn, 1998).  
Rail companies in the US are classified in three classes. Class I railroads are those 
with revenues over US$ 250 million; Class II railroads are those with revenues 
between US$ 20 million and US$ 250 million, while Class III railroads are those with 
revenues under US$20 million. Intercity passenger services are provided by the 
National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak), a public corporation. Commuter 
networks are financed locally.   
                                                                                                                                           
accountable to and may be removed by the members, although the Board is involved in selecting the 
public members. Network Rail’s members comprise the SRA, license holders (…), and other interested 
organizations and individuals drawn from the general public. There are between 100 and 120 
members, of which representatives of the public interest form a majority but no more than 75 percent 
of the total. SRA has special membership rights, including the right to appoint a member of the Board 
of Directors and the right to remove all other members in the event of fundamental financial failure. 
Despite the unusual structure of Network Rail and its underlying government guarantees, it is still 
designated as a private company: it has not been formally re-nationalized.” (p. 19) 
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decrease in freight rates. Around 40 Class I railroads were consolidated into nine 
companies, and some small rail operators emerged (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
In 1995, the Interstate Commerce Commission was replaced by the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB). The STB is an independent body attached to the 
Department of Transportation. It supervises access and antitrust issues for all rail 
companies operating in the US, although it is primarily focused on Class I railways. 
For example, the STB has the right to approve or decline mergers or to impose 
conditions on the merger to avoid market dominance. The US rail policy largely relies 
on intra and inter-modal competition. The STB is only allowed to regulate prices when 
a shipper does not have alternative transport options and the rate asked by the rail 
company is considered unreasonable. Less that 30% of freight traffic is subject to 
regulation (ECMT, 2001). 
In the US, access to facilities owned by other companies is arranged through the use of 
voluntary contractual arrangements. The arrangements are negotiated freely between 
the parties. The STB does not regulate access terms; it only requires that they are not 
discriminatory.  Access agreements can take many forms. The most important are the 
following (Jahanshahi, 1998): 
a. Trackage rights. One railway uses the tracks of another railway and pays an 
agreed charge based on tonnage or a fee for service; 
b. Paired track arrangements.  When railways have parallel tracks and agree to 
integrate them into a double track line, thus increasing operating efficiency; 
c. Joint track arrangements. When the track is co-owned by two or more 
railways. Dispatch and maintenance are shared but each operator is 
responsible for scheduling its own trains; 
d. Joint subsidiaries. When a new company is established to undertake track 
maintenance and some operations; 
e. Joint facilities. The railway is owned by two or more operators; 
f. Reciprocal operating agreements.  When one operator provides rolling 
material and other provides infrastructure services. The track owner receives a 
fee; 
g. Reciprocal switching. A mutual exchange of wagons from one line to another; 
h. Detours. The use of tracks of another railway due to unforeseen events, such 
as natural disasters and derailments; 
i. Pooling. Aggregation of several rail operators to serve large industries; and 
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j. Haulage and car-handling contracts.  One operator pulls the wagons of 
another company when it is not permitted or economically justified to run a 
separate train. 
It is worth mentioning that the non-regulated nature of access arrangements implies 
that competition is not introduced in all segments of the market. In some 
circumstances, for example, although there are many competing railways, there is 
only one track to the final destination. As a matter of fact, Jahanshahi (1998) reports 
that there have been a number of disputes between energy companies and railways 
transporting coal regarding the access charges for the use of these essential facilities. 
Amtrak also has the right to operate over tracks owned by freight companies under 
negotiated access agreements. This allows the company to use 24,000 additional miles 
of track through the payment of access rights to around 20 freight companies. Access 
charges are based on a formula based on avoidable costs that comprises a cost for 
gross tonnage and speed, linked to incentive and penalty payments. It is worth 
mentioning that the future of Amtrak is uncertain. The company requires around US$ 
20 billion to repair its network and the current administration has eliminated its 
operational subsidy of US$1.2 billion for 2006 without restructuring plans been 
approved (The Economist, 2002; 2005a).   
10.5.3 Australia 
The structure of Australian railways follows the economic and demographic patterns 
of the country. Long distances, scarce population concentrated in the east, west and 
south coasts; and a significant mineral production, favor the development of a freight 
network. In fact, over 50% of the freight transported in the country is via rail. Coal 
represents almost 70% of the weight transported by the system. Unlike Europe and 
US, inland waterways are not important for the Australian transport system. Most 
inter-modal competition comes from road (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
The interstate network links the capital cities of all states and is administered by the 
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), a public corporation owned by the 
commonwealth government. There are two main corridors in this network: (i) north-
south, connecting the states of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland along the 
east coast; and (ii), east-west, from New South Wales to Western Australia along the 
southern coast of the country (see figure 10.4). 
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Figure 10.4: Australian Rail System65
Railways began operating in Australia in the 1850s, linking ports, cities and rural 
areas. They were privately owned and operated until the early 1900s, when the 
bankruptcy of several of these companies prompted state governments to take over the 
industry. Within state jurisdictions, vertically-integrated, public-owned monopolies 
operated the systems. Differences in standards and regulations led to a lack of 
integration of the state networks. In the 1970s, the commonwealth government tried to 
consolidate the diverse state systems, but only two state governments agreed to sell 
their railways.   
Besides network fragmentation, legal restrictions to compete with road freight and 
inconsistent cost recovery policies between rail and road resulted in the decline of the 
industry. This poor performance led to commonwealth and state governments to 
promote a large-scale reform of the industry in the 1990s. One if the major difficulties 
in addressing the industry’s problems, however, was that railways are primarily a state 
responsibility. Decisions about the public or private provision of services and 
licensing of operators are made at state level. Hence, regulatory reform was aimed 
primarily at (i) harmonizing the different regulatory regimes; and (ii), standardizing 
the infrastructure. In 1995, the gauge of all interstate tracks was standardized through 
a substantial investment made by the commonwealth government (ECMT, 2001).  
                                                
65 Source: Australasian Railway Association (2005) 
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A wide range of structural, ownership and access policies were introduced by the 
states during the 1990s. Some states vertically separated the provision of 
infrastructure and train services and others privatized parts of the network. In 
Queensland, train services are still provided by an integrated state-owned company. 
Table 10.4 shows the structure and ownership of Australian railways after the reform. 
Table 10.4: Structure and ownership of Australian railways 
Jurisdiction Train Services Provider 
Infrastructure Services 
Provider 
Commonwealth Private Government 
New South Wales Private Government 
Victoria Private Government  
Queensland Government Government 
Western Australia Private Private  
South Australia Private Private  
Tasmania Private Private 
Source: Owens (2003) 
Access to rail infrastructure is governed by the provisions of the National Access 
Regime. The basis for access to interstate rail infrastructure in Australia is the ARTC’s 
access undertaking, accepted by the ACCC in 2002. According to this undertaking, 
access charges are based on published reference tariffs which can be negotiated 
according to the particular needs of the service providers.  Charges are structured as a 
two-part tariff. One component is levied on a fee per kilometer and is specific to each 
train service type and segment. The second component is related to distance and 
weight, and levied on a fee per gross tonnes per kilometer. The published reference 
access charges are adjusted annually using the RPI-X methodology. Access prices are 
also subject to floor-ceiling revenue limits. The floor is given by the incremental cost 
of ARTC providing a service, while the ceiling is the full economic cost of providing 
access to a certain segment of track, including the costs specific to a service, 
depreciation and an allocation of indirect costs, and a return on assets employed. 
Access to intrastate rail networks is nonetheless regulated through state-based 
regimes. These regimes vary in the independence of the arbitrator, the transparency of 
the arbitrator’s decision, the scope to appeal against decisions, pricing principles and 
the mechanisms used to resolve disputes. The regimes are similar in that non-price 
access terms are in all cases determined through a process of negotiation and 
arbitration (Productivity Commission, 2001).   
As in other countries, entry has been modest despite the implementation of the access 
regime. Two companies have entered the national market (both providers of inter-
modal services); although there has been additional entry for niche markets and also 
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from non-rail companies providing their own transport services. According to some 
estimates, these companies account for 15% of the total market (Fagan, 2007). 
10.6 Lessons for a port access regime 
Decades after the nationalization of the industry, changes in markets and technology 
that favor other transport modes and the difficulties faced by organizations structured 
as monopolies to adapt to these circumstances, caused the crisis that questioned the 
way rail services were provided. Different approaches were taken to deal with the 
problem. In the UK, the network is mostly used for passenger traffic, which makes it 
operationally different from those in US and Australia. The approach was to privatize 
the infrastructure separated from the provision of services and to grant Railtrack a 
monopoly to provide infrastructure. The provision of passenger services is franchised 
through auctions to non-related train operators which receive subsidies from the 
Strategic Rail Authority. Freight services were to be supplied in competition with 
other transport modes. It seems that the investment needed to upgrade the network 
and maintain reasonable safety standards was severely underestimated. This might 
have led the government to acknowledge that under these circumstances, the 
provision of infrastructure services also requires financial support from the public 
treasury. In fact, higher access charges and thus, higher train services’ prices, would 
have encouraged passengers to use road transport, which does not fully internalize the 
negative externalities it causes. In Australia, where the problem was the lack of 
integration, the approach taken by the commonwealth and state governments was to 
harmonize regulatory frameworks and to create a single corporation to operate the 
interstate infrastructure. In the US, the approach taken by the government was to 
deregulate the industry to facilitate intra- and inter-modal competition. To avoid 
passenger services to disappear, a public corporation was created to take over the 
market.  
Table 10.5 presents the characteristics of the rail access regimes implemented in the 
UK, US and Australia.  
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Table 10.5: Main characteristics railways industry’s access regimes  
UK US Australia 
Vertical 
structure 
Vertical separation Integration 
Separation for interstate; 
mixed for intrastate 
networks 
Access pricing 
Regulated, with some 
scope for negotiation in 
freight  
Freely negotiated 
Negotiable reference 
charges 
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Regulated, with some 
scope for negotiation in 
freight. 
Freely negotiated 
Negotiable reference 
terms 
Mechanism to 
expand the 
infrastructure 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered necessary are 
remunerated. 
Market incentives 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered necessary are 
remunerated. 
Governments and port regulators can draw several lessons from the reform of the rail 
industry. First, that the decisions regarding the port sector’s vertical structure take into 
account the country’s geographical and economic particularities, since they have a 
large influence in the degree of competition that will arise: its geographical features, 
its production/consumption patterns, the characteristics of the existing insfrastructure, 
etc. As the history of the rail industry shows, there cannot be a “one-size fits all” 
approach to reform, since a model that works well under certain circumstances may 
have negative consequences under different ones. In fact, the vertical structure is 
different in each of the analyzed countries. 
The second main lesson comes from the US experience, which indicates that even in 
industries where competition is strong, regulation may still be needed in some 
segments. As mentioned before, in this country the regulator still sets prices for 30% 
of the freight (EMCT, 2001). In the port industry, where terminals face different 
degrees of competition, this implies that services for some cargoes will need to be 
regulated while others are liberalized. 
The third main lesson is that access may not occur despite the characteristics of the 
implemented regime. As Pittman (2005) argues, the lack of entry is an indicator that 
the economies of scale, scope and density enjoyed by integrated operators are so large 
that prevent competition from non-integrated companies. This is relevant for ports 
because they also present economies of scale and scope (Heaver, 1975; Tovar, Jara-
Diaz and Trujillo, 2004 and 2004). In these circumstances, the absence of an effective 
competition to discipline the incumbent might require regulators to intervene 
regulating not only the monopolistic segments of the logistics chain (such as 
infrastructure provision) but even potentially-competitive markets (shipping and 
nautical services). In these cases, the conditions offered by the few entrants to their 
customers may serve as a benchmark for regulating service conditions.  
Two valuable lessons for regulators in the port industry can be drawn from the 
analysis of access pricing regimes in the rail industry. The first is the confirmation of 
the trend consisting in the use of price caps when the scope for negotiation is small.
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The second is that policies aimed at encouraging the use of a particular transport
mode may use access charges as a tool, but it will require a close coordination 
between the government and the regulator. One policy that would facilitate this 
coordination is having a single regulator in charge of all transport modes, such as in 
Peru and Australia. 
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Part III: An access regime for the port 
industry 
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11. Lessons for formulating access 
policies in the port industry  
More than two decades of reforms in network industries allow drawing useful lessons 
on how to promote competition by implementing access policies. As seen in previous 
chapters, even though the economics and reform drivers differ from industry to 
industry and from country to country, the access problem is common to all of them. 
Section 11.1 discusses the similarities between the economic characteristics of port 
and network industries. This comparison is helpful for determining which of the 
access policies implemented in network industries are more suitable for port 
terminals. Section 11.2 summarizes the lessons learned from implementing access 
policies in network industries. Section 11.3 uses these lessons to determine the 
characteristics that an access regime for naturally monopolistic port terminals should 
have. Finally, the appendix at the end of the chapter analyzes the characteristics of 
access regimes in each of the studied countries. This analysis, even though 
complementary, is useful to determine if the characteristics of some of the discussed 
access policies can be attributed to particular conditions to a broader regulatory 
philosophy. 
11.1 Similarities among ports and network industries 
Table 11.1 shows the economic characteristics of the analyzed industries.  
As discussed in chapter 6, network industries share several features. One of the most 
notorious characteristic is that final services (a call, electricity or gas delivery, the 
completion of the transport logistics chain) are composed by inputs produced in both 
competitive and monopolistic markets. In these circumstances, a regulated company 
providing integrated services has incentives to discriminate against competitors in the 
competitive markets, thus producing the access problem.  
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Unlike network industries this is not necessarily the case in the port industry. As 
explained in chapter 5, naturally monopolistic terminals arise only in ports whose 
traffic is too small to allow building a second terminal (due to sub-additivity of costs). 
But when they arise, the resulting access problem is similar to that of network 
industries: an integrated terminal operator has incentives to discriminate against 
service providers in related markets (stevedoring, storage, towage) to control the 
whole transport chain and recover profits foregone by regulation. 
It can be seen in table 11.1 that all the analyzed industries exhibit economies of scale. 
Ports, telecommunications and railways also exhibit economies of scope, which 
allows providing several services more cheaply than if they were produced by 
independent producing units. Moreover, network industries also exhibit economies of 
density, arising from the fact that it is cheaper to add a new link than building a new 
network. In the case of railways, economies of density arise from the fact that it is 
cheaper to add a new wagon to an existing train than operating a new one.  
Likewise, ports produce positive and negative externalities. Positive, when the assets 
considered public goods are used by other users; and negative, when vessel traffic 
produces congestion or environmental pollution. The externalities produced by the 
other industries are of a different nature. In telecommunications and railways, positive 
ones are produced over existing networks when a new subscriber o rail link is added 
to the network. In the ESI, since electricity systems need to be balanced all the time, 
actions from one generator may have consequences on the remaining generating 
plants or the transmission network.  
It can also be seen in table 11.1 that an important characteristic shared among port 
terminals, telecommunications and railway networks is that their infrastructure 
supports several markets. For example, long-distance and mobile services in 
telecommunications; shipping, cargo handling, pilotage and others in port terminals, 
and freight and passenger services in railways. The ESI and the natural gas industry, 
on the contrary, deliver just only one good.  
Port terminals also share with railways the characteristic that their infrastructure can 
only be expanded in discrete amounts of relatively large minimum sizes. Moreover, a 
large part of the investments is considered sunk, since they have few alternative uses. 
Something similar occurs in the natural gas industry, were production and transport 
requires large capital investments. In telecommunications and the ESI, only some 
technologies and fixed-wire networks require large capital investments and involve 
sunk costs. 
An interesting feature shared between the port industry and natural gas is that 
exogenous factors may have a large impact on competition. Indeed, as explained in 
chapter 9, the location of consumption centers relative to the producing wells may 
allow competition between pipelines even if economies of scale or density are not 
exhausted. As discussed in section 5.1.3, the degree of competition in the port 
industry largely depends on factors such as the location of competing terminals, the 
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existence of suitable shores (to build new terminals), the size of the regional 
economy, among others. 
11.2 Lessons learned from implementing access 
policies  
This section presents the lessons port regulators and policy makers can learn from the 
formulation and implementation of access policies in network industries. As 
explained in chapter 5, formulating access policies involves making decisions or 
setting rules regarding four main issues: vertical structure, access pricing, non-price 
terms and the incentives used to expand the infrastructure.  
Regulators have at least two theoretical options for each of them, as shown in table 
11.2.  
Table 11.2: Options for the design of an access regime 
Option 1 Option 2 
Vertical structure Separation  Integration 
Access pricing Regulation Negotiation 
Non-price terms and 
conditions 
Regulation Negotiation 
Mechanism to expand the 
infrastructure 
Regulation Incentives 
In reality, however, regulators may opt for intermediate or mixed approaches, as 
allowing integration for freight but enforcing separation for passengers (as in US
railways) or setting charges jointly with the incumbent in consultation with other 
operators (as in UK telecommunications). 
11.2.1 Vertical structure 
As explained in chapter 3, the importance of vertical structure lays on the fact that 
integration or separation gives incumbents totally different incentives whether to grant 
access to third parties or not. Indeed, integration gives firms controlling monopolistic 
markets incentives to seek deterring competition in non-monopolistic ones. This 
behavior is facilitated by the information asymmetry that characterizes the interaction 
between regulator and regulated firm (as discussed in chapter 2) and the large 
information costs involved in defining the terms of non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure facilities (as discussed in chapter 5). As seen in previous sections, many 
access terms and conditions involve subtle issues that make discrimination and the 
creation of entry barriers difficult to identify, such as service timetabling, technical 
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specifications for equipments, minimal amounts of insurance cover, personnel 
qualifications requirements, among others. Therefore, implementing access policies 
under vertical integration requires significant regulatory capabilities in terms of 
experience and financial resources66.  
On the other hand, under vertical separation the incumbent has no incentives to 
discriminate, since it cannot provide the service in the competitive market directly or 
through a related company. Under this structure, the more profitable scenario is to 
charge for access to as many companies as possible. Nonetheless, even though this 
behavior reduces the regulatory burden, it also increases transaction costs. And as 
railways illustrate, in the presence of economies of scope these transaction costs can 
be so large that impede entry. 
The vertical structure of network industries in the analyzed countries is shown in table 
11.3. It can be seen that policies regarding the vertical structure of 
telecommunications, ESI and natural gas seem to be consistent across countries: 
integration is allowed for the first, but separation is enforced between monopolistic 
and competitive activities in the remaining two. In railways, UK opted for separation, 
US for integration and Australia for en intermediate approach.  
Table 11.3: Vertical structure of network industries 
UK US Australia 
Telecomm. 
Integration allowed for 
long-distance; legal 
separation required for 
mobile; LLU for internet 
services 
Integration allowed for 
long-distance to 
incumbents opening their 
networks; legal separation 
required for mobile; LLU
for internet  
Integration allowed for 
long-distance and mobile; 
LLU for internet services; 
sharing for data services 
ESI
Legal separation between 
transmission, distribution 
and other activities. 
Integration allowed for 
generation and retailing. 
Operational separation; 
incentives given for 
divestiture and the 
formation of ISOs and 
RTOs. 
Separation. Integration 
subsists among some 
public-owned companies. 
Natural Gas 
Legal separation. 
Integration is allowed 
between transport, storage 
and distribution; and 
between production and 
retailing. 
Operational separation. 
Integration is allowed 
between transport and 
storage.  
Legal separation. 
Integration is allowed  
between transport, storage 
and distribution; and 
between production and 
retailing 
Railways Vertical separation Integration 
Separation for interstate; 
mixed for intrastate 
networks 
The first lesson that port regulators can learn from the experiences of network 
industries is that the decision regarding the vertical structure of an industry has to be 
the consequence of a realistic estimation of the potential for competition in a 
                                                
66 Defilippi (2004) estimates that the costs of regulating monopolistic ports in Peru is equivalent to 
allowing a concessionaire to obtain monopolistic rents in excess of 6% above a normal return 
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particular market. As UK experience in regulating the natural gas industry shows, the 
cost for consumers of allowing integration when separation was needed, is high. A 
related lesson is that the market power of incumbents cannot be underestimated. They 
will take advantage of any flaws in regulation to discourage competitors to enter 
related markets. 
The second lesson is that despite the many criticisms, integration constitutes a 
workable option to organize an industry characterized by having both monopolistic 
and non-monopolistic markets. Indeed, as seen in chapter 7, integration is the 
preferred form of vertical organization in the telecommunications industry, despite the 
fact that incumbents enjoy large amounts of market power (much of it inherited from 
the time when they were publicly owned). A related lesson for port regulators is that 
even in cases where a single operator is allowed to provide several services, some 
form of separation might be needed. Moreover, the fact that either operational or legal 
separation is implemented in a context of vertical integration indicates that the cost of 
implementing these options are not large; or, if large, that these costs are overcome by 
a more transparent operation or an improved regulation.  
The third main lesson concerning vertical structure is that separation seems to be 
necessary when there is the need to create a new market. As explained in chapters 8 
and 9, the main goal of the reforms carried out in the industries of electricity supply 
and natural gas was to create a market for these commodities, regulating only the 
monopolistic segments. But in both industries, the creation of markets necessarily 
requires the separation of the provision of monopolistic from non-monopolistic 
services, as the experience of the UK natural gas industry indicates. In this country, the 
incumbent was able to enjoy monopolistic rents until it was forced to separate by the 
Gas Act of 1995. 
The fourth main lesson regarding vertical structure is that, as the experiences of the 
telecommunications and the railways industries show, the creation of an access 
regime is not enough to ensure entry to non-monopolistic markets, regardless of the 
vertical structure of the industry. This is more evident in the railways industry, where 
entry has been very limited under both vertical integration (The Netherlands, 
Germany, Switzerland) and separation (UK, Sweden). Therefore, regulators should be 
prepared to regulate prices and conditions or closely monitor markets that in theory, 
are competitive. This is the case of internet (where LLU has not encouraged entry as 
expected) or rail freight services.  
11.2.2 Access pricing 
As in many other public policy matters, selecting the mechanism to set access prices 
involves a trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Indeed, 
setting access prices or the methodology to estimate them through a regulatory 
decision may avoid the delays characteristic of negotiation, but it has a higher risk of 
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regulatory failures (due to the information asymmetry between regulator and 
regulated firm and other problems discussed in chapter 2). On the other hand, 
allowing the parties to negotiate may reduce the risk of regulatory failure (since the 
information asymmetry between incumbent and access seeker is smaller than the one 
between regulator and incumbent), but negotiations take time and there is the risk that 
the terms of the agreement may result favoring the incumbent. Negotiation has also 
limits. Indeed, as seen in previous chapters access arrangements include a large 
number of issues that need to be determined, and this complexity could induce 
incumbents to strategically delay their completion.  
Table 11.4 shows how access prices are set in the studied industries and countries. 
Table 11.4: Access pricing in the network industries 
UK US Australia 
Telecomm. 
Set jointly by the regulator 
and the incumbent in 
consultation with other 
operators  
Set at state level, although 
parties are free to 
negotiate other rates 
Negotiated 
ESI
Transmission charges set 
annually using LRMC. 
Total revenues set using 
RPI-X. Connection charges 
are negotiated.
Set by transmission 
owners according to 
guidelines set by the Ferc. 
Regulated using price-
caps (RPI-X methodology) 
Natural Gas 
Regulated. Charges 
capped using RPI-X. 
Set by the pipeline owner 
using a regulated 
methodology. 
Negotiable reference 
tariffs estimated using a 
regulated methodology.  
Railways 
Regulated, with some 
scope for negotiation in 
freight  
Freely negotiated 
Negotiable reference 
charges 
The main lesson regarding access pricing is that there is a strong relationship between 
the option to set access charges (regulation or negotiation) and the methodology to 
determine them (cost-based or price caps). In countries and industries where 
negotiation is encouraged (telecommunications in US and Australia, for example), the 
tendency is to use a cost-based methodology. This occurs even in situations when the 
room for negotiation is small, such as in the UK’s electricity supply and railways 
industries. On the other hand, in industries where vertical separation is mandated, 
such as in the natural gas industry and the ESI in US and Australia, the tendency is 
toward the regulator setting access charges using price caps. 
The main reason behind this finding seems to be the incentives each pricing 
methodology gives the regulated company. When RPI-X is used, the company is given 
an incentive to reduce costs (and achieve productive efficiency) because it is allowed 
to retain the difference between the regulated price and their real costs. In this sense, 
price caps are superior to cost-based methodologies, under which the company does 
not have incentives to reduce costs, since all incurred ones are passed on to the users 
(Bernstein and Sappington, 1998). For this mechanism to work, however, long 
horizons are needed: price reviews are usually performed every four or five years, for 
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which it does not seem to be a useful methodology for a negotiation-arbitration 
framework designed to provide incentives to potential entrants to negotiate their 
access terms 
It is worth commenting the option used by the UK telecommunications regulator to set 
access prices and the problems it would pose for port regulators, especially in the 
developing world. In this case, negotiation does not occur between incumbent and 
access seeker but between incumbent and regulator, in a process where the regulator 
receives advise from other operators. Even though this may seem and interesting 
alternative, it seems to be a very difficult one to adopt in developing countries. 
Indeed, to achieve superior results than a negotiation between incumbent and access 
seekers, this option requires the regulator to know better than the access seekers, for 
example, the characteristics of the demand and the costs involved for all the 
technologies used. This implies, in fact, that the regulator is in a position to overcome 
the information asymmetry that characterizes its interaction with regulated firms. This 
option also requires having a regulator that is totally immune from the influence of 
interest groups. As explained in chapter 2, one of the main causes of regulatory failure 
is the regulator making biased decisions because it has been “captured” by interest 
groups (Guasch and Spiller, 1999). Having the regulator involved in direct 
negotiations with one of the parties not only facilitates the occurrence of this failure 
but also changes its role as the industry’s arbitrator. 
The second main lesson regarding access prices concerns the use of negotiable 
reference tariffs. As explained in chapter 9, the Productivity Commission of Australia 
found during an inquiry that the fact that reference tariffs would prevail in case of a 
dispute discouraged negotiation and led to de facto regulation. To remedy this, the 
Commission recommended to establish more specific pricing principles and allowing 
the use of methodologies different to cost-based ones and to  adopt a monitoring 
rather that a regulatory approach when the benefits of regulation are not clear 
(Productivity Commission, 2004). 
11.2.3 Non-price access terms 
As seen in chapter 5, the purpose of creating a regulatory framework to set non-price 
access terms is to avoid an integrated incumbent creating entry barriers; but also to 
prevent excess entry. As in the previous section, non-price access terms can be either 
set by the regulator or allow parties to negotiate to determine them.  
Table 11.8 shows how non-price access terms are regulated in the network industries 
of UK, US and Australia. 
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Table 11.5: Non-price access terms in the network industries
UK US Australia 
Telecomm. 
Regulated via “standard 
interconnect agreement” 
Set at state level, but 
parties are free to re-
negotiate them.  
Main ones regulated via 
“standard access 
obligations”. Others are 
negotiated. 
ESI
Main terms are regulated 
by a Code. Others are 
negotiated. 
For integrated utilities, 
regulated minimum terms. 
In organized markets, set 
by the system operator.  
Regulated by the National 
Electricity Code. 
Natural Gas 
Regulated. Set in the 
Network Code 
Set by the pipeline owner 
but consistent with 
regulated guidelines  
Negotiable reference 
terms established using 
regulated guidelines 
Railways 
Regulated, with some 
scope for negotiation in 
freight. 
Freely negotiated 
Negotiable reference 
terms 
There are three main lesson port regulators can learn from the analyzed experiences. 
The first is that the mechanism to set non-price access terms tends to be the same as 
for setting access charges, but not necessarily. In the Australian telecommunications 
industry, for example, even though access charges are set through negotiation, the 
main non-price access terms are regulated. Only the remaining ones are negotiated.  
The second lesson regards the difference between the theory and the practice of 
negotiation when setting non-price access terms. As explained in chapter 5, 
negotiation is used as a mean to overcome the information asymmetry existing 
between the regulator and the regulated firm. In theory, access seekers have better 
information than the regulator regarding the real costs of providing services, for 
which, to avoid regulatory failures, the regulator should only intervene if negotiations 
between the regulated company and the access seeker fail. However, the analysis 
carried out in previous chapters indicates that the information asymmetry does not 
prevail in all non-price aspects. Indeed, as shown by the access regimes in the 
telecommunications industry, at least some of the non-price access terms can be set 
outright (arguably, the most obvious ones, or those that have been set in previous 
access agreements), thus reducing the scope for negotiation and shortening the 
process.  
The third lesson is analogous to the previous one. Under an access regime that favors 
setting non-price access terms through regulation, the practice indicates that at least 
some terms can be left to be determined though negotiation, such as in the UK’s 
railways and electricity supply industries. Terms left for negotiation are those where 
the information asymmetry between regulator and regulated firm is larger. For 
example, in the UK’s ESI, entrants have to negotiate with the incumbent which works 
will have to be undertaken for connecting to the transmission grid. Trying to regulate 
this in advance is of little help, since the nature and costs of these works will depend 
on the particular conditions of the entrant’s infrastructure. In this case, negotiation 
would lead to better results.  
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11.2.4 Mechanism to expand the infrastructure 
In competitive markets, companies have incentives to expand their infrastructure to 
meet demand; otherwise, they might lose clients to competitors offering better 
services. Monopolists, however, do not have these incentives. In fact, as explained in 
chapter 2, it is more profitable for them to restrict supply until the point where 
marginal costs equal marginal revenue. Regulated monopolists face similar incentives 
than non-regulated ones. They will not expand their infrastructure unless they face 
incentives of some sort; especially if they are vertically integrated and the 
infrastructure will also be used by other operators in related competitive markets. For 
these reasons, regulators need to decide what mechanism will be used to ensure that 
the infrastructure will be expanded. They have two options: they can either order the 
incumbent to expand the infrastructure or give him economic incentives to do it when 
necessary.  
It is worth recalling what was discussed in chapter 5 regarding the form under which 
the private sector participates in the port industry. Unlike telecommunications, 
electricity supply and natural gas industries, where privatization through the sale of 
public assets is the rule, port terminals are transferred to the private sector through 
several arrangements which may require or not the expansion of the infrastructure. 
Concessions, Greenfield Projects and Divestitures generally require private 
companies to expand the infrastructure, whereas Management Contracts and Leases 
do not (World Bank, 2007). More importantly, out of the 299 port projects with 
private participation carried out in developing countries between 1990 and 2006, the 
large majority (276) belong to the first group; i.e., require private companies to 
expand the terminal’s infrastructure when needed (PPIAF, 2007). 
The main difficulty with opting for ordering the monopolist to expand the 
infrastructure is the already discussed information asymmetry regarding demand and 
the incumbent’s costs. Because of that, the regulators may lack information to decide 
whether the expansion (or what kind of expansion) is needed. The second difficulty 
with this option arises from the regulatory capture’s problem: the regulator’s decision 
may be biased because of influence from an interest party, such as the government, 
consumers or the regulated company itself. It also incentives incumbents to spend 
resources in unproductive activities (such as lobbying) trying to convince the 
regulator that their planned investments are, in effective, necessary (Lasheras, 1999).  
The option of giving the incumbent economic incentives to expand the infrastructure 
has also disadvantages, as discussed in chapter 5. Financial rewards allow incumbents 
to obtain monopolistic rents; market incentives are only suited for incumbents facing 
competition, and subsidies only work for unprofitable services. As we will see, 
regulators tend to use mixed approaches. 
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Table 11.6 shows the incentives given to incumbents to expand the infrastructure in 
the analyzed network industries.  
Table 11.6: Mechanism to expand the infrastructure in network industries  
UK US Australia 
Telecomm. 
Universal service 
obligations 
Universal service 
obligations 
Universal service 
obligations 
ESI
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered necessary are 
remunerated 
In organized markets, the 
system operator decides 
over expansions. Other 
operators face market 
incentives.  
Regulated. The regulator 
will only remunerate 
investments passing the 
"Regulatory Test". 
Natural Gas 
Regulated. Ofgem set 
expansion targets. 
Market incentives 
Market incentives, but the 
regulator can order 
expansions if requested by 
access seekers 
Railways 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered necessary are 
remunerated. 
Market incentives 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered necessary are 
remunerated. 
The first lesson for port regulators is that the decision regarding the expansion of the 
infrastructure in monopolistic markets cannot be left to the monopolist. As one can 
see in Table 11.6, only in industries where infrastructure owners compete against each 
other (natural gas and railways in the US) the decision is left to the incumbent, who 
can decide whether to expand the infrastructure according to market conditions. In all 
the remaining cases, the decision is made or authorized by the regulator, with the sole 
exception of the US ESI (in Organized Markets, the decision is made by the System 
Operator).  
The second lesson is that regulators in network industries have implemented two 
policies to deal with the problem of expanding the infrastructure, each with important 
shortcomings.  
a. The first is to allow an independent planner to decide when infrastructure 
should be expanded, as in the US Organized Markets. In theory, independent 
system operators have enough information to make opportune and demand-
adjusted decisions. However, as discussed in section 8.4, i) these bodies may 
lack incentives to make the right decisions, since they do not bear the cost of 
their mistakes; and, ii) they tend to have complex governance structures 
(Arizu, Dunn and Tenenbaum, 2001).  
b. The second option is to allow the asset owner to propose expansions but only 
approve those that are considered necessary, which is the method used in the 
electricity supply and railways industries in UK and Australia. However, as 
argued by Parker (2002), this option is prone to regulatory failures due to the 
existing information asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated 
firm. 
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The third lesson regarding the mechanisms used to expand the infrastructure is that 
the use of auctions may constitute a useful tool to allocate installed capacity, but it 
does not provide adequate incentives to expand the infrastructure. Moreover, as the 
UK’s natural gas industry experience indicates, allowing the incumbent to keep even a 
small percentage of the proceeds introduces incentives that are perverse, since the 
more acute the infrastructure scarcity is, the higher the revenues it receives. For these 
reasons, auctions should be used together with other incentives that penalize the 
incumbent for not expanding the infrastructure. The UK natural gas regulator 
combines long-term options with exposing the incumbent to buy-back costs by 
forcing it to repurchase the required capacity at spot prices67.  
The following box summarizes the lessons learned from analyzing the access policies 
implemented in network industries. 
                                                
67 When capacity is scarce, spot prices are much higher that long-term ones (Chan, Laplagne, and 
Appels, 2003) . 
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Box  1: Access Policies Implemented in Network Industries:  
Lessons for the Port Industry 
Vertical structure 
1. The decision regarding the vertical structure of an industry has to be the consequence of a 
realistic estimation of the potential for competition in a particular market. As experience 
shows, the cost for consumers of allowing integration when separation is needed, is high.  
2. Despite the many criticisms, integration constitutes a workable option to organize an 
industry where monopolistic and non-monopolistic segments coexist. However, 
experience shows that even in cases where a single operator is allowed to provide several 
services some form of separation might be needed.  
3. Vertical separation seems to be necessary when there is the need to create a new market. 
Indeed, the main goal of the reforms carried out in the industries of electricity supply and 
natural gas was to create a market for these commodities, regulating only the 
monopolistic segments. But in both industries, the creation of markets necessarily 
requires separating the provision of monopolistic from non-monopolistic services.  
4. As the experiences of the telecommunications and the railways industries show, the 
creation of an access regime is not enough to ensure entry to non-monopolistic markets, 
regardless the vertical structure of the industry. 
Access pricing 
5. There is a strong relationship between the option to set access charges (regulation or 
negotiation) and the methodology to determine them (cost-based or price caps). In 
countries and industries where negotiation is encouraged (telecommunications in US and 
Australia, for example), the tendency is to use a cost-based methodology. In industries 
where vertical separation is mandated, the tendency is toward the regulator using price 
caps to set access charges. 
6. The use of negotiable reference tariffs may discourage negotiation, as the experience of 
the Australian natural gas industry indicates.  
Non-price access terms 
7. The mechanism to set non-price access terms tends to be the same as for setting access 
charges, but not necessarily.  
8. Under an access regime that favors setting non-price access terms through negotiation, at 
least some of the non-price access terms can be set outright, thus reducing the scope for 
negotiation and shortening the process.  
9. Under an access regime that favors setting non-price access terms through regulation, at 
least some terms can be left to be determined though negotiation. 
Mechanism to expand the infrastructure 
10. The decision regarding the expansion of the infrastructure in monopolistic markets 
cannot not be left to the monopolist 
11. Regulators in network industries have implemented two policies to deal with the problem 
of expanding the infrastructure:  
a. To allow an independent planner to decide when infrastructure should be 
expanded (as in US Organized Markets).  
b. To allow the asset owner to propose expansions but only approve those that are 
considered necessary (as in the electricity supply and railways industries in UK
and Australia). 
12. The use of auctions may constitute a useful tool to allocate installed capacity, but it does 
not provide adequate incentives to expand the infrastructure. For this reason, auctions 
should be used together with other incentives that penalize the incumbent for not 
expanding the infrastructure.  
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11.3 Elements of an access regime for the port 
industry  
The purpose of analyzing the access policies implemented in network industries is to 
use these experiences to propose an access regime for the port industry. According to 
the analysis carried out in previous sections, such a regime should have the following 
characteristics. 
Table 11.7: Characteristics of an Access Regime for the Port Industry 
Element Recommendation for ports 
Vertical structure 
Integration with operational 
separation 
Access pricing 
Negotiation. Use of cost-based 
methodologies. 
Non-price terms and conditions 
Negotiation, but some with terms 
established ex ante by the regulator 
Mechanism to expand the 
infrastructure 
Intermediate approach: use of triggers 
11.3.1 Vertical structure 
The preceding sections have shown that the trend in the telecommunications industry 
is to allow vertical integration with some form of operational or legal separation; 
whilst in the energy industries (ESI and natural gas), there is a clear tendency toward 
enforcing vertical separation. In railways, the tendency is not clear. Access regimes 
with both separation (UK, Sweden) and integration (Germany, The Netherlands) have 
been implemented and entry has been limited under both options. Which of these 
options is the more suitable for the port industry?  
We have seen that the port terminals are similar to telecommunications networks in 
the sense that both support several markets. For example, pilotage, towage and others 
in port terminals; and long-distance and mobile services in telecommunications. The 
monopolistic segments of both the ESI and the natural gas industry are used to deliver 
just one commodity. Moreover, in these industries separation was the consequence of 
a necessity, since the newly created markets for these commodities could not work 
without separating the monopolistic segments from the competitive ones. 
Another argument to be taken into account is that one of the main trends in the 
transport industry (not only in ports) is toward competition among integrated logistics 
chains (ADB, 2000). Ports (and terminals) constitute the most important link (node) in 
competing supply chains (Haralambides, 2007).  
Under these considerations, integration is the most recommendable option of vertical 
structure for naturally monopolistic port terminals. However, this is only a 
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preliminary conclusion. As the experience of the UK natural gas industry shows, the 
consequences of erring in this aspect are dear for consumers. Indeed, as one can recall 
for chapter 9, regulators underestimated the incumbent’s potential for exploiting 
market power, for which integration allowed the incumbent to deter competitors 
despite the implementation of an open access regime. The market for natural gas 
could perform competitively only after separation was enforced.  
For this reason, even though allowing integration seem to be a logical decision, port 
regulators still need to carry out adequate estimations of economies of scale and scope 
at particular ports. In this sense, the experience of the railways industry is 
exemplifying. As Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) found, estimation of economies of 
scope indicate that a fully integrated firm would have a 20-40% cost advantage over a 
vertically separated company. In these circumstances, very little entry would be 
expected regardless of the characteristics of the access regime. 
11.3.2 Price and non-price access terms 
The analysis carried out through this study shows that in industries where integration 
is allowed, there is a tendency toward the use of negotiation to determine price and 
non-price terms (telecommunications in US and Australia). The analysis also shows 
that in industries where integration is allowed, cost-based methodologies are used to 
determine access charges, even in situations when the room for negotiation is small 
(as in the UK’s electricity supply and railways industries).  
Since integration is the most recommendable option of vertical structure for naturally 
monopolistic port terminals, negotiation constitutes the most recommendable option 
to determine price and non-price terms. In these circumstances, the regulator should 
only intervene when parties do not reach an agreement.  
For the same reasons, a cost-based methodology should be used to determine access 
charges. However, as the experience of the Australian natural gas industry indicates, 
port regulators should refrain from establishing reference tariffs that would prevail in 
case of a dispute. Experience shows that this arrangement has discouraged negotiation 
and led to de facto regulation (Productivity Commission, 2004). 
One of the main lessons of access policies implemented in network industries 
indicates that even in industries where non-price terms are set through regulation, 
some of these terms can be set outright by the regulator, especially those that are 
considered industry standards or where the information asymmetry between regulator 
and regulated firm is small. For example, the amount of insurance cover that the 
incumbent might require to third parties operating inside the terminal, the 
characteristics of the equipments to be used, the qualifications of the laborers, or the 
terminal’s queuing policy (as in the Australian natural gas industry). 
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11.3.3 Mechanism to expand the infrastructure 
As the statistics of public-private partnerships in the port industry show, the large 
majority of projects carried out in developing countries require the operator to expand 
the terminal’s infrastructure when needed (PPIAF, 2007). Only leases and management 
contracts do not impose this requirement. The regulator’s problem is then to devise a 
mechanism to assure that the infrastructure will be expanded when needed. One of the 
main lesson from the experiences of network industries is that this decision should not 
be left to the incumbent. 
The analysis shows that regulators in network industries have implemented two 
policies to deal with the problem of expanding the infrastructure. The first is to allow 
an independent planner to decide when infrastructure should be expanded (as in the 
US Organized Markets). The second option is to allow the asset owner to propose 
expansions but only approve those that are considered necessary (as in the electricity 
supply and railways industries in UK and Australia). Both options have important 
shortcomings that were discussed in chapter 11. 
However, none of these options seem better than simply indicating the maximum 
congestion level a terminal can stand, which is the method used in the concession of 
Matarani port terminal, in Peru (Alcazar and Lovaton, 2005). In this case, congestion 
acts as “trigger”: once the maximum level is reached, the operator has to expand the 
terminal. Two considerations that make the asymmetry between regulator and 
regulated firm almost inexistent support this conclusion. First, unlike network 
industries there are few technical options to expanding a port terminal when 
occupancy reaches congestion levels. Second, the criterion that a terminal reaches 
congestion levels when it reaches between 60% and 70% of berth utilization is 
considered the norm in the industry (Nathan Associates, 2004). For these reasons, the 
most recommendable mechanism to determine when to require the incumbent to 
expand the terminal’s infrastructure is the use of “triggers”. 
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Appendix 4: National access regimes in the studied 
countries 
The analysis of access regimes by country is a useful exercise because: (i) it allows 
one to identify national regulatory patterns; and (ii), to understand the extent to which 
the choice of options made to regulate access in a particular industry is influenced by 
a broader regulatory philosophy or national policy.
A4.1 United Kingdom 
The scope and extent of the regulatory reforms undertaken in the UK’s allows 
extracting valuable lessons. Indeed, this was the first country to restructure its 
network industries at large scale. Reforms were based on the guiding principle that 
competitive markets yield more efficient results than government supply.  As a result, 
state-owned monopolies were privatized and markets traditionally reserved to be 
served by public companies were opened to competition. The role of the government 
in network industries shifted from service provider to regulator and arbitrator. This 
approach was later followed by a number of countries around the world.   
However, as discussed in previous chapters, some of the restructuring policies 
initially implemented in the UK were flawed, inconsistent or implicitly made 
assumptions that were later proven wrong.  For example, the design of the Electricity 
Pool allowed the owners of mid-priced plants to collude or game the system, and the 
instrument to trade futures distorted the price of electricity. These and other flaws 
forced the government to replace the pool with NETA in 2001 (Newbery, 1999).  
Likewise, assessments about the contestability of certain markets were inconsistent. In 
the telecommunications industry, only one competitor was initially licensed to 
challenge the incumbent in each market; while in the natural gas industry the 
government trusted that competition could develop even if BG owned the transmission 
system and was the only purchaser of the gas produced in the North Sea.   
In addition, some of the implemented policies were based on assumptions that were 
later proven wrong. For example, the division of BR’s freight services into six 
companies implicitly assumed that on-rail competition could be introduced even in 
the presence of sizeable economies of scope. At the time of privatization, nonetheless, 
three of these companies were sold to a single operator which later acquired two more 
of the privatized companies. Similarly, it was assumed that the amount of investments 
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needed to maintain and upgrade the rail system could be solely recovered through 
access charges. This assumption also ignored that higher rail prices would encourage 
passengers to shift to road traffic, thus creating more congestion and other related 
externalities. 
Table A4.1 presents the characteristics of the access regimes currently in effect in the 
UK.  
Table A4.1: Access regimes in UK network industries 
Telecom ESI Natural gas Railways 
Vertical 
structure 
Integration allowed 
for long-distance; 
legal separation 
required for 
mobile; LLU for 
internet services 
Legal separation 
between 
transmission, 
distribution and 
other activities. 
Integration allowed 
for generation and 
retailing. 
Legal separation. 
Integration is 
allowed between 
transport, storage 
and distribution; 
and between 
production and 
retailing. 
Vertical separation 
Access 
pricing 
Set jointly by the 
regulator and the 
incumbent in 
consultation with 
other operators  
Transmission 
charges set 
annually using 
LRMC. Total 
revenues set using 
RPI-X. Connection 
charges are 
negotiated.
Regulated. Charges 
capped using RPI-X. 
Regulated, with 
some scope for 
negotiation in 
freight  
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Regulated via 
“standard 
interconnect 
agreement” 
Main terms are 
regulated by a 
Code. Others are 
negotiated. 
Regulated. Set in 
the Network Code 
Regulated, with 
some scope for 
negotiation in 
freight. 
Mechanism 
to expand the 
infrastructure 
Universal service 
obligations 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered 
necessary are 
remunerated 
Regulated. Ofgem 
set expansion 
targets. 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered 
necessary are 
remunerated. 
It seems that there is a trend toward vertically separated activities among the access 
regimes implemented in the UK. Although the approach is more flexible for 
telecommunications, transmission and other services should be provided by legally 
separated companies in both energy industries.  In the rail industry, the operator of the 
network is also banned from providing train services.   
A tendency can also be observed toward the regulation of access prices. Indeed, 
parties are allowed to negotiate only connection charges to the transmission grid and 
certain aspects of rail access charges for freight services. In the telecommunications 
industry, access charges were initially set after a negotiation involving BT, the 
regulator and representatives of the consumers, but since then are adjusted by the 
regulator using the RPI-X methodology.   
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The UK’s trend toward regulation is more evident regarding access terms and 
conditions. As a matter of fact, there is no scope for negotiation in any of the analyzed 
industries. Only in the ESI, parties can negotiate complementary agreements which 
establish the works required to connect to the transmission system. 
As for the incentives used to expand the network, the tendency toward regulation is 
less clear. In telecommunications, incumbents with significant market power are 
obliged to meet universal service obligations; in the ESI and railways, expansions to 
be remunerated using access charges are subject to regulator’s approval; while in the 
natural gas industry, Ofgem complements regulated targets with economic incentives.   
A4.2 United States 
The US economic system has a large history of reliance on the private sector to deliver 
services traditionally supplied by state-owned companies in other countries. Indeed, 
while railways and telephone companies were nationalized in Australia and the UK, 
they remained private in the US.  
Private provision of public services was nonetheless complemented by government 
regulation as early as 1887, when the Interstate Commerce Commission was created 
to countervail the market power of railway owners. Regulation was later extended to 
other network industries with the creation of the FCC and the Ferc. The responsibility 
for regulation of network industries in the US is shared by federal and state regulators.  
In industries such as railways and natural gas, tight or flawed regulation has been 
regarded as one of the main causes of their gradual decline between the 1950s and 
1980s (OECD, 1998).   
In telecommunications and electricity supply, on the contrary, it is the lack of 
regulation and authorities’ regulatory powers that was considered as the cause for 
markets not working properly. For example, the public status of many participants in 
the ESI and the legal constraints faced by federal and state regulators to mandate the 
unbundling of transmission and generation has limited the implementation of ISOs and 
RTOs (Brown and Sedano, 2003). As a result, some state PUCs have been obliged to 
provide financial incentives to integrated utilities to divest their assets. Likewise, the 
implementation of the Telecommunications Act by the FCC was legally challenged by 
the incumbents in a process that lasted six years.   
Two aspects of the US access regimes are worth noting. The first is that the access 
framework in the natural gas industry encouraged the creation of a secondary market 
for capacity rights, which led to the development of a spot gas market. The second is 
the non-mandatory nature of the access arrangements in the rail industry, which 
implies that competition has not been introduced in all segments of the market.   
Table A4.2 presents the characteristics of the access regimes in US network industries. 
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The characteristics of US access regimes show a tendency toward non-intervention.  
Only the ESI seems to be closely regulated, presumably because of its unique features 
discussed in previous chapters.  
It can be seen that although regulatory criteria may differ among federal and state 
regulators, vertical integration is common. However, unbundling of electricity 
activities is encouraged and ring-fencing arrangements are imposed to enforce 
operational separation in both energy industries. Prices, terms and conditions for 
access are negotiated in all studied industries with the exception of the ESI. In the 
natural gas industry, reference tariffs for transmission are estimated by the pipeline 
owners themselves following Ferc’s methodologies and guidelines. 
In gas and railways, networks expansion is guided by market incentives rather than by 
regulatory targets.  In the ESI, this is the mechanism used by ISOs and RTOs, although 
systems not using these organized markets may follow different guidelines. In 
telecommunications, the coverage of high cost areas is assured through the imposition 
of universal service obligations. Further network expansions are guided by 
commercial incentives. 
Table A4.2: Access regimes in US Network industries 
Telecom ESI Natural gas Railways 
Vertical 
structure 
Integration allowed 
for long-distance 
for incumbents 
opening their 
networks; legal 
separation required 
for mobile; LLU for 
internet services 
Operational 
separation; 
incentives given 
for divestiture and 
the formation of 
ISOs and RTOs. 
Operational 
separation. 
Integration is 
allowed between 
transport and 
storage.  
Integration 
Access 
pricing 
Set at state level, 
although parties are 
free to negotiate 
other rates 
Set by transmission 
owners according 
to guidelines set by 
the Ferc. 
Set by the pipeline 
owner using a 
regulated 
methodology. 
Freely negotiated 
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Set at state level, 
but parties are free 
to re-negotiate 
them.  
For integrated 
utilities, regulated 
minimum terms. In 
organized markets, 
set by the system 
operator. 
Set by the pipeline 
owner but 
consistent with 
regulated 
guidelines  
Freely negotiated 
Mechanism 
to expand the 
infrastructure 
Universal service 
obligations 
In organized 
markets, the system 
operator decides 
when expansions 
are needed. 
Integrated 
operators face 
market incentives.  
Market incentives Market incentives 
A4.3 Australia 
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As a late comer, Australia could reap from the reforming experiences of other 
countries, in particular the UK. The approach taken was to institute a general access 
regime that applies to all facilities of national importance, regardless of their 
ownership or industry to which they belong. 
As seen in chapter 3, the National Access Regime establishes the criteria to bring 
facilities and services under access regulation, and subjects the determination of their 
prices, terms and conditions to a negotiation-arbitration framework. Although specific 
access regimes have been developed for the telecommunications, electricity and 
natural gas industries, these are consistent with the regulations of the National Access 
Regime. 
Since Australia is politically organized as a federal government, regulatory 
responsibilities are shared among the commonwealth and state regulators, akin to the 
US system. For this reason, industry reforms required close coordination between 
national and state governments.   
Non-economic factors such as the size of the population relative to the extension of 
the country and its distribution within the territory play a relevant role in Australian 
network industries. In the ESI, for example, although the interstate electricity market is 
called the National Electricity Market, it only comprises eastern and southern 
Australia. The natural gas industry developed in the form of isolated networks with 
little or no interconnection, and differences in standards and regulations led to a lack 
of integration of the state rail networks. 
Table A4.3 presents the characteristics of the access regimes in Australian network 
industries. It can be seen that the Australian scope to regulate access in network 
industries is intermediate among those implemented in the US and the UK. Although 
integration is allowed in telecommunications, even for mobile services; separation is 
the preferred structure in the remaining industries, at least for private companies and 
interstate networks.  
As in other countries, price and non-price conditions for the ESI are regulated. These 
elements are subject to negotiation (and arbitration) in the remaining industries with 
the exception of telecommunications, where non-price terms are regulated via 
standard access obligations. 
The incentives used to encourage network expansion are not uniform across 
industries. In both energy industries, market incentives guide network expansions.  
But in the ESI, new assets will secure a return only if they pass a “regulatory test”; 
while in the natural gas industry regulators may mandate the expansion of a pipeline if 
it is justified by the requirements of a prospective user. In telecommunications, 
carriers are required to meet universal service obligations, while in the rail industry, 
regulators estimate access charges including only justifiable investments. 
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Table A4.3: Access regimes in Australian network industries 
Telecom ESI Natural gas Railways 
Vertical 
structure 
Integration allowed 
for long-distance 
and mobile; LLU
for internet 
services; sharing 
for data services 
Separation. 
Integration subsists 
among some 
public-owned 
companies. 
Legal separation. 
Integration is 
allowed  between 
transport, storage 
and distribution; 
and between 
production and 
retailing 
Separation for 
interstate; mixed 
for intrastate 
networks 
Access 
pricing 
Negotiated 
Regulated using 
price-caps (RPI-X
methodology) 
For transport, 
negotiable 
reference tariffs 
estimated using a 
regulated 
methodology.  
Negotiable 
reference charges 
Non-price 
terms and 
conditions 
Main ones 
regulated via 
“standard access 
obligations”. 
Others are 
negotiated. 
Regulated by the 
National Electricity 
Code. 
Negotiable 
reference terms 
established using 
regulated 
guidelines 
Negotiable 
reference terms 
Mechanism 
to expand the 
infrastructure 
Universal service 
obligations 
Regulated. The 
regulator will only 
remunerate 
investments 
passing the 
"Regulatory Test". 
Market incentives, 
but the regulator 
can order 
expansions if 
requested by access 
seekers 
Regulated. Only 
expansions that are 
considered 
necessary are 
remunerated. 
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12. A model of access regime for the 
port industry 
The aim of this chapter is to propose an access regime to regulate naturally 
monopolistic port terminals using the lessons learned from network industries. 
Section 12.1 presents the basic elements of the model (objectives, actors and 
elements). Section 12.2 describes its operation using the example of Matarani port 
terminal. Section 12.3 uses game theory to analyze the expected consequences of the 
proposed model on the contestability and efficiency of port-related markets.  
12.1 Basic elements  
12.1 1 Objectives 
As explained in chapter 2, the aim of regulation is to eliminate the barriers that 
impede the functioning of competitive markets; or, if this is not possible, to replicate 
the discipline that market forces would impose on the regulated firm if they were 
present (Guasch and Spiller, 1999). To achieve these goals, regulation is based on two 
main policies: (i) price regulation (regulation of prices and quality of service), and; 
(ii) access regulation (regulation of how firms access the facilities they need to 
compete) (Defilippi and Flor, 2008). 
The main objective of the proposed access model is to allow competition to occur in 
markets that otherwise would need to be price-regulated. By limiting regulatory 
intervention only to situations when it is effectively needed, this policy is less costly 
and less likely to spawn market distortions. 
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12.1.2 Parties 
There are three parties:  
a. Regulator: It can be a government agency specialized in monopoly regulation, 
such as Ositran (Peru), Superintendencia de Puertos y Transporte (Colombia), 
or the state regulators of Victoria68 and South Australia69; as well as 
empowered ministries such as Mexico’s Secretaría de Transporte, or 
competition agencies such as Australia’s ACCC, or the ICCC in Papua New 
Guinea.  
b. Incumbent: A private firm that operates a terminal under any contractual or 
ownership arrangement. It can be a concessionaire, lessee or terminal owner. 
c. Entrant: A private firm that would like to enter the market of any service 
necessary to complete the logistics chain. It can provide one or many services. 
12.1.3 Assumptions 
The model has the following assumptions: 
a. The port has a single terminal, handling liquid bulk; dry bulk; break-bulk; and 
containerized cargo. 
b. The terminal constitutes a natural monopoly for all cargo originated in or 
destined to its hinterland. 
c. The terminal operator:  
• Is a private firm.  
• Is in charge of maintaining and expanding the terminal’s infrastructure. 
• Has the right to collect wharfage (to cargo) and berthage (to vessels) to 
pay for maintaining and expanding the infrastructure. 
d. The port authority has normative and regulatory duties regarding traffic, safety 
and security issues.  
e. Port services (stevedoring, warehousing, pilotage, towage, mooring, etc.) can 
be provided by the terminal operator, a related company or competing firms. 
There are no sizeable entry barriers. 
                                                
68 The Essential Services Commission.  
69 The Essential Services Commission of South Australia.  
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f. Cargo is handled using equipment that is not fixed to the infrastructure: mobile 
cranes and conveyor belts, forklifts, tipper trucks, yard trucks, loading shovels, 
and the ship’s own equipment. Containers are shipped in geared vessels. 
12.1.4 Characteristics of the model 
Consistently with the analysis and recommendations of section 11.3, the proposed 
access regime should have the following characteristics: 
a. Vertical structure: Integration with legal or operational separation (similar to 
access regimes implemented in the telecommunications industry). The 
terminal operator is allowed to provide all the services needed to complete the 
logistics chain by itself (operational separation) or through related companies 
(legal separation). 
b. Access pricing: Access charges result from a negotiation between the 
incumbent and entrant using a cost-based methodology. Similar to the 
arbitration-negotiation devised in the Australian National Access Regime, the 
regulator only intervenes if the parties do not reach an agreement. 
c. Non-price terms: Non-price terms are also subject to negotiation between 
incumbent and entrant. The regulator sets the rules of negotiation and is 
expected to set some basic terms outright. As for access pricing, the regulator 
only intervenes if the parties do not reach an agreement. 
d. Mechanism to expand the infrastructure: Use of “triggers”. Similarly to the 
system used in the UK’s natural gas industry, the regulator pre-announces the 
maximum congestion level and penalizes the operator if this level is surpassed. 
Under this arrangement, the operator has incentives to expand the 
infrastructure when needed.  
Unlike network industries, in ports the number of service providers can be limited by 
safety, security or operational reasons. In this case, auctions would be used as a 
mechanism to select the operator. As discussed in chapter 2, Demsetz (1968) claims 
that it is possible to achieve optimal results by generating ex ante competition (the 
“Demsetz Approach”). In the absence of collusion, equal access to essential inputs 
and symmetric information among the bidders, the auction would make prices 
approach the average cost of the most efficient firm, thus minimizing simultaneously 
productive and allocative inefficiencies.  
12.2 Operation of the model 
Once the basic characteristics of the regime are decided, principles are needed to 
determine which services will be covered (stevedoring, warehousing, pilotage, 
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towage, mooring, etc.) and which facilities the operators should be granted access to 
(piers, wharves, docks, aprons, yards, transit and parking areas, etc.) To decide this, 
the model borrows two important characteristics of the Australian National Access 
Regime: the use of the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) and the declaration of 
“Essential Services”.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the National Access Regime applies to all infrastructures 
considered of “national importance”, regardless of the industry. The regime works by 
declaring these infrastructures “Essential Facilities” and granting access to parts of 
them according to the criteria of the EFD. So far, the regime has been applied to the 
network industries analyzed in this study as well as to port and airport terminals 
(Productivity Commission, 2001). It is important to take note that not all services 
provided with essential facilities are covered by the Australian regime. Only those 
that are needed to deliver the good or service provided by the industry in question are, 
and are listed by regulators as “Essential Services”.  
In the port industry, “Essential Services” are only those that are needed to complete 
the logistics chain: pilotage, towage, mooring, stevedoring, etc. These are the services 
that a regulated monopolist would try to monopolize to recover profits foregone by 
regulation. But a service such as bunkering, for example, may not be declared an 
Essential Service if the regulator considers that ships can refuel in another location. In 
this case, competition alone would limit the incumbents’ ability to charge 
disproportionate prices and thus, to recover monopolistic rents. Regulation would not 
be warranted and thus should be avoided.  
In this model, “Essential Facilities” are those the providers of “Essential Services” 
require access to. For example, to provide towage services, towboats require access to 
the basin and mooring areas. Their crews also require access to transit areas within the 
terminal. Since an integrated terminal operator might impede non-related towage 
companies provide services by restricting access to these facilities, the basin, as well 
as mooring and transit areas constitute Essential Facilities for the provision of towage 
services. Once a service is declared as Essential Service, the conditions to access 
Essential Facilities are regulated. 
Table 12.1 shows the three types of market that exist in a port with a naturally 
monopolistic terminal: markets that are effectively monopolistic (and require price 
regulation); those that would be competitive if the incumbents’ ability to deter 
competition is limited (require access regulation); and those that do not require 
regulation (regular antitrust policies could be used to deal with anti-competitive 
behavior).  
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Table 12.1: Types of Markets in Ports with Monopolistic Terminals 
Type of market Contestability Regulation required 
Monopolistic No Price regulation 
Competitive (but the incumbent 
has the ability to deter 
competition) 
Yes, but access policies are 
needed to sustain competition 
Access regulation 
Competitive (the incumbent 
does not have the ability to deter 
competition) 
Yes. No regulatory safeguards 
are needed to sustain 
competition  
No regulation 
 
To distinguish among these three types of markets, the proposed model uses a 
sequential rationale that is depicted in figure 12.1 (Defilippi and Flor, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 12.1: Rationale to Determine Regulatory Option 
 
At first, the regulator asks itself if the market of a certain service is competitive (or 
potentially competitive) or not. If it is not competitive, price regulation is needed. If 
the market is indeed competitive (or potentially competitive), the regulator should ask 
itself if it corresponds to an Essential Service or not. If it does not, the service should 
not be regulated. But, if the market corresponds to an Essential Service, access can be 
granted through negotiation or auction. If the number of providers is not limited, 
negotiation may proceed. Otherwise, an auction must be called. This process has to be 
repeated for each service. 
 
The operation of the model can be exemplified using the Matarani port as an example. 
As previously mentioned, this is a common-user port located in southern Peru. Its 
only terminal handles most types of cargo: dry bulk (grains and minerals), liquid bulk 
(sulfuric acid), break bulk and containerized cargo. Moreover, this terminal 
constitutes a natural monopoly for users located in southern Peru (Tamayo, Paredes 
and Flor, 1999). 
 
Matarani port terminal was concessioned in 1999 to Romero group, one of the largest 
business conglomerates in Peru, with interests in several sectors of this economy70. 
The terminal’s concession contract allows the operator (a special-purpose company 
                                                 
70 Besides logistics, the Romero group has interests in finance, manufacturing, agribusiness, fishing and 
retailing, among others. 
Price Regulation? Access Regulation? Negoation or Auction?
Yes
Yes
Yes No
No
No
Is the market 
competitive?
Negotiation
Auction
Price Regulation
No regulation
Limitation in the 
number of 
providers?
Essential service?
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named Tisur) to charge wharfage and berthage tariffs for the use of the infrastructure, 
the exclusive right to provide mooring services and the non-exclusive right to provide 
storage services. Tariffs for wharfage, berthage and mooring are regulated, as well as 
for some storage services: liquid bulk (sulfuric acid) and dry bulk (grains and mineral 
ore). Besides operating the terminal, Romero group provides other logistics services 
through related companies with various degrees of integration: shipping, shipping 
agency services, pilotage, towage, stevedoring, and cargo agency services, among 
others. This structure corresponds to vertical integration with legal separation. Other 
non-related firms provide these services as well (Alcazar and Lovaton, 2005). It is 
important to mention that the Matarani port terminal operates in an institutional and 
regulatory framework that complies with the assumptions made in section 12.1.3. 
Table 12.2 presents the results of applying the rationale of the proposed model to the 
Matarani port terminal. One can see that the tariffs for wharfage, berthage and storage 
for liquid and dry bulk (grains and mineral ore) would still need to be regulated, since 
the terminal faces no competition in these markets (painted in green). On the other 
hand, the terminal faces competition for the provision of ancillary services such as 
bunkering, ship-store and waste collection, for which they do not require neither price 
nor access regulation (painted in yellow). One can also see that all of the remaining 
services have two common characteristics: (i) their provision is strictly necessary to 
complete the logistics chain, and; (ii) their providers require using the terminal 
facilities. These characteristics give the monopolist operating the terminal the 
incentives and the ability to try deterring competition in these markets. Therefore, 
they require to be covered by an access regime.
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Table 12.2: Appropriate Regulatory Option for Matarani  
Services provided at 
the terminal 
Is their market 
competitive? 
Essential Service? Regulatory policy 
Shipping Yes Yes Access regulation 
Pilotage Yes Yes Access regulation 
Towage Yes Yes Access regulation 
Mooring Yes Yes Access regulation 
Wharfage No Yes Price regulation 
Berthage No Yes Price regulation 
Stevedoring  Yes  Yes  Access regulation 
Storage for:       
Containerized cargo(*) Yes Yes Access regulation 
Dry bulk (grains) No Yes Price regulation 
Dry bulk (mineral ore) No Yes Price regulation 
Break bulk(*) Yes Yes Access regulation 
Liquid bulk No Yes Access regulation 
Ancillary services:       
Bunkering Yes No No regulation 
Ship-store Yes No No regulation 
Waste collection Yes No No regulation 
Ship repair Yes Yes Access regulation 
 (*) Storage for containerized cargo and break bulk can be provided by warehouses located outside the 
port. Access is required for trucks carrying the cargo to and from the terminal. 
12.3 Analysis71  
In this section, game theory will be used to analyze the access strategies of the 
terminal operator (the incumbent) and a potential entrant. This analysis will serve to 
assess the consequences of implementing the proposed access model on the 
contestability and efficiency of Essential Services’ markets. 
Two further assumptions need to be made: 
a. Both price and non-price access terms will be determined through negotiation. 
b. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the regulator can enact a mandate 
setting both price and non-price access terms. Neither party can foresee the 
terms of the mandate, thus creating incentives for them to reach a “Nash 
equilibrium”72. 
                                                
71 This section is based on Flor and Defilippi (2003)
72 A “Nash equilibrium” is a situation in which neither party has incentives to change their strategies 
(Vega Redondo, 2000).  
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Figure 12.2 shows the possible outcomes of the interaction between incumbent and a 
potential entrant in the market of any Essential Service.  
 
 
Figure 12.2: Possible interactions between incumbent and an entrant  
 
Table 12.summarizes the results of these interactions. 
 
Table 12.3: Interactions between Incumbent and Potential Entrant 
Outcome Situation Result 
Profits 
(incumbent, 
challenger) 
a Competitive market Market returns (r, r) 
b Challenger monopolizes the market Monopolistic rents for challenger (0, r+) 
c Contestable market Market returns (r, 0) 
d Incumbent monopolizes the market Monopolistic rents for incumbent (r+, 0) 
e Competitive market Market returns (r, r) 
f Price war Returns below market levels (r-, r-) 
g Contestable market Market returns (r, 0) 
h Incumbent monopolizes the market Monopolistic rents for incumbent (r+, 0) 
 
Where:  
r market returns 
r+ Returns above market  
r- Returns below market  
 
Before the proposed access model is implemented, the incumbent is the exclusive 
supplier of the essential service. The incumbent can assume an active or passive 
attitude. Once the regime has been implemented, potential entrants may decide 
whether to enter the market or not, regardless of the attitude of the incumbent.  
a b c d e f g h
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Since the incumbent is vertically integrated, it can grant access to third parties on fair 
terms or try to discriminate in favor of its related firm. In the first case, the parties 
may easily reach an agreement. In the second case, the incumbent risks the regulator 
mandating access in terms that are less convenient than those that could be obtained 
through negotiation. In addition, it faces the possibility of being fined for denying or 
delaying access unrightfully.  
It can be seen that the incentives created by the access regime make the markets for 
essential services potentially more competitive than before. Indeed, as a result of the 
interaction between incumbent and entrant, eight different outcomes can be reached, 
out of which five result in a competitive market (a, c, e, f and g, shaded in yellow).  
However, only four of them constitute a “Nash equilibrium” (Vega Redondo, 2000).  
But as a result of a price war (outcome f), both parties would be obtaining below-
market returns, for which it is likely that they will continue playing until one of them 
is driven out of the market or a competitive equilibrium (r, r) is reached. 
It is important to mention that in the absence of entry barriers, it is unlikely that a 
price war would result in a predatory situation (Tarzijan and Paredes, 2001). Even if 
the incumbent could temporarily reduce the price of a service below its cost, it would 
probably be unable to recover its losses after expelling competitors because a later 
increase in prices would encourage the entry of new ones (or reentry of the firms that 
had left the market).   
An interesting result of the implementation of the proposed model is that the increase 
in contestability may generate a situation in which a service is provided by just one 
supplier, but at competitive prices (c and g). This outcome is produced by the 
difficulty of increasing margins caused by the threat of new entrants, which 
disciplines the provider and produces competitive profits.  
The outcomes b, d and h will lead to either party obtaining returns above market 
levels.  In the absence of entry barriers, the most likely outcome is that these returns 
will attract more competitors to the market, which will interact until a competitive 
equilibrium is reached. Only then neither player would have incentives to change their 
strategies. 
It is also worth mentioning that the possibility of collusion between the incumbent 
and competitor is also present. But such arrangements are very hard to enforce in 
absence of entry barriers, for which such outcome is unlikely to occur (Ivaldi et al., 
2003). 
From this analysis, the following can be concluded:
a. The implementation of the proposed  access regime is likely to reduce entry 
barriers, increase contestability and introduce competition in markets for port 
services.  Five out of eight possible outcomes are clearly competitive, and the 
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above-the-market returns obtained in the remaining three are expected to 
attract competitors until the rents disappear.   
b. The strengths of the proposed regime are that it makes markets more 
contestable, has low transaction costs and reduces the cost of regulation. By 
implementing the rule that the regulator intervenes only when a market 
solution is not attainable, the regime avoids unwarranted regulation. In 
countries with history of discretional regulatory policies, this rule may 
encourage private investment in port infrastructure. 
c. The model has three important weaknesses: 
• The presence of multiple operators may increase coordination costs, 
especially in small ports.  
• The procedures required to implement the proposed access regime may be 
lengthy, which may increase transaction costs and thus, reduce the 
potential benefits of implementing the regime.   
• It requires the regulator to be credible. In developing countries this 
requirement is related to the prevailing political environment and may 
make the proposed regime difficult to implement.  
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13. Conclusions  
Although usually located far from main maritime routes and poorly endowed with 
transport infrastructure, developing countries urgently need to increase trade to 
provide jobs and improve the living conditions of their populations. Despite problems 
caused by mismanaged privatization processes and learning costs, an increasing 
number of governments are concessioning their infrastructure to be operated by the 
private sector, so they can concentrate their efforts and scarce funds in other fields, 
such as education and health.  
However, due to the economic characteristics of port operations (economies of scale, 
scope and density, and lumpy investments) some port terminals constitute natural 
monopolies for carriers and shippers located in their hinterlands (Flor and Defilippi, 
2003). Unfortunately, regulation of monopolies is still an unknown discipline in the 
port sector. Initially developed to deal with monopolies in network industries such as 
telecommunications and electricity supply, its adaptation to transport has been 
limited. Indeed, the only one known to have established port regulators are Australia, 
Colombia and Peru. The further development of the discipline would allow 
governments to involve the private sector in the operation and construction of 
monopolistic terminals without the fear of harming carriers and shippers. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the characteristics of access policies 
implemented in the telecommunications, electricity supply, natural gas and railways 
industries, and to use the lessons learned from these experiences to propose a model 
suitable for the port industry.  
The problem of access arises in industries where inputs from monopolistic and 
competitive markets are complementarily needed to provide a service, or in the case 
of ports, to complete the logistics chain. In these circumstances, the firm controlling 
the monopolistic segment has incentives to deter competition in the competitive 
segments (markets) to recover profits foregone by regulation (Paredes, 1997). To 
avoid such situations from occurring, governments have two options. They can either 
(i) forbid integration between terminal operators and providers of port services or, (ii) 
establish a framework under which all service providers are allowed to access and use 
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the terminal under similar conditions. As suggested by Vickers (1995), the first option 
(vertical separation) may create non-trivial transaction costs that result in higher 
prices for the consumers, for which the second option (the implementation of access 
policies) constitutes a more desirable policy.  
This research analyzes access policies implemented in the network industries of three 
countries: UK, US and Australia. These countries were chosen because they have 
approached the access problem from different perspectives, and because they are 
considered best practice cases among regulation practitioners (ADB, 2000). The UK
was the first developed country that carried out a comprehensive privatization 
program, which required formulating access policies without the benefit of previous 
experiences. As seen in the previous chapters, this lack of experience led UK
regulators to underestimate the monopolists’ ability to deter competition despite the 
implementation of open access policies. The US, on the other hand, has a long 
tradition of encouraging competition and allowing the private supply of public 
services. In this country, the reform of network industries focused more in 
restructuring than in changing the nature of their ownership. The Australian strategy, 
on the other hand, consisted on implementing the National Access Regime whose 
provisions cover all relevant infrastructures (regardless of the nature of their 
ownership and the industry they belong). 
Part I 
Chapter 2 presented the basic elements of regulation theory: monopoly pricing, 
regulation rationale and regulatory failures. It also introduced the five basic dilemmas 
a regulator faces when addressing the problems caused by the existence of 
monopolies. The first one is that in the presence of sub-additive costs, productive 
efficiency is achieved by having only one firm supplying the market; but the 
consequent lack of competition will cause allocative inefficiency instead. The second 
dilemma is that although the use of Ramsey prices may assure economic efficiency, 
these are not necessarily subsidy-free, sustainable or socially equitable.  The third 
dilemma a regulator faces is between using auctions that generate ex ante competition 
but introduce contractual rigidities, or a more flexible regulation that may better 
address unexpected problems but also generates higher social costs. The fourth 
dilemma is created by the information asymmetry between the regulator and the 
regulated firm. The regulator may encourage the regulated firm to reveal its costs, but 
to do so it will need to offer an economic incentive that generates an informational 
rent. Finally, the regulator must choose between using rate-of-return and RPI-X as 
pricing methodologies. Both work well under certain circumstances but may cause 
undesired effects and social costs if the choice is wrong. 
Chapter 3 discussed various topics related to the problem of introducing competition 
in naturally monopolistic industries: the convenience of vertical separation, access 
pricing and the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD). This chapter showed that although 
vertical separation facilitates regulation, it may cause diseconomies of scope or 
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coordination. It also discussed the diverse methodologies of access pricing and the 
problems found when implementing them. Finally, this chapter analyzed the EFD from 
an economic point of view and explained its role in the Australian National Access 
Regime. It showed that the application of the EFD can be seen as a trade-off between 
static and dynamic economic efficiency. On one hand, is desirable to limit the 
incumbent’s property rights to avoid the loss of welfare caused by the reduction of 
competition in at least one market. On the other hand, this limitation on property 
rights also reduces the incumbent’s incentives to invest, innovate and improve the 
coverage of infrastructure.   
Chapter 4 analyzed the evidence on the effects of privatization processes around the 
world. It started by discussing the reasons argued by governments to embark on 
privatization programs and the extension of these programs in the world. It also 
reviewed diverse assessments on efficiency, tariffs and welfare, concluding that the 
majority support the idea that privatization had brought net positive effects to the 
implementing countries. Finally, the chapter reviews privatization assessments in the 
port industry. Chapter 4 concluded that that successful processes are those 
complemented by sound regulatory policies, thus supporting the idea that better 
regulatory policies are needed to deal with monopolies in the port industry. 
Chapter 5 provided an overview of the basics of port economics, discussed the main 
drivers for port reform around the world, and illustrated the processes undertaken in 
three developing countries. Its aim was to demonstrate that privatization could be 
counterproductive in countries where ports are naturally monopolistic unless an 
access regime is implemented. It also discusses the main characteristics that such 
access regime should have and that will serve as guidelines to analyze access regimes 
in network industries.  
Part II 
Part I showed the complexities involved in formulating access policies. Fortunately, 
regulators in network industries have already decided over these issues. The main 
features of these access regimes and the lessons learned from their implementation 
provide valuable inputs for the design of access policies for the port industry. The aim 
of part II is to summarize these lessons and use them to propose an access regime for 
naturally monopolistic port terminals. 
This part starts with chapter 6, which described the economic characteristics of 
network industries and their relationship with diverse market structures. The 
discussion focused on the main economic characteristics of network industries 
(externalities and complementarities; economies of scale, scope and density; 
compatibility and standards) and how they may lead to market structures that do not 
necessarily result from lack of competition or anti-competitive practices.   
Chapters 7 to 10 analyzed the access regimes implemented in telecommunications, 
electricity, natural gas and rail industries. To facilitate comparisons, they followed the 
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same structure. With the aim of contextualizing the analysis, the economic 
characteristics of the industry and its reform trends were first presented. This was 
followed by a discussion on the access arrangements typically implemented in the 
industry; and a study of the UK, US and Australian cases. Each chapter concluded with 
a section summarizing the lessons that can be drawn for designing an access regime 
for naturally monopolistic port terminals.  
Part III 
The aim of part III was to propose an access model for naturally monopolistic port 
terminals using as inputs the lessons drawn from analyzing access regimes 
implemented in network industries. Chapter 11 aimed at drawing lessons from 
network industries in order to propose an access regime for naturally monopolistic 
port terminals. It started by discussing the similarities between the economic 
characteristics of ports and the analyzed industries. The second section presented the 
lessons learned from implementing access policies in network industries, while the 
last section used these lessons to propose a model of access regime for the port 
industry.  
The lessons learned from implementing access policies in network industries are 
shown in the following box: 
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Lessons Learned from Implementing Access Policies in Network Industries 
Vertical structure 
1. The decision regarding the vertical structure of an industry has to be the consequence of 
a realistic estimation of the potential for competition in a particular market. As 
experience shows, the cost for consumers of allowing integration when separation is 
needed, is high.  
2. Despite the many criticisms, integration constitutes a workable option to organize an 
industry where monopolistic and non-monopolistic segments coexist. However, 
experience shows that even in cases where a single operator is allowed to provide 
several services some form of separation might be needed.  
3. Vertical separation seems to be necessary when there is the need to create a new 
market. Indeed, the main goal of the reforms carried out in the industries of electricity 
supply and natural gas was to create a market for these commodities, regulating only the 
monopolistic segments. But in both industries, the creation of markets necessarily 
requires separating the provision of monopolistic from non-monopolistic services. 
4. As the experiences of the telecommunications and the railways industries show, the 
creation of an access regime is not enough to ensure entry to non-monopolistic markets, 
regardless the vertical structure of the industry. 
Access pricing 
5. There is a strong relationship between the option to set access charges (regulation or 
negotiation) and the methodology to determine them (cost-based or price caps). In 
countries and industries where negotiation is encouraged (telecommunications in US and 
Australia, for example), the tendency is to use a cost-based methodology. In industries 
where vertical separation is mandated, the tendency is toward the regulator using price 
caps to set access charges. 
6. The use of negotiable reference tariffs may discourage negotiation, as the experience of 
the Australian natural gas industry indicates.  
Non-price access terms 
7. The mechanism to set non-price access terms tends to be the same as for setting access 
charges, but not necessarily.  
8. Under an access regime that favors setting non-price access terms through negotiation, 
at least some of the non-price access terms can be set outright, thus reducing the scope 
for negotiation and shortening the process.  
9. Under an access regime that favors setting non-price access terms through regulation, at 
least some terms can be left to be determined though negotiation. 
Mechanism to expand the infrastructure 
10. The decision regarding the expansion of the infrastructure in monopolistic markets 
cannot not be left to the monopolist 
11. Regulators in network industries have implemented two policies to deal with the 
problem of expanding the infrastructure:  
a. To allow an independent planner to decide when infrastructure should be 
expanded (as in US Organized Markets).  
b. To allow the asset owner to propose expansions but only approve those that are 
considered necessary (as in the electricity supply and railways industries in UK
and Australia). 
12. The use of auctions may constitute a useful tool to allocate installed capacity, but it 
does not provide adequate incentives to expand the infrastructure. For this reason, 
auctions should be used together with other incentives that penalize the incumbent for 
not expanding the infrastructure. 
According to these lessons an ideal access regime for naturally monopolistic terminal 
should have the following characteristics: 
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1. Port terminals are similar to telecommunications networks in the sense that 
both support several markets. Moreover, in these industries separation was the 
consequence of a necessity, since the newly created markets for these 
commodities could not work without separating the monopolistic segments 
from the competitive ones.  
Another argument to be taken into account is that one of the main trends in the 
transport industry (not only in ports) is toward competition among integrated 
logistics chains (ADB, 2000). Ports (and terminals) constitute the most 
important link (node) in competing supply chains (Haralambides, 2007). 
Under these considerations, integration is the most recommendable option of 
vertical structure for naturally monopolistic port terminals.  
2. Since integration is the most recommendable option of vertical structure for 
naturally monopolistic port terminals, negotiation constitutes the most 
recommendable option to determine price and non-price terms. In these 
circumstances, the regulator should only intervene when parties do not reach 
an agreement.  
For the same reasons, a cost-based methodology should be used to determine 
access charges. However, as the experience of the Australian natural gas 
industry indicates, port regulators should refrain from establishing reference 
tariffs that would prevail in case of a dispute. Experience shows that this 
arrangement has discouraged negotiation and led to de facto regulation 
(Productivity Commission, 2004). 
3. The analysis shows that regulators in network industries have implemented 
two policies to deal with the problem of expanding the infrastructure. 
However, none of these options seem better than simply indicating the 
maximum congestion level a terminal can stand. In this case, congestion acts 
as “trigger”: once the maximum level is reached, the operator has to expand 
the terminal. For these reasons, the most recommendable mechanism to 
determine when to require the incumbent to expand the terminal’s 
infrastructure is the use of “triggers”. 
Chapter 12 proposed an access regime to regulate naturally monopolistic port 
terminals using the lessons learned from network industries. The main objective of the 
proposed access model is to allow competition to occur in markets that otherwise 
would need to be price-regulated.  
The model has the following assumptions: 
a. The port has a single terminal handling liquid bulk, dry bulk, break-bulk and 
containerized cargo. 
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b. The terminal constitutes a natural monopoly for all cargo originated in or 
destined to its hinterland. 
c. The terminal operator:  
• Is a private firm.  
• As the only user of the port’s infrastructure, it is in charge of 
maintaining and expanding it. 
• Has the right to collect wharfage (to cargo) and berthage (to vessels) to 
pay for maintaining and expanding the infrastructure. 
d. The port authority has normative and regulatory duties regarding traffic, safety 
and security issues.  
e. Port services (stevedoring, warehousing, pilotage, towage, mooring, etc.) can 
be provided by the terminal operator, a related company or competing firms. 
There are no sizeable entry barriers. 
f. Cargo is handled using equipment that is not fixed to the infrastructure: mobile 
cranes and conveyor belts, forklifts, tipper trucks, yard trucks, loading shovels, 
and the ship’s own equipment. Containers are shipped in geared vessels. 
The model borrows two important characteristics of the Australian National Access 
Regime: the use of the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) and the declaration of 
“Essential Services”. In the port industry, “Essential Services” are only those that are 
needed to complete the logistics chain: pilotage, towage, mooring, stevedoring, etc. 
These are the services that a regulated monopolist would try to monopolize to recover 
profits foregone by regulation.  
Game theory was used to analyze the access strategies of the terminal operator (the 
incumbent) and a potential entrant. From this analysis, the following can be 
concluded: 
a. The implementation of the proposed access regime is likely to reduce entry 
barriers, increase contestability and introduce competition in markets for port 
services.  Five out of eight possible outcomes are clearly competitive, and the 
above-the-market returns obtained in the remaining three are expected to 
attract competitors until the rents disappear.   
b. The strengths of the proposed regime are that it makes markets more 
contestable, has low transaction costs and reduces the cost of regulation. By 
implementing the rule that the regulator intervenes only when a market 
solution is not attainable, the regime avoids unwarranted regulation. In 
countries with history of discretional regulatory policies, this rule may 
encourage private investment in port infrastructure. 
256
c. The model has three important weaknesses: 
• The presence of multiple operators may increase coordination costs, 
especially in small ports.  
• The procedures required to implement the proposed access regime may be 
lengthy, which may increase transaction costs and thus, reduce the 
potential benefits of implementing the regime.   
• It requires the regulator to be credible. In developing countries this 
requirement is related to the prevailing political environment and may 
make the proposed regime difficult to implement.   
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Summary 
The problem of access arises in industries where inputs from monopolistic and 
competitive markets are complementarily needed to provide a service. In these 
circumstances, the firm controlling the monopolistic segment has incentives to deter 
competition in the competitive segments (markets) to recover profits foregone by 
regulation (Paredes, 1997). In the port industry, for example, a number of services 
need to be provided to complete the logistics chain: pilotage, towage, stevedoring, 
storage, etc. Without any of these, cargo cannot be delivered. In ports where a 
terminal constitute a natural monopoly, an integrated terminal operator73 has 
incentives to deter competition in the markets of services that are necessary to 
complete the logistics chain, since this would allow him to charge disproportionate 
prices and recover monopolistic rents. This strategy can be implemented by 
preferential treatment to itself or sister companies, or by restricting competitors access 
to the terminal. 
To avoid the situations from occurring, regulators have two options. They can either 
(i) forbid integration between terminal operators and carriers or, (ii) establish a 
framework under which all service providers are allowed to access and use the 
terminal under reasonable conditions. As suggested by Vickers (1995), the first option 
(vertical separation) may create non-trivial transaction costs that result in higher 
prices for the consumers, for which the second option (the implementation of access 
policies) constitutes a more desirable policy. However, formulating access policies is 
not an easy task. If access conditions are too high, a limited number of entrants will 
use the terminal, allowing providers to obtain economic rents. If conditions are too 
relaxed, an excess of entry may occur, thus reducing the terminal operator’s 
incentives to adequately maintain and expand the infrastructure (Laffont and Tirole 
1994).  
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the characteristics of access policies 
implemented in the telecommunications, electricity supply, natural gas and railways 
                                                
73 A terminal operator that also provides shipping or logistics services (by itself or through related 
companies). 
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industries, and to use the lessons learned from these experiences to propose a model 
suitable for the port industry.  
This research analyzes access policies implemented in the network industries of three 
countries: UK, US and Australia. These countries were chosen because they have 
approached the access problem from different perspectives, and because they are 
considered best practice cases among regulation practitioners (ADB, 2000).  
The lessons learned from implementing access policies in network industries are the 
following: 
Vertical structure 
1. The decision regarding the vertical structure of an industry has to be the 
consequence of a realistic estimation of the potential for competition in a 
particular market. As experience shows, the cost for consumers of 
allowing integration when separation is needed, is high.  
2. Despite the many criticisms, integration constitutes a workable option to 
organize an industry where monopolistic and non-monopolistic segments 
coexist. However, experience shows that even in cases where a single 
operator is allowed to provide several services some form of separation 
might be needed.  
3. Vertical separation seems to be necessary when there is the need to 
create a new market. Indeed, the main goal of the reforms carried out in 
the industries of electricity supply and natural gas was to create a market 
for these commodities, regulating only the monopolistic segments. But in 
both industries, the creation of markets necessarily requires separating 
the provision of monopolistic from non-monopolistic services. 
4. As the experiences of the telecommunications and the railways industries 
show, the creation of an access regime is not enough to ensure entry to 
non-monopolistic markets, regardless the vertical structure of the 
industry.  
Access pricing 
5. There is a strong relationship between the option to set access charges 
(regulation or negotiation) and the methodology to determine them (cost-
based or price caps). In countries and industries where negotiation is 
encouraged (telecommunications in US and Australia, for example), the 
tendency is to use a cost-based methodology. In industries where vertical 
separation is mandated, the tendency is toward the regulator using price 
caps to set access charges. 
6. The use of negotiable reference tariffs may discourage negotiation, as the 
experience of the Australian natural gas industry indicates.  
Non-price access terms 
7. The mechanism to set non-price access terms tends to be the same as for 
setting access charges, but not necessarily.  
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8. Under an access regime that favors setting non-price access terms 
through negotiation, at least some of the non-price access terms can be 
set outright, thus reducing the scope for negotiation and shortening the 
process.  
9. Under an access regime that favors setting non-price access terms 
through regulation, at least some terms can be left to be determined 
though negotiation. 
Mechanism to expand the infrastructure 
10. The decision regarding the expansion of the infrastructure in 
monopolistic markets cannot be left to the monopolist 
11. Regulators in network industries have implemented two policies to deal 
with the problem of expanding the infrastructure:  
a. To allow an independent planner to decide when infrastructure 
should be expanded (as in US Organized Markets).  
b. To allow the asset owner to propose expansions but only approve 
those that are considered necessary (as in the electricity supply 
and railways industries in UK and Australia). 
12. The use of auctions may constitute a useful tool to allocate installed 
capacity, but it does not provide adequate incentives to expand the 
infrastructure. For this reason, auctions should be used together with 
other incentives that penalize the incumbent for not expanding the 
infrastructure.  
According to these lessons, an ideal access regime for naturally monopolistic terminal 
should have the following characteristics: 
1. Integration is the most recommendable option of vertical structure for 
naturally monopolistic port terminals.  
2. Negotiation constitutes the most recommendable option to determine price and 
non-price terms. In these circumstances, the regulator should only intervene 
when parties do not reach an agreement. For the same reasons, a cost-based 
methodology should be used to determine access charges.  
3. The most recommendable mechanism to determine when to require the 
incumbent to expand the terminal’s infrastructure is the use of “triggers”. 
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Samenvatting 
In industrieën waar de inbreng van monopolistische en concurrerende markten nodig 
is om een dienst aan te kunnen bieden, speelt het probleem van markttoegang. In 
dergelijke omstandigheden heeft de monopolist een duidelijk motief om concurrentie 
in de segmenten (markten) met meerdere tegenspelers te ontmoedigen teneinde de 
nadelen van regulering te beperken (Paredes, 1997). Zo zijn in de havenindustrie 
verschillende diensten tezamen nodig om een volledige logistieke keten te realiseren: 
loodswezen, sleepdiensten, stuwadoors, opslag, enzovoorts. Als één van deze diensten 
ontbreekt, dan kunnen goederen niet worden afgeleverd. In havens met een natuurlijk 
monopolie voor de terminal heeft een geïntegreerde terminalbeheerder een duidelijk 
motief om concurrentie op het gebied van deze voor de logistieke keten noodzakelijke 
diensten te ontmoedigen. Op deze manier kan de beheerder disproportionele prijzen 
rekenen en de economische marge naar zich toetrekken. Een dergelijke strategie kan 
worden gerealiseerd in de vorm van een voorkeursbehandeling voor de eigen of 
zusterondernemingen, of door de toegang van concurrenten tot de terminal te 
beperken. 
Regelgevers hebben twee mogelijkheden om dergelijke situaties te voorkomen. Ze 
kunnen de integratie tussen terminalbeheerders en rederijen verbieden of een 
raamwerk vaststellen voor de toegang tot en het gebruik van de terminal onder 
redelijke voorwaarden. Zoals voorgesteld door Vickers (1995), kan de eerste optie 
(verticale scheiding) leiden tot niet-triviale transactiekosten die resulteren in een 
hogere prijs voor de consument. De tweede optie, het invoeren van een 
toegangsregime, is daarom een aantrekkelijker beleid. Het is echter niet eenvoudig om 
een dergelijk toegangsregime te formuleren. Indien de toetredingsbarrieres to hoog 
zijn, zal slechts een beperkt aantal toetreders de terminal gebruiken en kan de 
aanbieder economische marges naar zich toetrekken. Zijn de voorwaarden 
daarentegen te gemakkelijk gesteld, dan kan er te groot aantal gebruikers van de 
terminal gebruik willen gaan maken. In dat geval is er voor de beheerder van de 
terminal onvoldoende stimulans om de infrastructuur te onderhouden en uit te breiden 
(Laffont en Tirole, 1994). 
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Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de eigenschappen van toegangsregimes, zoals deze 
in de telecommunicatie-, electriciteits-, aardgas- en spoorwegindustrieën zijn 
ingevoerd, te analyseren en om de lessen uit deze industrieën te gebruiken teneinde 
een theoretisch model te ontwikkelen dat geschikt is voor de havenindustrie. 
In dit onderzoek worden toegangsregimes die zijn ingevoerd in de netwerkindustrieën 
van drie landen (Verenigd Koninkrijk, Verenigde Staten van Amerika en Australië) 
onderzocht. Deze landen zijn geselecteerd omdat deze de toegangsregimes vanuit 
verschillende perspectieven hebben benaderd en omdat zij door regelgevingexperts 
als de beste praktijkvoorbeelden worden gezien (ADB, 2000). 
Op basis van deze ervaringen komen we tot de volgende aanbevelingen voor een 
ideaal toegangsregime voor een haventerminal met een natuurlijk monopolie: 
1. Integratie is de meest aan te bevelen keuze voor de verticale structuur voor 
een haventerminal met een natuurlijk monopolie. 
2. Prijzen en andere condities kunnen het beste door middel van 
onderhandelingen tot stand komen. In dergelijke omstandigheden dient de 
regelgever alleen tussenbeide te komen indien de partijen niet tot 
overeenstemming kunnen komen. Om dezelfde reden dient een op kosten 
gebaseerde methodologie voor het bepalen van de toegangsprijzen te worden 
gebruikt. 
3. Als mechanisme om de gevestigde partij aan te zetten tot het uitbreiden van de 
terminalinfrastructuur stellen wij het gebruik van zogenaamde triggers voor. 
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Resumen  
El problema del acceso surge en industrias en las que la producción de un bien o 
servicios requiere complementariamente insumos producidos en mercados 
competitivos y monopólicos. En estas circunstancias, la firma que controla el 
segmento monopólico tiene incentivos para limitar la competencia en los mercados 
conexos con el fin de recuperar las rentas perdidas como consecuencia de la 
regulación. En la industria portuaria, diversos servicios son necesarios para completar 
la cadena logística: practicaje, remolcaje, estiba, almacenamiento, etc. En puertos en 
los que un terminal constituye un monopolio natural, un operador integrado tiene 
incentivos para limitar la competencia en los mercados mencionados, ya que ello le 
permitiría cobrar precios desproporcionadamente altos y recuperar las rentas 
monopólicas que la regulación le impide obtener.  
Para impedir la aparición de situaciones como las descritas, los reguladores tienen dos 
opciones: (i) impedir la integración entre operadores de terminales y prestadores de 
servicios logísticos o, (ii) establecer un marco en el cual todos los prestadores de 
servicios logísticos pueden acceder a las instalaciones del terminal bajo condiciones 
razonables. Como sugiere Vickers (1995), la primera opción (separación vertical) 
tiene el potencial de crear costos de transacción que pueden resultar en mayores 
costos para los usuarios, por lo cual la segunda opción (la implementación de políticas 
de acceso) constituye una política deseable. Sin embargo, la formulación de políticas 
de acceso no es una tarea fácil. Si las condiciones de acceso son demasiado exigentes, 
sólo ingresará al mercado un número limitado de firmas, permitiendo a las empresas 
existentes obtener rentas económicas. Si las condiciones son muy laxas, ocurrirá un 
exceso de entrada que reducirá los incentivos del operador del terminal a mantener y 
expandir la infraestructura (Laffont y Tirole, 1994). 
El objetivo de esta tesis es el de analizar las características de los regímenes de acceso 
implementados en las industrias de telecomunicaciones, electricidad, gas natural, y 
ferrocarriles, y utilizar las lecciones aprendidas de estas experiencias para proponer un 
régimen de acceso para la industria portuaria.  
Las lecciones aprendidas son las siguientes: 
Estructura vertical 
1. Las decisiones sobre la estructura vertical de la industria deben ser 
consecuencia de una estimación realista del potencial de surgimiento de 
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competencia. Como lo demuestra la experiencia de la industria de gas natural 
del Reino Unido, el costo para los consumidores de permitir la integración 
cuando la separación es necesaria, es muy alto.  
2. La segunda lección es que a pesar de las múltiples críticas, la integración 
vertical constituye una opción válida para organizar industrias caracterizadas 
por requerir insumos de mercados competitivos y monopólicos. La experiencia 
indica que el costo de estas políticas no es muy alto, o que éste es compensado 
por una operación más transparente o por una mejor regulación. 
3. La separación parece ser necesaria cuando existe la necesidad de crear un 
mercado, como los de gas y electricidad, que requiere necesariamente la 
separación de las actividades monopolísticas de las competitivas. 
4. Tal como lo demuestran las experiencias de las industrias de 
telecomunicaciones y ferrocarriles, la implementación de un régimen de 
acceso no garantiza la entrada a los segmentos competitivos.  
Cargos de acceso 
5. Existe una fuerte relación entre la opción para fijar cargos de acceso 
(regulación o negociación) y la metodología para determinarlos (basados en 
costos o precios tope). En países e industrias en donde se incentiva la 
negociación, la tendencia es a utilizar metodologías basadas en costos. En 
industrias en donde la separación vertical es obligatoria, la tendencia es que el 
regulador fije los cargos de acceso usando precios tope. 
6. El uso de tarifas referenciales negociables que prevalezcan en caso de disputa 
desincentiva la negociación y lleva a una regulación de facto basada en costos. 
Condiciones de acceso 
7. Si bien las condiciones de acceso pueden ser determinadas usando el mismo 
mecanismo que para fijar el cargo, ello no tiene que ser necesariamente así. En 
la industria australiana de telecomunicaciones, por ejemplo, aunque los cargos 
de acceso son negociados, las principales condiciones del mismo están 
reguladas. 
8. En regímenes que favorecen el uso de negociación para determinar las 
condiciones de acceso, al menos algunas de ellas pueden ser fijadas desde un 
principio, lo que reduce el ámbito de la negociación y acorta el proceso. 
9. En regímenes que favorecen el uso de regulación para determinar las 
condiciones de acceso, la práctica indica que algunos términos pueden ser 
sujetos de negociación entre las partes. 
Mecanismo para ampliar la infraestructura 
10. La decisión de expandir la infraestructura no puede ser dejada en manos del 
monopolista. Sólo en las industrias en las que los operadores de la 
infraestructura enfrentan una competencia efectiva, éstos tienen la libertad de 
expandirla de acuerdo con los incentivos proporcionados por el mercado.  
11. Los reguladores de las industrias de red implementan dos políticas para 
enfrentar el problema de la expansión de la infraestructura, ambos con 
importantes desventajas: 
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a. Permitir que la decisión sea tomada por un planificador independiente, 
como en “mercados organizados” de la industria eléctrica estadounidense.  
b. Permitir que el operador de la infraestructura proponga las expansiones, 
pero sólo aprobar las que el regulador considera necesarias, como  en las 
industrias de electricidad y ferrocarriles del Reino Unido y Australia. 
12. El uso de subastas constituye una herramienta útil para asignar capacidad 
existente, pero no provee incentivos adecuados para expandir la 
infraestructura. Más aún, puede constituir un incentivo perverso, ya que el 
monto a recibir es mayor cuanto más aguda sea la escasez de infraestructura. 
Por ello, las subastas deben ser usadas conjuntamente con otras medidas que 
penalicen al monopolista por no llevar a cabo las expansiones necesarias.  
De acuerdo con estas lecciones,un régimen de acceso ideal para terminales portuarios 
naturalmente monopólicos debería poseer las siguiente características: 
1. La integración es la opción de estructura vertical más recomendable para 
terminales portuarios con características de monopolio natural.  
2. La negociación constituye el mecanismo más recomendable para determinar 
cargos y condiciones de acceso. En estas circunstancias, el regulador sólo debe 
intervenir cuando las partes no alcanzan un acuerdo. Por las mismas razones, 
deberían usarse metodologías basadas en costos para determinar cargos de 
acceso.  
3. El mecanismo más recomendable para determinar cuándo debe ser obligatorio 
para un operador expandir un terminal es el uso de triggers 
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l)ACCESS REGULATION FOR NATURALLY MONOPOLISTIC PORT TERMINALS
LESSONS FROM REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES
The access problem arises in industries where services are produced using inputs from
both monopolistic and competitive markets. In the port industry, a number of services
need to be jointly provided to complete the logistics chain: pilotage, towage, stevedoring,
storage, etc. In ports where a terminal constitutes a natural monopoly, an integrated
operator has incentives to deter competition from providers of the competitive services. To
avoid such situations from occurring, regulators have two options: forbidding integration
or implementing access policies under which all service providers are allowed to use the
terminal under reasonable conditions. The first option may create non-trivial transaction
costs that result in higher prices for the consumers, for which the second option
constitutes a more desirable policy. 
Unfortunately, formulating access policies is not an easy task. If conditions are too
high, a limited number of firms will enter the market, allowing existing ones to obtain
economic rents. If conditions are too relaxed, an excess of entry may occur, thus reducing
the operator’s incentives to adequately maintain and expand the terminal. This may
produce dear consequences in developing countries, where there is urgency for updating
and expanding port infrastructure. 
The objective of this thesis is to propose a model to deal with the access problem in the
port industry using as inputs the lessons learned in the telecommunications, electricity,
natural gas and railways industries.
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